(dissenting) — The Westlake Project will serve a "public use"; and, as designed, it is constitutionally and statutorily permissible. The trial court's finding of no public use, see finding of fact No. 8, is in effect an erroneous conclusion of law which is not binding upon us. The legally requisite public use is not vitiated by the private use or purchase of condemned property. By holding otherwise the majority overrules In re Port of Seattle, 80 Wn.2d 392, 495 P.2d 327 (1972) and Miller v. Tacoma, 61 Wn.2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963). It also undermines the public purpose analysis of United States v. North Bonneville, 94 Wn.2d 827, 621 P.2d 127 (1980) and Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wn.2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974).
*636I
The project is for a public use, as evident from both the substance and the chronology of the other factual findings. The trial court found that the project would forestall inner-city decay, would create necessary public space, and would result in a museum, a public park, public parking, an auditorium, and a library. It specifically found:
4. The City of Seattle intended that creation of an urban focal point as designed for the Westlake Project would, among other things, relocate and improve the monorail terminal, create public parks and open spaces, increase diverse pedestrian traffic in the area, increase city tax revenues, possibly decrease crime in the area by reason of the pedestrian traffic, create accessible shopping, transportation and recreational facilities for the handicapped, create a center of activity for Seattle, and increase civic pride, all as more particularly described in Ordinance 108591. It appears that there is a reasonable prospect that the Westlake Project would accomplish many of these purposes.
5. The retail shops within the Westlake Project are a substantial element of the project and are an essential part of the Westlake Project and this urban focal point. The retail element of the project cannot be separated from the Project's other elements in the project as now designed to make the project economically feasible and to accomplish the intended purpose of the design.
7. The City's reason for acquiring the entire site for the Westlake Project, and controlling the entire development was its belief that public ownership of the underlying land is necessary for implementation of the public improvements and for assuring that such new private development as might take place on the Project site will be functionally, operationally, architecturally and aesthetically compatible with, and complementary to, the public facilities.
8. The Westlake Project as designed is not a public use.
Finding of fact No. 8 does not follow from findings of fact Nos. 4, 5, and 7, and, in fact, appears inconsistent with them. By itself, it offers no reason for its pronouncement; it *637only reflects the trial court's erroneous understanding of the law. These findings do not, therefore, support a conclusion of no public use.
II
The majority's constitutional analysis is predicated upon a literal reading of State ex rel. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Superior Court, 133 Wash. 308, 233 P. 651 (1925). But that case, besides being distinguishable from this one, does not require the majority's result and, if it did, it would be inconsistent with recent constitutional developments.
Puget Sound is factually distinguishable. Unlike this case, it did not involve a private use necessary to effectuating a public purpose. At issue was the ability of a power company to construct transmission lines to provide electricity for both private and public consumption. The court repeatedly emphasized that the company had surplus generating capacity even without the condemnation.
The facts of Puget Sound illustrate that the broad language of that case, upon which the majority relies, cannot be given a literal application. Other cases applying the Puget Sound analysis make this clear. See, e.g., Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 107 P. 199 (1910); State ex rel. Harris v. Superior Court, 42 Wash. 660, 85 P. 666 (1906); see also Tacoma v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 57 Wn.2d 257, 356 P.2d 586 (1960); State v. Larson, 54 Wn.2d 86, 338 P.2d 135 (1959); State ex rel. Eastvold v. Superior Court, 48 Wn.2d 417, 294 P.2d 418 (1956). For example, in Nisqually Power, Tacoma was permitted to condemn certain lands and water rights for the purpose of generating electric power, even though during nonpeak hours a substantial amount of that power was to be sold to private enterprise. Both public and private uses were involved; but, because the public use necessarily required an arrangement of that sort, the condemnation was permissible. That case reflects the long-standing principle, not repudiated by Puget Sound, that any taking is constitutional if reasonably *638necessary to the effectuation of a public use. See also Humble Oil, supra; Larson, supra; Eastvold, supra.
