¶ 87. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I agree with the court of appeals that the circuit court's sua sponte order granting summary judgment to Trinity on its bad faith claim was improper. The tort of bad faith is an intentional tort. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 691, 271 N.W.2d *370368 (1978). "To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim." Id.
¶ 88. The tort of bad faith contains an objective and a subjective element. Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 377, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995). The first element — the absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim — is objective. Id. at 378. The second element — the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim — is subjective. Id. at 392. The "subjective component can be inferred from a 'reckless disregard of a lack of a reasonable basis for denial or a reckless indifference to facts or to proofs submitted by the insured.'" Id. (quoting Anderson, 85 Wis. 2d at 693).
¶ 89. Issues of subjective intent are generally not suitable for resolution on summary judgment. Tri-Tech Corp. of America v. Americorp Serv., Inc., 2002 WI 88, ¶ 30 n.5, 254 Wis. 2d 418, 646 N.W.2d 822. "We have stated [that] the issue of... intent is not one that properly can be decided on a motion for summary judgment. Credibility of a person with respect to his subjective intent does not lend itself to be determined by affidavit." Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston, 81 Wis. 2d 183, 190, 260 N.W.2d 241 (1977) (citing Doern v. Crawford, 30 Wis. 2d 206, 214, 140 N.W.2d 193 (1966)); see also Green Spring Farms v. Spring Green Farms Assoc., 172 Wis. 2d 28, 41, 492 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1992).
¶ 90. Here, Tower moved for summary judgment on the bad faith claim, arguing that it had a reasonable basis to deny Trinity's coverage claim as a matter of law. Trinity opposed the motion, arguing that there was no *371reasonable basis to deny the claim (because it was entitled to reformation of the policy) and that there were disputed issues of material fact regarding Tower's knowledge or reckless disregard, requiring a jury trial. The circuit court denied Tower's motion, but then, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(6), sua sponte entered summary judgment for Trinity. The parties eventually stipulated to compensatory damages in the amount of $17,570, representing the reasonable value of the attorneys' fees Trinity had incurred in proving up insurance coverage. The case proceeded to trial on the issue of punitive damages only.
¶ 91. The court of appeals concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate because "the facts related to what Tower actually knew and thus whether there was intentional disregard are in dispute." Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Ins. Co., 2002 WI App 46, ¶ 21, 251 Wis. 2d 212, 234, 641 N.W.2d 504. The majority correctly notes that this misstates the intent component of the bad faith tort, which requires "knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim" rather than "intentional disregard" as stated by the court of appeals. Anderson, 85 Wis. 2d at 691; majority op., ¶ 37. However, later in its opinion, the court of appeals reframes the disputed issue as "whether the facts necessary to evaluate the claim were properly investigated and developed or recklessly ignored and disregarded," or alternatively, whether there was a "knowing failure to exercise an honest and informed judgment." Id., ¶¶ 25, 27. This correctly states the subjective intent component of the bad faith tort.
¶ 92. Because issues of subjective intent are generally not amenable to resolution on summary judgment — particularly summary judgment entered *372sua sponte — I agree with the court of áppeals that summary judgment on the bad faith claim was improperly granted. The circuit court's written decision on summary judgment notes that "[Gene] Gallagher [Tower's vice president] testified that he did not actually know whether Trinity had requested non-owned and hired auto insurance." Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, July 21, 1999, p. 7. Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded that Gallagher's failure to contact the underwriter Fischer (who testified that he had actual knowledge), consult with legal counsel, or contact Trinity satisfied the subjective knowledge element of bad faith under Anderson. Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8.
¶ 93. While the evidence cited by the circuit court strongly supports a finding of reckless disregard, Tower was entitled to have a jury decide the matter after a trial rather than have the circuit court do so on the basis of a paper record. Evaluating issues of knowledge or recklessness involves weighing credibility and drawing inferences, a task for a jury at trial, not a court on summary judgment. Although it was not entitled to summary judgment in its favor on the objective element of the tort of bad faith (the absence of a reasonable basis to deny the claim), Tower was entitled to litigate at least the subjective element at a jury trial.
¶ 94. This is especially true in light of the claim for punitive damages, which was tried on the basis of instructions that informed the jury that the court had determined "as a matter of law" and as a result of "undisputed material facts" that Tower had "acted in bad faith in denying coverage to Trinity because, A, Tower lacked a reasonable basis for denying coverage to Trinity ... and, B, based on Tower's failure to conduct an adequate investigation of Trinity's claim for cover*373age, Tower recklessly failed to ascertain that coverage to Trinity ... . should have been provided." As a result of the summary judgment, Tower was precluded from presenting evidence or argument that it was not guilty of bad faith — either the objective or the subjective components of the claim. Instead, the jury was told that Tower's bad faith was an established matter, not open to dispute, and that it need only decide whether Trinity was entitled to punitive damages.
