dissenting to Part III.
Accompanying the amendment to I.C. § 6-906 is a statement of purpose which explains that the statute was being amended to “give claimants a more reasonable length of time to learn of and exercise their rights while at the same time giving the government a more easily ascertained statute of limitation.” The amendment extended the existing 120 day time limitation to a 180 day period. The legislature intended to upgrade the procedural scheme under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and it is evident that the amendment is remedial in nature and retrospective application was intended.
In Durtschi, this Court recognized the need for a liberal interpretation of the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. A liberal interpretation avoids thwarting meritorious claims on nonmeritorious, technical grounds. Durtschi, supra, 110 Idaho at 468, 716 P.2d 1238. Furthermore, in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981), this Court also committed itself to liberally construing statutes with a view to accomplishing the aims and purposes of obtaining substantial justice. In Farber, this Court refused to literally and strictly apply the notice requirement of I.C. § 6-905, because it would “result in denying the legitimate claims of those who have suffered injury at the hands of the state, without furthering the legislative purposes behind the statute.” Id. at 402, 630 P.2d at 689.
There is no suggestion that I.C. § 6-906, as amended, would affect the substantive right of the parties, it would only extend the time in which a notice of claim may be filed. Clearly, the statute or the amendment is remedial in nature and should be applied retroactively to the Gaileys’ claim. This application will not hinder the purposes of the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. However, only apply*434ing I.C. § 6-906 prospectively results in denying legitimate claims and neither furthers the legislative purpose behind the statute nor promotes substantial justice. Id. at 402, 630 P.2d at 689.