Moreover, our recent cases indicate that we no longer follow, if we ever did, the majority's use of Puget Sound. A condemnation is not illegal simply because private enterprise is allowed to either purchase or lease the acquired land. See, e.g., In re Port of Seattle, 80 Wn.2d 392, 495 P.2d 327 (1972); Miller v. Tacoma, 61 Wn.2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963).
As long as the object sought to be accomplished is for a public purpose, it is for the legislature to determine the means to accomplish it . . . The fact that private enterprise may be selected to effectuate the plan . . . does not make the purpose ... a private one.
(Italics mine.) Port of Seattle, at 396, citing Miller, at 387. A condemnation is not invalid, even though private enterprise may subsequently purchase or lease the acquired land, provided such effectuates a public purpose. Port of Seattle, at 397; Miller, at 387, 392; see also United States v. North Bonneville, 94 Wn.2d 827, 621 P.2d 127 (1980); Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wn.2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974). Simply stated, the current test is whether the advantage to private enterprise is part of a single, inseparable plan benefiting the public. See generally Note, An Expanded Use of Excess Condemnation, 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 60 (1959). If so, the condemnation is constitutional.
This current interpretation of article 1, section 16 (amendment 9) simply reflects the changing nature of our society. It has been observed that:
The principle of private ownership of land is deeply imbedded in our democratic system of government, yet it has never been denied that the principle is subject to the power of the government to take land for public use. During the first century of our constitutional society, great wealth was tied up in land and even the man of moderate wealth depended on his land for security. It is not surprising, therefore, that the power of the government to take private land was construed strictly. In our modern society most of the wealth is invested in corpo*639rate and government securities rather than in land, and while private land ownership is still an important characteristic of free government, it seems natural that the limitation on that principle, namely the power of the government to take land for public use, should be interpreted more liberally. Our experience with the democratic form of government with its separation of powers assures us that we need not fear abuse of power so long as certain safeguards surround the power.
Note, supra at 70. Accord, Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (1923).
Both Miller and Port of Seattle reflect those changing conditions. In Miller, we upheld the constitutionality of urban renewal projects whereby blighted areas, and some peripheral, unblighted areas, were condemned and later resold to private developers. Similarly, in Port of Seattle, we upheld a port's plan to condemn certain land, to construct air cargo facilities upon it, and then to lease them to private enterprise. In each the condemnation was lawful because the private use facilitated a public purpose.
Miller, Port of Seattle, and their predecessors are therefore not necessarily inconsistent and none bars the West-lake Project. Our cases are also not inconsistent with the general rule followed elsewhere. A synthesis of state and federal law reveals that land may be condemned:
(1) to enable government to carry on its functions, and to preserve the safety, health and comfort of the public, whether or not its individual members may use the property so taken, provided the taking is by a public body; (2) to serve the public with some necessity or convenience of life required by the public as such and which cannot readily be furnished without the aid of the government, whether or not the taking is by a public body, provided the public may enjoy such service as of right; and (3) in special and peculiar cases, sanctioned by custom or justified by the existence of unusual local conditions, to enable individuals to cultivate their land or carry on business in a manner not otherwise possible, if their success will indirectly enhance the public welfare, even though the taking is by a private individual and the public has no right to the enjoyment of the property *640taken or to service from him.
County of Essex v. Hindenlang, 35 N.J. Super. 479, 490, 114 A.2d 461 (1955); 2A J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain 7-47 (3d rev. ed. 1980).
It is significant that states with constitutions similar to ours have taken a "liberal" approach. Arizona, Colorado, and Missouri appear to permit any condemnation which benefits the public. Kansas City v. Liebi, supra; Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 P. 464 (1906); Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, 26 P. 376 (1891). They do not follow the majority's stringent "public use" approach.
Furthermore, as we have frequently stated, the definition of "public use" evolves with the changing needs of society. In Miller, we wrote:
it may fairly be stated . . . that judicial interpretation of "public use" has not been circumscribed in our State by mere legalistic formulas or philological standards. On the contrary, definition has been left, as indeed it must be, to the varying circumstances and situations which arise, with special reference to the social and economic background of the period in which the particular problem presents itself for consideration. Moreover, views as to what constitutes a public use necessarily vary with changing conceptions of the scope and functions of government, so that to-day there are familiar examples of such use which formerly would not have been so considered. As governmental activities increase with the growing complexity and integration of society, the concept of "public use" naturally expands in proportion.
