dissenting.
Because the anti-SLAPP statute, OCGA § 9-11-11.1, requires verification for “any claim” “arising from an act” that “could reasonably be construed as an act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances,” it covers all actions that William Douglas Denton undertook in compiling the report of illegal activities that he submitted to government officials, including taking the photographs used in the report. The majority opinion misconstrues the plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute to exclude acts taken in furtherance of First Amendment rights, and I therefore respectfully dissent.
1. According to Appellees Browns Mill Development Company, Inc. and Peach State Development Group, Inc. (collectively “the Developers”), Denton could not have taken the photographs used in his report without trespassing onto their property. Denton denied having trespassed in his answer. Assuming the Developers’ allegations are true, however, the question before the Court is whether Denton’s walking on the Developers’ property without consent to take pictures for the report was an act that furthered, or reasonably could be construed as furthering, Denton’s exercise of his free speech and petition rights and, thus, required the Developers to verify their trespass claim. Under the plain language of the statute, Denton’s *8acts furthered the exercise of his free speech and petition rights, and the trespass claim should have been verified.
The anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation”) statute is broad: it requires verification for “any claim” that arises from an act that “could reasonably be construed as an act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition the government... in connection with an issue of public interest or concern.”3 The word “furtherance” in this context means “promotion” or “advancement.”4 The plain language of the statute applies the verification requirements to all acts that constitute acts of free speech and petitioning the government as well as any acts that are taken to promote or advance acts of free speech and petitioning. The statute covers both verbal and non-verbal acts.
Section (c) of the statute, which identifies certain acts that are statutorily-privileged,5 supports the statute’s broad application. It provides that an “ ‘act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a redress . . .’ includes any oral or written statement, writing, or petition.”6 This Court has held that the legislature’s use of the word “include” does not limit the statute’s application to those items specifically listed,7 which is consistent with the ordinary and everyday meaning of the word “include.”8 The majority misinterprets the anti-SLAPP statute to cover only “acts of communication” of the kind identified in section (c). Reading the word “includes” according to its plain meaning, however, the antiSLAPP statute covers, but is not limited to, the acts of speaking and writing identified in section (c).
Indeed, limiting the anti-SLAPP statute strictly to the kinds of acts in section (c) would mean non-verbal acts such as marches,9 boycotts,10 sit-ins,11 picketing,12 and other conduct that the courts have *9found protected under the First Amendment13 would all be subject to the dangers posed by SLAPP actions. Americans have used nonverbal acts as expressions of free speech and to petition the government on some of the most important matters of public concern that we as a country have ever faced. Nothing in the text of the antiSLAPP statute suggests that the legislature intended to leave constitutionally-protected expressive speech open to SLAPP actions.
Furthermore, the language chosen by the legislature shows that it intended the anti-SLAPP statute to cover both constitutionally-protected activities and acts that are taken to further constitutionally-protected activities. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intention of the General Assembly.14 Here, the legislature expressly stated that its intent was to encourage citizens to participate in matters of public significance by exercising their constitutional rights to free speech and petition the government without the threat that Georgia’s courts could be abused to chill the exercise of these constitutional rights.15
The particular danger that concerned the legislature was that SLAPP lawsuits would be used to silence those who spoke out on matters of public concern. Plaintiffs use SLAPP actions to punish their critics for having spoken out and to create an in terrorem effect that will dissuade other would be critics from speaking out.16 The purpose of SLAPP lawsuits is not to win on the merits.17 Rather, the plaintiff’s aim is to bully the defendant into silence with litigation costs and to create delay.18 As one court characterized SLAPP actions, “[s]hort of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined.”19 To protect Georgians against these abusive tactics, the General Assembly wrote the anti-SLAPP *10statute to cover both acts of free speech and petitioning the government and acts taken to further these constitutional rights.
