concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the affirmance of Greene’s convictions, but I must respectfully dissent to the affirmance of the death sentence on several grounds. First, the trial court erred in excusing for cause several prospective jurors who said that they could vote for the death penalty but would have qualms about it. Second, the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony in the sentencing phase that, based on hearsay suggesting Greene might become violent at sentencing, extreme and unprecedented measures were taken to secure the courtroom. Finally, the prosecutor improperly urged execution on religious grounds. Each of these errors requires reversal of the sentence under settled principles of law.
1. Greene contends that the trial court committed reversible error in excusing five prospective jurors for cause on the ground that they opposed the death penalty. In Division 2 of its opinion, the majority dismisses this contention as unsupported both factually and legally. Yet the majority opinion fails to provide any summary of the voir dire and fails to cite any of our cases interpreting the standard articulated in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412 (105 SC 844, 83 LE2d 841) (1985). In fact, the record shows that although the prospective jurors expressed qualms about the death penalty, four of them unambiguously indicated on voir dire that they could vote to impose a death *453sentence in an appropriate case. Therefore, this case is indistinguishable from Jarrell v. State, 261 Ga. 880 (1) (413 SE2d 710) (1992), and reversal is required.
The standard for death-qualification is whether the prospective juror’s views on capital punishment would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror in accordance with [her] instructions and [her] oath.’ ” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. at 424, quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38, 45 (100 SC 2521, 65 LE2d 581) (1980). If a venire member merely indicates on voir dire that she would have difficulty imposing a death sentence, has qualms about the death penalty or is leaning toward a life sentence, she may not be disqualified on that basis. See Jarrell v. State, 261 Ga. at 880 (1) (reversing death sentence where juror who was excused for cause said capital punishment is justifiable for bad crimes but that she had qualms, was not sure she could vote for it, and would probably lean toward a life sentence); Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717 (24) (386 SE2d 316) (1989); Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206 (4) (327 SE2d 168) (1985). Wainwright v. Witt does not alter the holding of Witherspoon that
a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 522 (88 SC 1770, 20 LE2d 776) (1968). See Alderman, 254 Ga. at 207 (4). To eliminate from the venire all persons voicing such scruples is to distort the “conscience of the community” which the jury is assembled to express. See Witherspoon, 391 U. S. at 519-520. That distortion in turn undermines the legitimacy of the judicial process in the exercise of its unparalleled power to determine whether an individual citizen will live or die. Execution of a death sentence imposed by a jury of such skewed composition would unconstitutionally deprive the defendant of life without due process of law. See id. at 523.
Examining in detail the voir dire of each of the prospective jurors in turn, it is plainly apparent that exclusion of at least four of them was clear error under the standard articulated in Wainwright v. Witt and applied in Jarrell v. State:
The first of the four prospective jurors indicated that it would be harder for her to impose the death penalty than a life sentence, that she would hate to know that she helped to put someone to death, and that she leaned toward a life sentence. However, she said unequivocally and repeatedly that she could vote for the death penalty under *454appropriate circumstances. She stated that her hesitation about the death penalty would not affect her decision on conviction. Asked if she would want jurors like herself to serve if the victim were her son, she said that she would not, but she explained that as the victim’s mother, she would want revenge.
Although the second of the prospective jurors initially stated that she was conscientiously opposed to the death penalty, she then clearly stated that under some circumstances she would vote for it. She expressed “some serious concerns about the death penalty,” primarily of a religious nature, commenting on the price she would have to pay for partaking in something that resulted in the taking of another’s life. When then asked by the prosecutor if it would be fair to say that, for religious or other reasons, she just had a feeling against the death penalty, she said, “Okay, I have a feeling against the death penalty.” She also agreed that her predisposition was long-held. She reiterated on continued questioning by the prosecutor that although she had problems with the death penalty, she would be open-minded enough to consider all the evidence and that she was not leaning toward either sentence in advance in this case, although in general she leans toward life. When the court asked her if she could “just lay aside [her] religious beliefs,” she said that she could not say definitely that she would be able to do so. Thereafter, the prosecutor asked her if she could “just casually cast aside” her views, and the juror answered, “I don’t think you can just casually cast aside what’s going to happen to someone’s life.” On repeated questioning, she said that she would bring her views to the jury room. However, she stated that her reservations would not keep her from considering the evidence and the instructions of the court, that she would listen to both sides, and that she would vote to impose the death penalty if the evidence warranted it. These responses clearly do not disqualify the juror from service. Wainwright v. Witt does not require that a prospective juror casually cast off her religious views at the jury room door, nor that she lack serious concern about imposing the death penalty.