Miller, at 384-85, quoting Carstens v. PUD 1, 8 Wn.2d 136, 142, 111 P.2d 583, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 667, 86 L. Ed. 533, 62 S. Ct. 128 (1941).
The Westlake Project is one attempt to resolve public problems now arising. It is an attempt to revitalize downtown retail corridors, to provide needed public space, and to confer cultural benefits. It is an attempt to innovatively create a satisfying downtown environment in response to contemporary downtown problems. As acknowledged by the *641trial court:
The Westlake Project is intended by the designer and legislative body to perform some of the same functions, in the contemporary urban setting, that in earlier and simpler times were performed by public squares or commons.
Finding of fact No. 41.
The Westlake Project is therefore, in its simplest terms, a contemporary public square. Consequently, as there is authority to condemn for public squares, RCW 8.12.030, and since the private use is necessary for the plan, the project is constitutional.
Ill
Conceived as such, the majority's statement that there is no statutory authority for the condemnation sought in this case is a play with words that is not accurate.
A municipal corporation has only those condemnation powers conferred to it by statute. State ex rel. Devonshire v. Superior Court, 70 Wn.2d 630, 424 P.2d 913 (1967); Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wn.2d 677, 399 P.2d 330 (1965). But those powers extend to the evident purpose of the legislative grant. Id. As we cautioned in Devonshire, at page 633:
a statutory grant of such power is not to be so strictly construed as to thwart or defeat an apparent legislative intent or objective.
Accordingly, a municipal corporation has the power to take and develop land if pursuant to a statutory end. In evaluating any condemnation, "'courts look to the substance rather than the form, to the end rather than to the means.'" State ex rel. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Superior Court, supra at 312.
There is statutory authority to condemn land for public squares, public markets, public parks, public auditoriums, art museums, public parking, and recreational areas. RCW 8.12.030; 35.21.020; 35.21.400; 36.34.340. These are all elements of the Westlake Project. And as reflected by the findings, the private enterprise component, which concerns *642the majority, is simply the means to accomplish the public end.
While the majority concedes express statutory authority for condemnation to further all the above mentioned purposes, it insists "there is no express statutory authority for the proposed project — a retail shopping center." Majority opinion, at 629. Insistence on this frame of reference stems from the majority's judgment that the "evidence shows, as the trial court found, that the primary purpose of the undertaking was to promote the retail goal." (Italics mine.) Majority, at 629. It is one thing to say that the retailing aspect of the project is "substantial" and "essential" to the project. Majority, at 628. Finding of fact No. 5. This is only to express what the municipality openly avows — that the interdependence of public and private entities is required for the success of the venture. But to say the retailing aspect of the project is "the primary purpose" of the project is to make a judgment about the facts, not to represent them.
In United States v. North Bonneville, 94 Wn.2d 827, 621 P.2d 127 (1980), both sides agreed that the Town's purchase of property "for streets, parks, and service facilities constitutes a public purpose." Id. at 834. Nevertheless, it was also "undisputed that the 'mode of use' for a portion of the property the town wishe[d] to purchase from the Corps [was] not municipal in nature." Id. at 833. We found a public purpose to the proposed purchase, stating:
[I]f the primary object is to subserve a public municipal purpose, it is immaterial that, incidentally, private ends may be advanced. Moreover, the public purposes for which cities may incur liabilities are not restricted to those for which precedent can be found, but the test is whether the work is required for the general good of all the inhabitants of the city. But it is not essential that the entire community, or even a considerable portion of it, should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to make it a public one. . . . [T]he test of a public purpose should be whether the expenditure confers a direct benefit of reasonably gen*643eral character to a significant part of the public, as distinguished from a remote or theoretical benefit.
(Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 834, quoting 15. E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 39.19, at 31-32 (3d ed. 1970).