2. Looking at the plain language of the statute and the legislature’s intent, Denton’s act of walking on the Developers’ property can reasonably be construed as furthering the exercise of his rights to free speech and petition the government, and the Developers’ trespass claim therefore should have been verified. Denton is the founder of DeKalb Citizens for a Better Environment (“DeKalb Citizens”). Denton walked on the Developers’ property to take the photographs that he used to document violations of state and federal law. Those same photographs were part of the DeKalb Citizens report that Denton sent to federal, state, and local elected officials, representatives of federal and state regulatory bodies, and the media. Through that report, Denton and DeKalb Citizens expressed to government officials and the public their views on violations of law at various construction sites in DeKalb County, a matter of undisputable interest and concern to the public. Under these circumstances, the act of walking onto property to take pictures is sufficiently intertwined with Denton’s compiling the report to be construed reasonably as an act furthering the exercise of his constitutional rights to free speech and petition the government. Just as Denton’s report was covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, the acts Denton took to compile the report are covered. '
Any contention that trespass cannot be subject to verification because it is based on an inherently unlawful act is without merit. Labeling something “illegal” or “unlawful” does not mean it is without constitutional protection, much less that it cannot have furthered the exercise of constitutional rights and be subject to a verification requirement. The case books are full of instances when a defendant engaged in activity that was labeled unlawful but was protected from penalty by the First Amendment.20
The important point to remember is that the anti-SLAPP statute does not shield illegal activity from liability. The verification procedure is only a pleading requirement, similar to other higher pleading requirements imposed by the General Assembly. Every malpractice claim for damages against licensed professionals, both those with and without merit, must be filed with an expert affidavit, swearing *11under penalty of perjury that the acts or omissions complained of do, indeed, constitute negligence.21 The anti-SLAPP statute’s verification requirement is no different. Meritorious and meritless claims are subject to sworn verification if the acts that give rise to the claim can reasonably be construed as furthering the defendant’s exercise of his constitutional rights to free speech and petition the government, regardless of whether the acts are labeled lawful or unlawful. Properly verified, a plaintiff’s claim can proceed the same as any other civil claim.
Decided March 27, 2002. Smith, Gambrell & Russell, Stephen E. O’Day, Andrew M. Thompson, for appellants. Quirk & Quirk, Neal J. Quirk, Kevin E. Quirk, Brendan H. Parnell, for appellees. Gerald R. Weber, Jr., Robert L. Tsai, Robert S. Ukeiley, Kesler T. Roberts, H. Wayne Phears, amici curiae.Had the Developers properly verified their trespass claim, then that claim could have proceeded in the same manner as other civil claims. The Developers, however, did not file the required verification, and the trial court correctly dismissed the trespass claim.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears and Justice Hunstein join in this dissent.
OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (b) (emphasis supplied).
Webster’s Third Int’l Dictionary, 924 (1961).
OCGA § 51-5-7.
OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (c) (emphasis supplied).
Housing Auth. of City of Carrollton v. Ayers, 211 Ga. 728, 729-730 (88 SE2d 368) (1955).
Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., p. 766 (1999) (include: “[t]o contain as a part of something”); see also OCGA § 1-3-1 (b); Payne v. Twiggs Cty. Sch. Dist., 269 Ga. 361, 362 (496 SE2d 690) (1998) (except for terms of art, the Court gives all words in a statute their ordinary everyday meaning).
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (85 SC 453, 13 LE2d 471) (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (83 SC 680, 9 LE2d 697) (1963).
See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (102 SC 3409, 73 LE2d 1215) (1982).
See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (86 SC 719, 15 LE2d 637) (1966).
See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 176-177 (103 SC 1702, 75 LE2d 736) (1983) (“[t]here is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment”); Thornhill v. *9Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (60 SC 736, 84 LE 1093) (1939).
See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (94 SC 2727, 41 LE2d 842) (1974) (displaying flag upside down with peace symbol attached to it); Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58 (90 SC 1555, 26 LE2d 44) (1970) (wearing military uniform in skit protesting war); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (89 SC 733, 21 LE2d 731) (1969) (armbands); West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (63 SC 1178, 87 LE 1628) (1943) (refusal to pledge allegiance); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (51 SC 532, 75 LE 1117) (1931) (displaying red flag for Communism).
OCGA § 1-3-1 (a); see also Kemp v. City of Claxton, 269 Ga. 173, 175 (496 SE2d 712) (1998).
OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (a).
See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Mass. 1998); 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 933 n.l (N.Y. 1992); Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Supr. Ct. N.Y. 1992); see also Daniel A. Kent and Douglas M. Isenberg, New Anti-SLAPP Statute: Protecting the Right of Free Speech Against Meritless Claims, Ga. Bar J., June 1997, at 26-33 (“Kent and Isenberg”).
Lobiondo v. Schwartz, 733 A.2d 516, 531 (N.J. 1999); Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 940; see also Kent and Isenberg, at 26, 28.
See 600 West 115th St., 603 N.E.2d at 933 n.l; see also Kent and Isenberg, at 26, 28.
Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 399, 420 (109 SC 2533, 105 LE2d 342) (1989) (flag-burning); Grace, 461 U. S. at 173-176, 183-184 (leafletting and picketing); Spence, 418 U. S. at 405-406, 415 (displaying flag upside down with peace symbol attached to it); Schacht, 398 U. S. at 60-63 (wearing military uniform in skit protesting war); Brown, 383 U. S. at 135-137,141-143 (sit-ins); Cox, 379 U. S. at 538-545 (marching and demonstrating); Edwards, 372 U. S. at 230-233, 235-238 (marching and demonstrating); Thornhill, 310 U. S. at 91-92, 101-106 (picketing); Stromberg, 283 U. S. at 362, 368-370 (displaying red flag for Communism).
OCGA § 9-11-9.1.