(concurring). I join in the majority’s holding that the ouil causing death statute1 is consti*268tutional and in its affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals. I agree with the majority’s finding that the statute does not codify the common law or impose strict liability. I further concur with the majority that the first two elements of the statute are: “(1) the defendant was operating his motor vehicle while he was intoxicated, (2) that he voluntarily decided to drive knowing that he had consumed alcohol and might be intoxicated . . . ,”2
However, I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s use of the term “intoxicated driving” in the third element, the causation element, to include not only the culpable condition of being intoxicated, but also the change, if any, in the particular defendant’s manner of driving.3 The majority’s definition of “intoxicated driving” is contrary to the plain language of the statute and undermines the legislative intent. To avoid this mistake, the third element should be more precisely defined as: that the operation of the vehicle by the defendant, while “under the influence, ”4 was a cause of the victim’s death.5 6Further, I *269would not require the prosecution to “establish that the particular defendant’s decision to drive while intoxicated produced a change in that driver’s operation of the vehicle that caused the death of the victim.” Ante at 258. The defendant’s manner of driving, and any change in that manner attributable to the defendant’s intoxicated state, is not an element of the statute. Rather, I would find that the causation element requires the people to prove that the death resulted from the defendant’s commission of the culpable act prohibited by the statute, which occurs when “a person becomes intoxicated and then decides to drive,” and actually does so. Id. at 245.
A
The relevant parts of the statute, which established the third element, provided:
A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles . . . within this state, under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or a fine of not less than $2,500.00 or more than $10,000.00, or both!61
This statute is the fourth of nineteen subsections within the driving while intoxicated, and reckless driving provisions, set forth in MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325. Rules of statutory construction dictate that *270this fourth subsection be construed as consistently as possible with the other subsections of MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325.
The other relevant subsections of MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325 included:
(1) A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles . . . within this state if either of the following applies:
(a) The person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance.
(b) The person has a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol.
(2) The owner of a vehicle or a person in charge or in control of a vehicle shall not authorize or knowingly permit the vehicle to be operated upon a highway or other place open to the general public . . . within this state by a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or who has a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol.
(3) A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public . . . when, due to the consumption of an intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance, or a combination of an intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, the person’s ability to operate the vehicle is visibly impaired.
(5) A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public . . . within this state, under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes a long-term incapacitating injury to another person is *271guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or a fine of not less than $1,000.00 or more than $5,000.00, or both!71
As the emphasized portions of these subsections indicate, none consider the manner, or the change in the manner, in which the vehicle is being operated. Instead, these companion provisions of the OUIL causing death statute turn on the driver’s condition or status while operating the vehicle.7 8 While the Court of Appeals was incorrect in concluding that the statute imposes strict liability, the Court was correct in asserting:
The crime of OUIL causing death contains the same elements as ouil with the only additional element being the aggravated circumstances of death resulting from the prohibited conduct
where the prohibited conduct was acting upon the decision to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.9 Absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the section of MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325 that includes the ouil causing death statute should be construed in accordance with its companion provisions so that the manner of operation, i.e., how the intoxicated defendant was driving, is not an element of the offense that the people must prove.10
*272The majority’s definition of causation will require the people to “establish that the particular defendant’s decision to drive while intoxicated produced a change in that driver’s operation of the vehicle that caused the death of the victim.” Ante at 258. In other words, the people will have to prove that the intoxicated driver was not operating the vehicle as that person would have operated the vehicle if sober and driving under the same circumstances. Therefore, the majority’s interpretation of the causation element in this statute requires the people to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) how the defendant typically drives when sober, taking into account any individual idi-osyncracies or limitations, (2) how that typical, sober manner of operation would affect the defendant’s driving leading up to the fatal accident, (3) how the hypothetical results of the particular defendant’s typical, sober manner of operation compare to the actual, intoxicated manner of operation and that there is an identifiable difference between the two manners of operation, and (4) that this difference in typical, hypothetical, sober driving and actual, intoxicated driving is “a substantial” cause in fact and “a proximate cause” of the victim’s death. Id. at 258-260. As established below, this demanding burden of proof was not intended by the Legislature and is not found in the language of the statute.