The third of the prospective jurors, when asked whether she was conscientiously opposed to the death penalty, said, “Well, I’ve never ... in my heart felt like that you should take one life for another. So, you know, it’s kind of hard for me to answer.” When the court asked her if she was so conscientiously opposed to capital punishment that she would not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances, she said that if upon hearing all of the evidence she was totally convinced that the death penalty was appropriate, she would vote for it. Later, when asked whether she could ever impose the death penalty, she contradicted her earlier answer, saying, “I don’t know. It’d just be hard for me to do it. I guess my answer would have to be no.” However, she explained that she was having a hard time answering with*455out having the benefit of any evidence about the case. She said that, because of her lack of information, she did not have a leaning toward either sentence at that time. She then clearly responded to a series of the court’s questions by indicating that she could vote to impose the death penalty. She did express misgivings about having to send someone to the electric chair. Also, when the prosecutor asked her if it bothered her that the case was a death penalty case, she said that, having never been involved in one, she did have some reservations. The prosecutor then asked her,
So, really and truly, insofar as the death penalty is concerned, your mind is not impartial between the two penalties, you would favor a life sentence just automatically because of the way you feel?
She answered, “Well, I wouldn’t say that automatically, I mean, I would rather go for a life sentence than the death penalty.” The prosecutor then asked the juror whether he would be able to talk her out of her personal views on the death penalty, and she responded that it would take more than just him. The state notes that the juror seemed to take offense at questions about the death penalty, but she explained that the questioning made her feel as if she were on trial. Again, the juror’s answers, taken as a whole, clearly do not disqualify her from service. The law does not require complete impartiality between sentencing options in the abstract, nor does it disqualify from jury service all citizens with any misgivings about electrocution. Furthermore, the law requires jurors to impose the death penalty only when they have been convinced to do so by the facts in evidence, never by the arguments of counsel.
The fourth of the prospective jurors said she was not conscientiously opposed to the death penalty. Then, on first being asked whether she could vote for death in the electric chair, she said, “I don’t think so.” After reiterating that view several times, she said that under some circumstances, she probably could vote for the death penalty. Ultimately, in response to the court’s questions, she said that she was not leaning toward either sentence. When the prosecutor began his questioning, she explained the apparent conflict in her answers, saying that she had not understood the questions at first, but that her decision about the penalty would depend entirely on the evidence and circumstances. She said she would probably vote for life imprisonment and that her belief that she would probably do so is one from which the prosecutor could not dissuade her. Finally, after the prosecutor asked her to concede that she is opposed to the death penalty, that she could never vote for it, and that she could not cast her beliefs aside, the juror said,
*456I still say it all depends on what the circumstances are. I would have to first weigh it in my mind and think about it. But I just couldn’t right off say, yes or no.
After more prodding, she said,
Well, you know, I’ve told you I would have to hear what the evidence is and everything, and the surrounding things that led up to it or what’s what. I couldn’t just right off say yes or no.
In questioning by the defense, she clearly stated that she could vote for the death penalty. Despite strong and repeated coaxing down the path of disqualification, the prospective juror clearly demonstrated that she was qualified to serve.
Clearly these prospective jurors did not, as the majority indicates, merely at some point in voir dire give answers which, if considered in isolation, would indicate that their opposition to the death penalty was not “automatic.” Nor is the record of voir dire ambiguous. On the contrary, each of the prospective jurors stated unambiguously that she could vote to impose the death penalty after considering all of the evidence and instructions. The majority’s deference to the trial court’s imagined findings regarding demeanor and credibility, under these facts, seriously undermines this Court’s ability ever to review any excusal for cause under Wainwright v. Witt. As such, it is a dramatic departure from precedent. See, e.g., Jarrell, 261 Ga. at 880 (1).