¶ 95. Accordingly, I do not agree with the majority's decision to reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. I would affirm the court of appeals' decision to the extent that it reversed and remanded for trial on Trinity's bad faith claim.
¶ 96. Although the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order of summary judgment on the bad faith claim, it nevertheless upheld the jury's $3.5 million award of punitive damages. The majority affirms this part of the court of appeals' opinion. I do not agree.
¶ 97. Any punitive damages claim is necessarily interwoven in the underlying determination of liability or fault. This is particularly true in the intentional tort of bad faith, for which liability attaches only upon a determination of the defendant's knowing or reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. Here, the entry of summary judgment eliminated Tower's ability to present evidence that it did not possess the requisite level of intent to establish liability for the intentional tort upon which any award of punitive damages would necessarily be premised. The starting point for the jury was the fact that Tower's bad faith had already been conclusively established. The circuit court instructed the jury that bad faith and reckless disregard had been determined by the court as a matter of law on the basis *374of "undisputed material facts," which necessarily influenced the jury's consideration of the appropriateness and amount of punitive damages. For this reason alone, I would reverse the award of punitive damages.
¶ 98. In addition, however, the punitive damages award cannot withstand the due process test for exces-siveness established in BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996), which requires a reviewing court to evaluate, de novo, 1) the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct; 2) the disparity or ratio between the punitive damages award and the harm or potential harm suffered; and 3) the difference between the punitive damages award and any civil or criminal penalties authorized for the conduct.1 See also Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001).
¶ 99. The United States Supreme Court has very recently reaffirmed the BMW test and the requirement of de novo review: "Exacting appellate review ensures that an award of punitive damages is based upon an 'application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice.' " State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S._, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 1520-21 (2003), (citing Cooper Industries, 532 U.S. at 436, quoting in turn BMW, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
*375¶ 100. Campbell, like this case, was a bad faith cause of action against an insurance company. The issue was whether "an award of $145 million in punitive damages, where full compensatory damages are $1 million, is excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 1517. The Supreme Court invalidated the $145 million punitive damages award, concluding that it "was neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed," and that it was "an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant." Id. at 1526.
¶ 101. Under both BMW and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Campbell, de novo review of the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct depends in part on whether the conduct was violent, caused physical injury, or was "purely economic," and whether it involved "trickery and deceit" or something closer to mere negligence. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-76; Campbell, 123 S.Ct. at 1521. Exemplary or punitive damages "should reflect 'the enormity of [the] offense.'" BMW at 575. In Campbell, the Supreme Court elaborated:
We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. ... The existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect.
*376Campbell, 123 S.Ct. at 1521.
¶ 102. None of these factors is present here. The conduct at issue implicated economic injury only (insurance coverage), and, in fact, Trinity was never at risk of having no insurance at all; either the agent's insurance carrier would provide coverage, or Tower would, depending upon the outcome of the coverage dispute. Also, Tower provided legal counsel and a defense as soon as Trinity was sued, and ultimately stipulated to reformation and paid the underlying claim. No one was physically injured; no one's health or safety was at risk. Nor was there any financial vulnerability, for the reasons just noted. There was no intentional malice, trickery, or deceit.
¶ 103. The majority characterizes Tower as a "recidivist" for purposes of evaluating the reprehensibility of its conduct, citing the fact that Tower was the defendant in Trible v. Tower Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 2d 172, 168 N.W.2d 148 (1969). Majority op., ¶¶ 59-60. By no stretch of the facts or imagination can Tower be considered a "recidivist" on the basis of Trible.
¶ 104. In Trible, this court held that an insurance agency's mistake is attributable to the insurer under agency law, and that reformation is an appropriate remedy for mutual mistake in an application for insurance. Trible, 43 Wis. 2d at 181-84. Yes, Tower was the defendant in Trible, but it was not a bad faith case; it was an action on an insurance contract, and in affirming the circuit court's reformation of the policy we noted that there had been a factual dispute on the issue of mistake, which had been resolved by the factfinder in favor of the insured. Trible, 43 Wis. 2d at 180. Contrary to the majority's assertions, then, majority op., ¶ 59, Trible did not hold that Tower had violated any duty, disregarded any law, or otherwise committed bad faith *377against its insured. Tower can hardly be considered a "repeat offender" on the basis of Trible.