*273B
The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that the Legislature intended causation to turn on the fact that the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated, rather than the changed manner in which, or how, the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated. Therefore the defendant’s culpability arises and should be evaluated in light of the defendant’s culpable decision to drive while intoxicated.11
*274Unlike statutes, discussed below, that prohibit similar conduct, the clear language of the OUIL causing death statute contains no reference to the manner in which the defendant operated the vehicle. The Legislature has enacted the following statutes that, unlike OUIL causing death, do manifest an intent, through express language, that causation be strictly tied to the specific manner in which the defendant operated a motor vehicle. For instance, negligent homicide requires the people to prove that the driver operated the motor vehicle “at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner . . . .” MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556 (emphasis added). Michigan’s felonious driving statute, MCL 752.191; MSA 28.661, also specifically requires proof that the manner of operation caused the harm. That statute targets
[e]very person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property and thereby injuring .... [Emphasis added.]
Similarly, involuntary manslaughter requires proof that the defendant operated the motor vehicle “in a grossly negligent manner.”12
However, the OUIL causing death statute does not contain similar language that manifests a legislative intent to tie causation to the specific manner of oper*275ation. Instead, the language in this statute indicates that the people need only prove that the defendant’s operation of the vehicle while intoxicated, not the defendant’s uncharacteristic and intoxicated operation,13 was a cause of the victim’s death.
c
In enacting this statute, the Legislature sought to prohibit and punish all intoxicated driving that results in a fatality, not just intoxicated driving that is performed in a manner that the people can prove is different from that particular defendant’s typical and sober operation of a vehicle in the same situation. The statute is aimed at prevention and deterrence.14 As the legislative analysis reveals, this statute was enacted because
*276“too many drinkers axe irresponsible drivers who are willing to risk current penalties to get behind the wheel. The proposed legislation will deter those drivers by closing technical loopholes in the law, promising swift and sure punishment for drinking drivers . . .15
The majority’s definition of causation creates an unintended loophole and diminishes the chances of swift and sure punishment by requiring the people to prove that, in a similar situation, that particular defendant, if sober, would not have caused the death.
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that
there is no reason to penalize an intoxicated driver with a fifteen-year felony when there is an accident resulting in a fatality if that driver, even if not intoxicated, would still have been the cause in fact of the victim’s death. There would be no reason because it would not prevent that fatality from occurring again.1161
The Legislature enacted the statute so that the burden of prevention rests clearly and heavily with the party most capable of avoiding fatalities, the intoxicated person who decides whether or not to drive. The Legislature drafted the statute so that the intoxicated driver would be responsible for all consequences that flow from his decision to drive while intoxicated.17 *277The majority’s determination that the defendant’s “drunken driving” must be a substantial cause of the victim’s death significantly frustrates the Legislature’s intent to prevent intoxicated driving, which always has the potential to result in death.
In essence, Michigan law imposes two distinct duties on drivers — to drive reasonably18 and not to drive while intoxicated.19 If, as the majority acknowledges, there is an “irrebuttable presumption of gross negligence”20 in driving while intoxicated, then intoxicated driving is never safe or reasonable conduct. Therefore, there is no such thing as safe or nonculpable driving while intoxicated. Any intoxicated driving is a violation of the duty all motorists owe to those with whom they share the road — to drive only when not intoxicated, or to suffer the consequences.21
MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4).
Ante at 259 and ns 49-50.
The majority opinion defines the third element as requiring the people to prove that “the defendant’s intoxicated driving was a substantial cause of the victim’s death.” Id. at 259-260.
The terms “under the influence” and “intoxicated,” as used in this opinion, refer to the condition, prescribed by the statute at the time of these incidents, of being: “under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol . . . .” MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4).
It is unnecessary to impose the common-law interpretation of the causation element in criminal negligence offenses, as further defined in People v Kneip, 449 Mich 83; 534 NW2d 675 (1995), because the plain language of this OUIL causing death statute clearly defines the causation element, including the “scope and necessary connection between the act and the injury . . . .” Id. at 95.
1991 PA 98, MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4) (emphasis added).
1991 PA 98, MCL 257.625(1>(3), (5); MSA 9.2325(1)-(3), (5) (emphasis added).
The offense of OUIL, contained in MCL 257.625(1) and (3); MSA 9.2325(1) and (3) is a “status crime” that focuses on the fact that the defendant operated a vehicle while intoxicated and does not require that the people prove the defendant was observed driving in an abnormal fashion. People v Crawford, 187 Mich App 344; 467 NW2d 818 (1991).
People v Lardie, 207 Mich App 615, 618; 525 NW2d 504 (1994).