Prosecutors, like defense attorneys, have available to them peremptory strikes. The prosecutor in this case could and did use a number of peremptory strikes to remove jurors perceived to lean toward a life sentence. However, the trial court’s practice of removing for cause any prospective juror with serious concerns about imposing the death penalty was plainly unconstitutional. See Witherspoon, 391 U. S. at 523. “In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.” Id. at 520-521.
Because the voir dire of four jurors who were excused for cause, viewed as a whole, fails to fairly support the trial court’s finding that any was disqualified, the death penalty cannot stand. See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122, 123 (97 SC 399, 50 LE2d 339) (1976); Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195 (7) (d), (e) (345 SE2d 831) (1986). Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
2. In Division 25, the majority holds that the trial court properly admitted testimony regarding an out-of-court statement allegedly made by Greene to another inmate, because it was not hearsay and *457was admissible to explain the conduct of Greene, as well as the conduct of the sheriff in employing certain security measures at trial. The majority further holds that testimony regarding the security measures themselves was admissible to rebut the witness’ testimony that Greene had behaved in prison. On the contrary, admission of testimony as to both Greene’s alleged statements and the security measures was highly improper and so prejudicial that it may well have determined the outcome of the sentencing phase of trial.
This case was tried in Clayton County. Over objection, the court permitted Sheriff Giles of Taylor County to testify on cross-examination that he had told the sheriff of Clayton County that an inmate had reported to Giles a statement that Greene allegedly made to the inmate. Specifically, Giles testified that Greene allegedly told the inmate that Greene would behave and there would be no trouble during trial up to the moment the jury announced its sentencing phase verdict, whereupon, if Greene received a death sentence, the sheriffs would have to kill Greene in the courtroom, and “that would be the end of it.” After eliciting the testimony, the prosecutor asked Giles whether, as a result of the information, there were measures taken to secure Greene in the courtroom “that we haven’t previously had in our part of the world.” Giles answered in the affirmative, and no further evidence was offered regarding the measures which had been taken.
The majority holds that the testimony regarding Greene’s alleged statements to the inmate was admissible not as hearsay but as original evidence to explain the conduct of the sheriff of Clayton County in taking security precautions. However, although out-of-court statements are sometimes admissible to explain the conduct or motive of a law enforcement officer, the conduct must involve matters relevant to the issues on trial. Morris v. State, 264 Ga. 823 (2) (452 SE2d 100) (1995); Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534 (1) (314 SE2d 910) (1984). Although any actions of or threats made by Greene which might have prompted the sheriff to employ extreme security precautions might arguably be relevant to rebut testimony regarding Greene’s good conduct, the sheriff’s conduct in actually employing those measures was completely irrelevant, just as it would be if the sheriff had utilized extreme security measures in an abundance of caution with no basis to believe that they were warranted. Therefore, admission of the information that formed the basis of the sheriff’s conduct cannot be justified on the ground that it was original evidence explaining his conduct.
Nor can admission be justified on the novel theory, never advanced by the state or trial court, that the testimony is not hearsay because it was offered to explain Greene’s conduct. If the evidence was offered for that purpose, it had to have been offered to prove the *458truth of the matter asserted, and it was therefore hearsay.
Finally, even if Greene’s alleged statements were admissible to rebut testimony that Greene behaved himself in prison, the state could at best introduce the alleged statements through the inmate who, according to the sheriff, told him what Greene had allegedly said. Yet the state never even attempted to call the inmate as a witness. Therefore, Greene had no opportunity to impeach the inmate’s credibility.
Testimony that Greene’s dangerousness required unprecedented security measures was not only inadmissible under any theory, it was highly prejudicial. It is widely recognized that any extreme security measure which is visible to a jury, such as shackling, is inherently prejudicial and may not be implemented unless justified by an essential state interest after giving the defendant an opportunity to contest the information which is its basis. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560, 568-569 (106 SC 1340, 89 LE2d 525) (1986); Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F2d 1439, 1450-1452 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 1014 (108 SC 1487, 99 LE2d 715). In this case, Greene had been fitted with a “stun” belt which was deliberately concealed under his clothing to avoid unfairly prejudicing Greene. The state had not attempted to show that an essential state interest required the use of security measures that would be visible to the jury, and it certainly made no showing that the jury needed to be informed of concealed security measures. Informing the jurors of the alleged need to employ extreme measures was far more prejudicial than merely permitting them to view shackles would have been, as the jurors might have assumed shackling was routine.
