dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and vote to reverse on the basis that a forecast of the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Allen engaged in a continued course of treatment to plaintiff through 25 November 1988. It is undisputed that plaintiff was admitted to Wake Medical Center on 25 November 1988, where she orally gave her medical history, including the history of her Hodgkin’s Disease, to the attending physicians. When asked who was her attending physician for her Hodgkin’s Disease, plaintiff identified defendant Dr. Allen. The medical records of *146Wake Medical Center further verify that Dr. Allen was identified as her treating physician and note the time of day (in military hours) he was contacted concerning plaintiff’s care on 25 November 1988. Defendants argue that this forecast of evidence does not show that Dr. Allen was asked about plaintiffs Hodgkin’s Disease when he was contacted. It is reasonable to assume that he was not contacted by the physicians to discuss the weather, but instead to discuss the health condition of plaintiff, including her Hodgkin’s Disease. This is bolstered by the forecast of evidence that, thereafter, plaintiff received a Medicare statement reflecting that Dr. Allen had billed for the services he rendered upon being consulted for an evaluation of plaintiff’s condition on 25 November 1988.
I believe this forecast of evidence is such that “a reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a conclusion [that Dr. Allen treated plaintiff on 25 November 1988 for her condition that was created by his alleged negligence in 1982].” See Hines v. Arnold, 103 N.C. App. 31, 34, 404 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1991) (evidence necessary to defeat motion for directed verdict). Therefore, plaintiff’s action is not time barred.