Michigan courts have recognized that a *272defendant may be convicted of OUIL even if he is observed driving in a normal fashion. People v Walters, 160 Mich App 396, 402-403; 407 NW2d 662 (1987). Thus, OUIL is a status crime which focuses only on the fact that the defendant operates an automobile while he is intoxicated. [People v Crawford, n 8 supra at 350.]
The msuority requires the people to prove mens rea with regard to the decision-maldng phase and causation when defendant is actually engaged in the intoxicated driving, a time after the culpable decision is made. The majority claims its construction of the causation element is necessary to ensure that “the statute does not impose a severe penalty when the injury was unavoidable for that particular driver . . . .” Ante at 258.1 believe the Legislature enacted this statute with the legitimate belief that deaths from intoxicated driving are always avoidable because, assuming the prosecution proves the first two elements of the crime regarding mens rea, an individual can always choose not to make the irrebuttable grossly negligent decision to drive while under the influence.
Furthermore, I believe that the Legislature also drafted this provision with the reasonable belief that deaths from intoxicated driving are never so remote as to preclude criminal liability. This belief is evidenced by the irrebuttable legal presumption that the decision to drive while intoxicated is grossly negligent. Id. at 252-253. As recognized by the majority
The moral culpability for the person who decides to drink and drive, where any reasonable person must recognize that he is creating a grave risk to himself and others, corresponds to the punishment of a fifteen-year felony when that decision causes the death of another. [Id. at 266.]
Arguments regarding the remoteness or unavoidability of causing death after making this culpable and inherently dangerous decision to drive while under the influence are most appropriately addressed to the court at the sentencing stage of the trial. At this stage, where justice and notions of fairness require, the court may choose to impose the minimum sentence under the OUIL causing death statute — a $2,500.00 fine. MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4) imposes a “felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not less than $2,500.00 or more than $10,000.00, or both.” (Emphasis added.)
Ante at 249, n 28, citing standard jury instructions for involuntary manslaughter (emphasis added). While this crime is based in common law, the Legislature codified the penalty at MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553 without modification to the common-law definition and elements.
The majority acknowledges that “the people need not prove the further point that the defendant’s driving was grossly negligent.” Ante at 251. However, the majority does impose an equally, if not more, onerous burden on the people by requiring them to prove a hypothetical situation, the particular defendant’s projected sober manner of operating the vehicle, and also a negative fact, that the death would not have occurred in the hypothetical situation.
Furthermore, the majority’s causation element rewards the individuals who typically drive in a careless or unsafe fashion when sober. As long as the typically careless, inattentive sober driver operates the vehicle in a characteristically poor or unsafe manner while intoxicated, the people will not be able to prove that intoxication caused the change in the manner of operation that, in turn, was a substantial cause of the victim’s death. However, those individuals, who typically drive in a careful and alert manner, as evidenced by a good driving record and history, are more likely to be convicted under the statute for any intoxicated driving that varies from their sober, careful driving where this variation is a substantial cause of the victim’s death.
The legislative analysis indicates that the Legislature was frustrated by the difficulty of enforcing the OUIL laws, citing a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimation that “on the average a drinking driver can drive drunk about 5,000 miles before being arrested; only one in a thousand drunk drivers get arrested.” House Legislative Analysis, HB 4827, June 4, 1991.
Ante at 253, n 33. The legislative analysis reveals that the Legislature enacted this statute to specifically combat societal acceptance of drinking and driving, and the belief that the drinking driver will not be caught and punished. House Legislative Analysis, HB 4827, May 23, 1991.
Id. at 258.
The msyority recognizes the statutory design to “deter motorists from deciding to drive after they have become intoxicated.” Id. at 245. However, the majority’s insistence that the manner of driving is an element of the statute only proliferates the misconception that driving while under *277the influence of intoxicating' liquor is permissible as long as the driver can drive as if sober.
This Court has recognized that “ 'Every person driving upon the public highway, or in other places frequented by others, is bound to exercise reasonable care and caution to prevent injury to others.’ ” People v Traughber, 432 Mich 208, 217; 439 NW2d 231 (1989), quoting People v McMurchy, 249 Mich 147, 167; 228 NW 723 (1930).
MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4).
Ante at 252.
Indeed the majority seems to acknowledge this point when it proclaims, “the legislation in the present case seeks not to regulate the conduct of a person who is otherwise innocent, but punishes a person’s gravely irresponsible act of operating a vehicle while intoxicated when that act causes another person’s death.” Id. at 255.