Testimony that Greene allegedly threatened violence in the courtroom, and that unprecedented security measures had been employed to control him, could reasonably have made the difference between a life or death sentence for Greene. Before the jurors heard the testimony, they likely believed that Greene’s crimes were heinous but that they were part of an isolated spree when Greene was addicted to crack cocaine. After the improper testimony, the jurors likely viewed Greene as consistently and fundamentally violent, with or without drugs, and as a threat even to themselves.3
Because the evidence consisted of hearsay and testimony regarding matters wholly irrelevant to the issues at trial, all of which was so inherently prejudicial that it might well have determined the outcome of the sentencing phase, its admission mandates that Greene’s death sentence be overturned. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
*4593. In Division 26, the majority concludes, citing Hill v. State, 263 Ga. 37 (19) (427 SE2d 770) (1993), that because the prosecutor did not urge imposition of the death penalty based upon Greene’s religious beliefs and did not specifically urge that the teachings of a particular religion mandate imposition of the death penalty, the prosecutor’s religious arguments were not improper. However, the prosecutor did implicitly urge the jury that certain passages of the Bible, as interpreted by the Baptist faith, mandate imposition of the death penalty in this case. First, he informed the jury that he was “a plain old country Baptist.” He then argued as follows:
Let’s get down to what this trial and what the laws are all about and this is retribution. An eye for an eye. A tooth for a tooth. Right there in the Bible with all those nice things that I’m sure that the lawyers over there . . . are going to be talking about. But no act in that Bible took those words out of it.
And one more thing. Remember this, that that was a limiting, limiting liberal rule in the old testament. That is, if you and I had an eye taken out you could not take out two. It was not to be harsh but to be limiting, to be just. How do we put it now? Let the punishment fit the crime.
Later, the prosecutor argued:
As you hear that word mercy there is one phrase from the Sermon on the Mount that I want you to hear at the same time. I’m not going to be able to come back and talk to you. But at the same time you hear those lawyers yell mercy hear blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain mercy. And you drank [sic] his whole and entire being and see if you can find a grain of mercy extended to anybody.
Thus, the prosecutor’s arguments were improper under Hill. See 263 Ga. at 46 (19). Furthermore, Hill merely provides two examples of prohibited religious argument, not an exhaustive list. Neither it nor Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582 (18) (d) (458 SE2d 799) (1995), which involved a far less extensive religious reference in rebuttal to defense efforts to play on religious sentiments, limit our ability to find error in new prosecutorial approaches to religious discourse. Religion should not be urged, however cleverly, as a basis for a jury’s sentencing decision in a death penalty trial. See, e.g., Jones v. Kemp, 706 FSupp. 1534, 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1989). See also United States v. Giry, 818 F2d 120, 133 (1st Cir. 1987) (prosecutor’s reference to religion constituted irrelevant and inflammatory appeal to jurors’ religious beliefs and warranted “especial condemnation”), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 855 (108 *460SC 162, 98 LE2d 116) (1987).
It is true that defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s improper references to religion. However, the improprieties in this case were of such magnitude that there is a reasonable probability that they may have altered the outcome of the sentencing phase. See Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81 (8) (i) (335 SE2d 567) (1985). The prosecutor did not stop at quoting Biblical text. Instead, he directed the jurors’ attention to Biblical passages which, in context, are subject to varying interpretations, and, speaking with a voice of authority, interpreted them virtually to require imposition of the death penalty. Furthermore, he disparaged mercy as a valid sentencing consideration, thereby striking at “the most important component of a capital jury’s discretion favoring capital defendants.” See Jones v. Kemp, 706 FSupp. at 1560, citing Wilson v. Kemp, 111 F2d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1153 (106 SC 2258, 90 LE2d 703) (1986). Therefore, because of the impropriety of the prosecutor’s argument, the sentence of death must be vacated, and I respectfully dissent.
