(dissenting)—I agree with that portion of the majority opinion stating the facts and describing the problem of language mechanics involved in this case. However, I cannot agree with the state’s arguments or with the reasoning of the majority supporting and affirming the decision of the trial court. More particularly, I do not agree (1) that the legislature included by mistake the proviso for or relating to deductions and allowances in the 1961 amendatory definition of minimum wages; (2) that the language of this proviso is surplusage, and (3) that it can be ignored, excised, deleted, or in effect vetoed by this court. I am convinced the contrary is more reasonable or rational: First, that the action of the legislature was deliberate and purposeful in its choice of and enactment of the proviso language, which, indubitably, refers to deductions and allowances, incorporates and makes these concepts a part of the statute and therefore legally applicable or potent in determining the state minimum wage; and second, that the legislature did make a mistake in draftsmanship in repealing RCW 49.46.050 without adding substitute language to supplement the reference to deductions and allowances, prescribing in detail legally acceptable standards to guide the director of the Department of Labor and Industries, as indicated in the decision in the Hagan case, (Peterson v. Hagan, 56 Wn. (2d) 48, 351 P. (2d) 127 (1960)). I think that either the majority conclusion or my dissenting conclusion may be reasonably inferred from the face of the 1961 amendments, and it seems to me no court can, with complete sanguinity and absolute accuracy, decide in which respect an error was made by the legislative branch. Perhaps it should be noted that, in embracing either of the opposing or alternate conclusions and grounding a decision and disposition on one or the other, the court risks a blithe accusation from the litigants or counsel on one side or the other of this litigation that we have engaged in judicial legislation—or, perhaps worse, that we have *582legislated judicially. Any such criticism from either side has an aura of naivete, intellectual myopia, or irresponsibility. It ignores or refuses to recognize statutory interpretation for what it is—the performance of a basic and necessary deciding function by the judicial branch. But there is some reassurance in the fact—and in the inherent common sense and necessity—that it is an ancient and orthodox function of the judicial branch to ameliorate defects, inconsistencies, and ambiguities in language which, on occasion, characterize the work product of the legislative branch. And it may be added that the function certainly is recognized and accepted by respectable modern authorities.2
Judicial work would be more pleasant, perhaps nicer and considerably easier, (a) if we could compliment opposing counsel for making fine, though diametrically antithetical presentations and interpretations of a statute; and (b) if we could advise such opposing advocates that we cannot arrive at absolute truth in evaluating arguments and applying the statute, and consequently, that we must refrain from deciding the case, and will have to leave counsel and their clients to their own devices in settling their differences. But our business is making decisions and deciding cases. And, insofar as common sense, experience, and general rules or principles of statutory interpretation enable us to arrive at reasonable solutions of statutory problems, we must do so.
As indicated above, I reject the state’s argument that, since the deductions provided for in § 2 depend upon RCW 49.46.050, the repeal of RCW 49.46.050 permits this court to ignore that which in effect is a proviso respecting deductions. The state supported this argument with an assertion that this construction would not increase the statutory minimum wage. This is misleading. Perhaps in a technical *583sense the statutory specification of a precise amount as the state minimum wage would not be changed. But as a practical matter the elimination of a deduction as to free meals results in an addition to the minimum wage; that is, something of value is received by the employee and contributed or paid by the employer over and above the exact amount or value received, as specified in the statute. So, realistically, the end result of the state’s argument in this appeal actually raises the statutory minimum wage to a higher value or figure by ignoring or not giving effect to any possible deductions. I believe such a result is inappropriate and unnecessary, and can and should be avoided with propriety by refusing to ignore the pertinent proviso and by noting and giving effect to this language—even conceding its imperfect state—as part of the effort to interpret the statute reasonably. In support of this I can say that I am hesitant to by-pass what seems to me a legislative intent to recognize and allow customary industry practices respecting deductions and allowances in determining the statutory minimum wage. I am even more reluctant to emasculate this ostensibly pertinent proviso in the absence of a clear direction by the legislature that such was intended. I believe that this court would better perform its traditional function of defining ambiguous passages of statutes if it seeks to make what seems to me to be reason and common sense out of this statute by considering it as a whole and in the light of the legislative and judicial history of this enactment and its social implications.
Judicial construction of statutes as a time honored function has followed the rule that the court must give statutory language its “plain and ordinary meaning.” Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. State, 53 Wn. (2d) 813, 815, 328 P. (2d) 884 (1958). A further lesson or rule from the fact of judicial interpretation or construction is that “where an act has a doubtful or ambiguous meaning, it is the duty of the court to adopt a construction that is reasonably liberal, in furtherance of the obvious or manifest purpose of the legislature.” State v. Rinkes, 49 Wn. (2d) 664, 667, 306 P. (2d) 205 (1957).
*584I think the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the term wages in the absence of a clear and pertinent statutory definition is value received. “Generally speaking, the term wages means compensation for labor or services, which may be in the form of money paid or other value given, such as board, lodging or clothes.” Pacific American Fisheries, Inc. v. United States (9th Cir. 1943), 138 F. (2d) 464. It seems unreasonable to me to limit the definition of wages to legal tender without a clear, unambiguous legislative mandate to that effect. The state, in urging us to limit “wages” to legal tender, is disregarding economic reality, industry, management and labor practices in this important area.
It is of interest that other departments of state government recognize in their rules and practices that free meals furnished to employees have an actual or real economic value. In fact, the State Tax Commission requires the defendant hotels to pay sales tax on meals given to employees at a valuation of 40 cents a meal; and the same department includes these meals in the computation of the business and occupation tax at the same rate. These regulations and results taxwise are in a different field or category of the law, and of course are not a mandate controlling judicial determination of the definition of wages in the instant case. But these other administrative practices or determinations certainly add weight to a determination that meals constitute value which more likely than not should and can be reasonably included in a definition of wáges by this court in relation to the minimum wage act.
Some support for a resultant that meals contribute a significant value in relation to wages is found in the typical collective bargaining agreement covering this industry:
“In addition to the wages provided'for in this Agreement, all employees . . . shall be furnished wholesome .and palatable food. In cases of establishments that do not serve wholesome and palatable food to the employees, said employees shall receive $1.00 per day, or proportion thereof, in lieu of meals herein provided for.” (Working Agreement and Wage Scale between Seattle Local Joint Executive *585Board and Washington State Restaurant Association, Inc., et al, § 4, p. 9 (Defendants’ Exhibit 4).)
Customary provisions of collective bargaining contracts surely do not control judicial construction or definition of the term “wage,” but this factor or consideration certainly provides insight into the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the common term “wages.”
Thus, by the reasoning and logic indicated, and in the frame of reference the issue herein is presented, I reach conclusions: (1) that the term “wages” as used in the Minimum Wage Act means “value received,” (2) that meals furnished to employees under the circumstances noted herein constitute “value received,” (3) are includable in calculating and determining minimum wages required by the act to be paid by the hotels involved in this lawsuit, and finally (4) that the decision of the superior court should be reversed.
Rosellini, C. J., concurs with Finley, J.
See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950); Loyd, Equity of a Statute, 58 U. Pa. L. Rev. 76 (1909); Radin, Realism in Statutory Interpretation and Elsewhere, 23 Cal. L. Rev. 156 (1934).