dissenting.
The vehicle in which defendant was riding1 was stopped after the officer observed specific and articulable evidence which would lead a reasonable policeman to conclude that a traffic infraction had been committed by the driver of the vehicle.2 ORS 487.165. Therefore, the stop was justified. ORS 484.350(4).
I take the majority opinion to hold that if the officer had testified that one of the reasons he stopped the vehicle was because he observed a traffic infraction, the stop would have been upheld, but because the officer failed to so testify, that that infraction may not serve as the basis for a valid stop and the prosecution of a serious traffic infraction has been compromised.3 The majority finds this result is dictated by State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 561 P2d 1006 (1977).
*509In State v. Tucker, 286 Or 485, 494, 595 P2d 1364 (1979), the Supreme Court said:
“* * * Valdez was presented to both the Court of Appeals and this court as a case involving the validity of an investigatory stop. The state did not contend that the stop was justified by the traffic infraction and we did not decide the case on that basis.”
In Tucker, Justice Tongue observed that:
“Valdez simply holds that when a police officer says that although he observed a traffic violation he actually made a stop for an entirely different reason, and was not concerned with enforcement of the traffic laws, the courts will take him at his word. * * * ” (Emphasis added.) 286 Or at 494.
Thus, taken together, Valdez and Tucker appear to establish a rule that the propriety of an officer’s action will be judged by that officer’s subjective motivation rather than by objective evidence. In my opinion such a rule is not logical or desirable.
In State v. Carter/Dawson, 287 Or 479, 485, 600 P2d 873 (1979), the Supreme Court held that an officer’s motives are not relevant to the question of the validity of an otherwise justifiable traffic stop.4 To me, this is reasonable and realistic. Applying Carter/Dawson to the facts here, I conclude that the trial court erred in allowing defendant’s motion to suppress.
This case, as well as Valdez, Tucker and Carter/ Dawson, should be required reading for every law enforcement officer in the state.
It is not clear to me why the state did not raise the issue of defendant’s standing to contest the validity of the stop.
The trial court found that there was no reason to believe that defendant was not illegally parked as the officer testified.
The trial court found that the officer’s reason for stopping the vehicle was his suspicion that a crime might have been committed, and that at no time did the officer indicate that he stopped the vehicle because of any violation of any traffic law.
In State v. Carter/Dawson, 287 Or 479, 485, 600 P2d 873 (1979), the evidence indicated the officer deliberately placed the vehicle under surveillance before there was any traffic violation. The officer’s primary interest was the investigation of recent burglaries in the area.