4. In Division 23, the majority briefly dismisses Greene’s contention that the prosecutor made improper references to parole, on the ground that Greene waived his rights by failing to move for a mistrial. I address this enumeration because I believe the prosecutor’s misconduct in referring to parole likely contributed to the impact of the erroneous admission of the sheriffs testimony in determining the outcome of the sentencing phase of trial.
Pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-76 (a), no attorney shall argue to or in the presence of the jury that a defendant, if convicted, may not be required to suffer the full penalty imposed by the court or jury due to pardon, parole or clemency. If an attorney does so, opposing counsel may request a mistrial, in which case it is mandatory that the trial court grant the motion. See id. at (b). The statute proscribes all reference to parole. Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 598, 616 (25) (340 SE2d 869) (1986). Greene argues that his sentence must be reversed because the prosecutor made frequent references to parole, and the trial court failed to declare a mistrial.
During the cross-examination of Greene, the prosecutor asked Greene if he wanted to go to Georgia’s electric chair. Greene testified that he did not. The prosecutor then asked Greene if he wanted to spend the rest of his life in the Georgia penitentiary. Greene responded, “Yes, sir, ... I would appreciate that.” The prosecutor reacted with disbelief, saying, “You want to? You’re saying, gosh, please let me do that, I don’t ever want to breathe a free breath?” Greene answered as follows:
Well, you know, life in prison is better than death. You know what I’m saying? You will have, you might have an opportu*461nity to get out, you might not. But that’s the chance you’ve got to take.
Having coaxed Greene into purportedly opening the door to testimony regarding the possibility of release, the prosecutor then asked Greene if he had told the deputy that when he “got out,” he was going to buy himself a Nissan pickup truck. Then, the prosecutor asked Greene whether, “by one means or another . . . [he] want[ed] to get out where there are more knives and more dope.” Later, the prosecutor asked, “You would reach for any straw that you could find to try to save your life so you could get out and get that Nissan pickup truck, wouldn’t you?” Greene’s attorneys did not object to any of the challenged questions.
In closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jurors whether Greene had given them “the slightest indication that this trial is anything more to him than some kind of hindrance between him and his Nissan pickup truck.” Later, after informing the jury that there are knives and drugs in prison, the prosecutor asked the jurors to put themselves in the position of a young man who has made a mistake and gone to prison, is putting his life together, and is introduced to Greene as his new roommate. He then went on to argue:
Put another way, so long as breath is in him he’s going to be living next door to somebody. Do you want him living next door to you? What would you do if he came to your door with a butcher knife in his hands? Put it on a personal basis and then understand a little bit more about what he does.
Once again, the defense failed to object.
Although the prosecutor never specifically used the word “parole,” his arguments and questions clearly were intended to refer to the possibility that the defendant “might not be required to suffer the full penalty imposed by the court.” See OCGA § 17-8-76. The purpose of the statute prohibiting such remarks is to prevent prosecutors from urging the jury to give a more severe sentence to compensate for, or avert, possible pardon, parole or other clemency. See Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 835 (15) (279 SE2d 650) (1981). “The jury should not be encouraged to recommend the death penalty because it fears that parole officials may grant parole if the defendant is given a life sentence.” Davis v. State, 255 Ga. at 615 (25). In this case, the prosecutor clearly intended to urge the jury to sentence Greene to death lest he be released on parole. I am unpersuaded that Greene’s concession on cross-examination, that he would not genuinely like to be incarcerated for the remainder of his life and would prefer to be freed *462at some juncture, opened the door to the prosecutor’s otherwise prohibited conduct. Nor am I persuaded that the prosecutor’s juxtaposition of a discussion of prison roommates with an argument that Greene might someday live next door to a juror obscured the implication that Greene would be released someday if not sentenced to die. The prosecutor violated the spirit and letter of the law in maneuvering to introduce improper considerations in the sentencing phase of trial. The improper references to parole compounded the impact of the prosecutor’s other misconduct and reinforce my conviction that the death sentence should be reversed.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this dissent.
The impact of this image was magnified by the prosecutor’s improper references to the possibility that Greene would be released if sentenced to life in prison and would be a next door neighbor to someone, perhaps a juror. This issue is discussed in Division 4, infra.