dissenting.
The commission is established, by delegation of legislative power, to exercise the function of eminent domain. In the context of a separation of powers dispute, a proper delegation of legislative authority is accomplished only when the body to whom such authority is delegated is bound by guidelines so that its duties are merely administrative, not legislative. Thus, in this case, assuming the existence of sufficient and specific guidelines, the function of the commission would be administrative, and the fact that some of its members were from the executive branch would be of no consequence. But here no such guidelines exist. The standard set forth in OCGA § 50-16-183 (b) — that the commission shall grant approval for acquisition of public property by condemnation where reasonable, necessary and in the public interest — provides no guidelines realistically restricting its actions. None of the cases cited by the majority supports the premise that the guidelines are sufficient for this purpose. Instead of justifying its characterization of the actions of the commission as administrative, the majority has simply abandoned the long-settled rule, reiterated in an earlier opinion in this case, that delegations of the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain must be strictly construed. Department of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124, 132 (337 SE2d 327) (1985).
The effect of this departure cannot be underestimated. As pointed out by the intervenors, while most citizens are accustomed to their local legislators participating in what might be unpopular decisions as to what is “reasonable, necessary, and in the public interest,” it is unprecedented that an ad hoc commission have the power to destroy, alter, and abolish municipal park lands with no guidance whatsoever.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.