Unlike the court in Bonneville, the majority here deems the private aspect of this project is not incidental to the public uses. It concedes that if the private use were incidental, "a different question would be presented", citing Miller, supra, and In re Port of Seattle, supra. Majority, at 634. The majority's reliance on these cases, I believe, misconceives the nature of the term "incidental" as it is used in those opinions and as it has since been construed by this court. The majority interprets the term "incidental" as a quantum reference: if most of the use is public then a small concomitant of private use may be deemed incidental. The cases do not bear out the majority's use of the term.
In Miller, supra, we did state " [T]he subsequent transfer of land to private parties is . . . 'merely incidental to the main public purpose."' Id. at 388. But we also stated such resale or lease provisions were "an essential and continuing part of the public purpose." Id. at 387, quoting Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571, 44 A.L.R.2d 1406 (1954). The private aspect of the urban renewal project at issue in Miller was an integral part of the public purpose, and yet we deemed it incidental.
In In re Port of Seattle, supra, again we stated that the lease of cargo facilities to private enterprise was "incidental to the main public purpose" of providing air cargo facilities. We stated:
The fact that private enterprise may be selected to effectuate the plan for providing air cargo facilities does not make the purpose of providing those facilities a private one. . . .
Perhaps if the sole purpose of acquiring the property was to lease it to an individual or corporation for private use, its acquisition and lease would be in violation of the [constitution].
Id. at 396-97, quoting in part Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 *644Wash. 294, 318, 322, 126 P. 628, 127 P. 580 (1912). The meaning of this language from Port of Seattle is that substantial leasing might occur to "effectuate" a public purpose. Even if there were a large number of privately leased cargo facilities, that private "means" would still be incidental to the overarching public purpose of providing air cargo facilities. While substantial and necessary for the effectuation of a public purpose, such leasing, as with the resale of property in Miller, would be "incidental."
More recently, in Bonneville, supra, we reaffirmed the true meaning of the term "incidental" in this context. In that case, we deemed "incidental" the substantial resale to private entities of property purchased by the municipality. Resale to private parties was thought "incidental" because "a large portion of the acquired property would go to undisputedly municipal uses as streets, parks, and service facilities", Bonneville, at 839, thus conferring "a direct benefit of reasonably general character to a significant part of the public ..." Bonneville, at 834, quoting 15 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 39.19, at 31-32 (3d ed. 1970).
Applying these principles to this case, we must first concede the retailing aspect of the Westlake Project constitutes a substantial portion of the project; the amount of property to be leased by the City to be devoted to retailing is not insignificant. But the magnitude of such activity does not make it any less "incidental" to the public purpose being served. The "different question" the majority seeks to avoid through its analysis is squarely presented in this case, and it is answered by our previous cases.
"Public need, as a primary purpose behind joint projects must, of course, be recognized." PUD 1 v. Taxpayers, 78 Wn.2d 724, 729, 479 P.2d 61 (1971). Such a public need and use is easily identifiable in the Westlake Project. A public square in the downtown area is both needed and a valid public use for which the municipality has express statutory authority to condemn property. While the question of public use is a judicial one, even the majority concedes this is a *645public use.
The municipality deemed it a necessary incident of that public use that substantial leasing to private retailers occur. That private activity is "incidental" (although both substantial and necessary) to the direct public benefit conferred by the project.
We have previously stated that determination of the means by which a public purpose is achieved is essentially a legislative question. In re Port of Seattle, 80 Wn.2d 392, 396, 495 P.2d 327 (1972). So it is in this case; the municipality is in a much better position than this court to determine what balance of private and public is necessary to the success of an accepted public purpose.
What is a public municipal purpose is not susceptible of precise definition, since it changes to meet new developments and conditions of times.
United States v. North Bonneville, 94 Wn.2d 827, 833, 621 P.2d 127 (1980), quoting 15 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 39.19, at 32 (3d ed. 1970).
In meeting the challenge of changing urban conditions, municipalities need flexibility in pursuing accepted legislative goals. It is not the role of the judiciary to impose its judgment on the wisdom of those goals. Private shopping centers must conform to an extent with the public interest. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wn.2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981). Are we now to deny municipalities the opportunity to integrate private and public energies to serve the good of the public in our urban centers?
Dolliver and Dimmick, JJ., concur with Utter, J.