concurring.
I agree with the opinion. As we have noted, no equitable claim is included in the relief sought by Jones. Nor is there any claim that seeks money damages against an individual. Because we have eliminated by our holdings some of the relief awarded in the trial court, I write to suggest the possibilities of additional relief (which is not here in issue), as might avail for a proper case in the future.
1. Recently we reiterated the long-standing distinction, in cases of official immunity, between ministerial and discretionary functions as to negligent acts of public officials.
Under this court’s decisions in Martin [v. Ga. Dept. of Public Safety, 257 Ga. 300 (357 SE2d 569) (1987), cert. denied 484 U. S. 998 (1988)] and Price [v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535 (361 SE2d 146) (1987)] . . . where there is a formal self-insurance plan or a policy covering official acts of a public official, sovereign immunity is waived. However, where there is no self-insurance fund, the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts is still viable in ruling on immunity for public officials for liability for their negligent acts. [Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 (392 SE2d 235) (1990).]
More important to the present discussion, however, is this observation:
It is important to keep in mind that the immunity is for negligent acts, not for malicious acts, acts of corruption, wilful acts, or acts involving reckless disregard for the safety of others. [Id. at 206-7.]
2. Just as we have held that fraud and corruption may be grounds for invalidating legislative acts,1 and that ultra vires acts of public officers are not binding upon a public agency,2 so it would *661seem, in a proper case, that fraud and corruption on the part of a public official resulting in the unlawful award of a publicly-bid contract may subject the fraudulent and corrupt official to personal liability to the same degree as the public agency.
3. That result follows upon a consideration of these two basic precepts of the law:
(a) “Public officers are the trustees and servants of the people and are at all times amenable to them.” Art. I, Sec. II, Par. I, Constitution of Georgia of 1983.
(b) “For every right there shall be a remedy. . . .” OCGA § 9-2-3.3
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Clarke, Justice Bell and Justice Hunt join in this concurrence.
E.g., Cross v. Hall County, 238 Ga. 709, 711 (235 SE2d 379) (1977):
When neighbors of rezoned property challenge the rezoning in court on its merits, it will be set aside only if fraud or corruption is shown or the rezoning power is being manifestly abused to the oppression of the neighbors. [Id. at 711.]
E.g., Earth Management, Inc. v. Heard County, 248 Ga. 442, 448 (283 SE2d 455) (1981):
We can only conclude that Heard County instituted the condemnation proceeding for the obvious purpose of preventing the land from being used as a hazardous waste facility. Such action is beyond the power conferred upon the county by law and amounts to bad faith. [Id. at 448.]
For a legislative provision imposing personal liability upon public officials for certain contract bidding irregularities, see OCGA § 50-5-79. See also Cobb County v. Wilson, 259 Ga. 685 (386 SE2d 128) (1989), concerning equitable relief:
[I]f the zoning authority refuses to comply with [the trial court’s] order to rezone, then the court has the power to punish the members of the zoning authority, in their individual capacities, for criminal contempt. Thus each member as an individual can be fined and/or jailed for contempt. [Id. at 686.]