concurring and concurring specially.
I concur fully with the majority. I write separately, however, to note that, with respect to Division 2 (a) of the majority, even if we were to reach the conclusion that, under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (f), the defendants were not required to raise the plaintiffs’ failure to file an expert affidavit in a motion filed separately from their answers, the defendants’ answers did not contain sufficient language to effectuate a motion to dismiss. As noted in the majority opinion, merely raising a general defense (that the complaint fails to state a claim) and making a conclusory statement, as was done here, that having answered the complaint it “should be dismissed” does not meet the requirements of a motion to dismiss for purposes of OCGA § 9-11-9.1.18 Cf. Glass v. Glover, 241 Ga. App. 838, 839 (528 SE2d 262) (2000); Howell v. Styles, 221 Ga. App. 781, 782 (1) (472 SE2d 548) (1996). Accordingly, the defendants’ answers here would not have sufficed to meet the requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (f) to raise the failure to file an affidavit by motion to dismiss. Thus, irrespective of whether a motion to dismiss must be filed as a separate document or not, the plaintiffs here would still be entitled to renew their complaint because the defendants did not properly raise the issue.
Furthermore, with respect to Division 2 (b) of the majority, I write separately to point out that in four of the overruled cases, Foskey v. Foster, 199 Ga. App. 205 (404 SE2d 303) (1991); Lyberger v. Robinson, 207 Ga. App. 845 (429 SE2d 324) (1993); Witherspoon v. Aranas, 254 Ga. App. 609 (562 SE2d 853) (2002); and Shirley v. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta/Lowndes County, 263 Ga. App. 408 (587 SE2d 873) (2003), the defendants did move to dismiss (or did raise the defect in their initial responsive pleadings), as required by the applicable statute, so the complaints, which initially failed to include *159the required affidavits, would have been subject to dismissal for failure to demonstrate mistake, despite the cases’ erroneous holdings with respect to the nonamendability of the defective complaints.19
Similarly, defendant’s second defense stating “to the extent as may be shown by the evidence through discovery, this Defendant avers the Plaintiffs have failed to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1” does not equate to a motion to dismiss.
It is unclear from the opinions in Trucano v. Rosenberg, 215 Ga. App. 153 (450 SE2d 216) (1994), and Grier-Baxter v. Sibley, 247 Ga. App. 560 (545 SE2d 5) (2001), whether the same is true in those cases as there is no discussion regarding whether the defendants raised the defect in their initial answers and/or by motion to dismiss.