dissenting, with whom ROSE, Chief Justice, joins.
I cannot agree with the views of the majority of the court in this case. I perceive a different legislative intent, which causes me to conclude that the erroneous language in these two conflicting statutes is that found in § 31-6-102(a), W.S.1977. I am convinced that the correct language is that found in § 31-6-103(b), W.S.1977, as I perceive the intent of the legislature, and I would affirm the district court.
My point of departure is State v. Chas-tain, Wyo., 594 P.2d 458 (1979), which is discussed in the majority opinion. The majority opinion does not note, however, that the careful reading of § 31-6-102(a) described in that case as the first step in an analysis of the implied consent law led the court to this conclusion:
“(4) In order to obtain a proper consent under § 31-6-102(a), certain information must be conveyed to a suspect. It is not necessary that this be done by the law enforcement officer directly (e.g., it could be funneled through a third person who is acting as an agent of the law enforcement officer where the suspect does not speak or understand English or where the suspect is conscious and has the capacity to consent but where, for medical reasons, the law officer would not be permitted to address the suspect in person). However, it is required that it be done and that the suspect consent to the test in the light of that information. * * *” (Emphasis added.) 594 P.2d at 463.
In State v. Chastain, supra, we described a statutory scheme intended by the legislature to impose a condition on the right to operate a motor vehicle in Wyoming, which condition is a consent to chemical tests for intoxication. At the hazard of license suspension the suspect can refuse to submit to the tests, but we there held that the exercise of the suspect’s choice should be based upon information.
If information is required, then the information which is furnished should be correct. The statute which provides for the scope of the hearing on judicial review sets forth the *1297information which is correct. It states, in part:
“ * * * [W]hether * * * he had been told that his driving privileges would be suspended for thirty (30) days if he refused to submit to the test. * * *” Section 31 — 6-103(b), W.S.1977.
The conclusion reached by the majority that advice in accordance. with § 31-6-102(a), that “failure to submit to the chemical test may result in suspension of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle” is correct information, is fallacious. That is not what the legislature intended.
The legislature intended that the operator’s license should be suspended for a period of thirty days if he refused to submit to the test. The statute provides that the department shall suspend the operator’s license for a period of thirty days upon receipt of the sworn report or statement of the law enforcement officer that he had probable cause to believe the arrested person was driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a degree which rendered him incapable of driving such vehicle. Section 31-6-102(c), W.S.1977. The language of the statute does not permit the employees of the Revenue and Taxation Department, Motor Vehicle Division, for reasons of their own, to not order the suspension, as suggested by the majority. Suspension is mandatory. The statutory scheme also assumes a duty on the part of the law enforcement officer to submit the sworn report or statement. In light of the statutory purpose he would be derelict in the performance of his duties if he did not do so, and he might well have committed an unlawful arrest if he could not do so.
There is a clear manifestation of the intent of the legislature that the operator’s license be suspended for a period of thirty days if he refuses to submit to the chemical tests upon request of the law enforcement officer. State v. Chastain, supra, holds, in effect, that the suspect must be informed of that result, and that holding can only mean that the suspect must be correctly informed. To the extent that § 31-6-102(a) appears to justify furnishing incorrect information to the suspect, it must yield to the provisions of § 31-6-103(b) with which it conflicts. Advice in accordance with this latter statute would furnish correct information to the suspect.
The language of § 31-6-103(b) must be given paramount significance for yet another reason. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the Court was concerned with the constitutionality of the Georgia statute providing for suspension of the motor vehicle registration and driver’s license of an uninsured motorist who was involved in an accident unless security to cover damages was posted. The Court there said at 402 U.S. 539:
“ * * * Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations.] This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege.’ * * * ”
The legislature, in delineating the scope of the hearing in § 31-6-103(b), has articulated the due process rights of the licensee. Given the conflict which appears in this instance the legislative intent manifested in the delineation of the scope of the due process hearing should not be subjected to a constitutional hazard by a construction of the statute that deletes a part of those due process rights.
We have recognized that a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege and not a right. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Shipley, Wyo., 579 P.2d 415 (1978). This holding is consistent with the general rule that statutes authorizing the suspension of motor vehicle operator’s permits are for the pro*1298tection of the public and are not intended to be punitive in nature. E.g., Campbell v. State Department of Revenue, Division of Motor Vehicles, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385, 60 A.L.R.3d 419 (1971); State v. Pruett, 91 Idaho 537, 428 P.2d 43 (1967); Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 126 N.W.2d 778, 9 A.L.R.3d 746 (1964); In re France, 147 Mont. 283, 411 P.2d 732 (1966); Texas Department of Public Safety v. Richardson, Tex., 384 S.W.2d 128 (1964); Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, Utah, 595 P.2d 1302 (1979); Thurston County v. Gorton, 85 Wash.2d 133, 530 P.2d 309 (1975). In Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, supra, the privilege to drive was recognized as a valuable one, and in Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, supra, the right to operate a motor vehicle was recognized as a valuable right or privlege not to be taken away without due process. Our legislature has recognized a significant impact in connection with the suspension of a license to operate a motor vehicle. In § 31-7-127, W.S.1977, the drivers’ license division is given discretion in some instances to rescind or modify an order of suspension “where undue hardship would result from a failure to extend such privilege.”
While by definition such statutes would not come within the rule requiring that a penal statute be construed most favorably to the accused (Horn v. State, Wyo., 556 P.2d 925 (1976); State v. Faulkner, 75 Wyo. 104, 292 P.2d 1045 (1956)), the cases and our statute appear to recognize the presence of a de facto, if not a de jure, penalty in connection with the suspension or revocation of drivers’ licenses. The result reached by the district court represents a construction of the conflicting provisions in this statute which is more favorable to the accused person, and in my view that is an appropriate treatment.
For the reasons set forth above I would affirm the disposition in this case by the district court.