¶ 105. "[PJerhaps [the] most commonly cited indi-cium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff." BMW, 517 U.S. at 580. Punitive damages "must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to compensatory damages." Id. Here, $3.5 million in punitive damages was awarded on the basis of only $17,570 in compensatory damages, a very steep 200:1 ratio.
¶ 106. Without even mentioning this 200:1 ratio of punitive damages to actual compensatory damages in this case, the majority, like the court of appeals, seems to adopt (although this is not entirely clear) Trinity's position that there is only a 7:1 ratio between the punitive and compensatory damages, citing evidence of "a harm" of $490,000. Majority op., ¶ 65. The $490,000 figure represents Trinity's liability in the underlying auto accident, but that amount has no bearing on the actual or even potential compensatory damages in the bad faith claim. As noted above, Trinity was never at risk for the auto accident damages, because either the agent (that is, his errors and omissions carrier) or Tower was responsible for the mistake in the insurance application. The actual compensatory damages in the bad faith claim consisted of the attorneys' fees Trinity incurred in the coverage dispute, not the personal injury damages in the underlying lawsuit, which Trinity would not and did not have to pay.2
*378¶ 107. The majority recognizes that due process requires a comparison of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and that "[cjompensatory damages represent the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff." Majority op., ¶ 63. Inexplicably, the majority fails to undertake the proper comparison (punitive damages to actual compensatory damages) and instead endorses (apparently) an improper comparison of punitive damages to a measure of "potential harm" that has no relationship to the bad faith claim upon which the punitive damages award was premised. As noted above, there was no "potential" that Trinity would have to pay the claimant in the underlying lawsuit, because either the insurance agent or Tower would be required to do so depending upon the result of the coverage litigation. In any event, a comparison of punitive damages to a creative (but obviously inapplicable) measure of "potential harm" is entirely inappropriate where, as here, actual compensatory damages have in fact been determined. Indeed, the jury was instructed that the compensatory damages were $17,570 and that punitive damages may be awarded based upon that amount of compensatory damages. The majority's position, appar*379ently adopting Trinity's, amounts to nothing more than a manipulation of the ratio for purposes of due process scrutiny.3
¶ 108. The majority's approach to this second BMW factor is also directly at odds with Campbell. There, the Supreme Court compared the punitive damages award to the actual compensatory damages in the bad faith action, not the damages in the underlying auto accident litigation. Campbell, 123 S.Ct. at 1524.
¶ 109. The Supreme Court also stated in Campbell that it is now an established principle in the law of punitive damages that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process." Id. at 1524. The Court, having declared that the case was "neither close nor difficult," held that the 145:1 ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages in Campbell could not pass constitutional muster. Id. at 1522,1526. Particularly in light of this most recent pronouncement from the Supreme Court, the 200:1 punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio in this case clearly exceeds constitutional limits.
*380¶ 110. The third factor of the BMW analysis requires a comparison of the punitive damages award to any "civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct." BMW, 517 U.S. at 583. The majority notes that the court of appeals dismissed this factor as "largely irrelevant" because the court had concluded that the "legislature has not prescribed penalties for the type of conduct engaged in by the defendant." Majority op., ¶ 67 (quoting Trinity, 2002 WI App 46, ¶ 41).
¶ 111. The majority goes on to note that the legislature has in fact provided a criminal penalty, including a fine of up to $10,000, for any violation of "any insurance statute or rule of this state," Wis. Stat. § 601.64(4), and that the Wisconsin Administrative Code contains insurance rules that prohibit unfair settlement practices, including the "[flailure to attempt in good faith to effectuate fair and equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear." Wis. Admin. Code § Ins. 6.11(3)(a)(4) (Jan. 2002). Majority op., ¶ 68. This statute and rule proscribe conduct that is comparable to the tort of bad faith. The $3.5 million punitive damages award in this case, evaluated against the $10,000 maximum fine provided for in Wis. Stat. § 601.64(4), yields a 350:1 ratio, even more startling than the 200:1 ratio for' punitive-to-compensatory damages. In Campbell, the Supreme Court said it "need not dwell long on this [BMW] guidepost" because the applicable $10,000 state fine for comparable conduct was "dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages award." Campbell, 123 S.Ct. at 1526. The same is true here.4
*381¶ 112. Our own precedent also requires that this punitive damages award he reversed. In Management Computer Services v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 206 Wis. 2d 158, 196, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996), this court held that a punitive damages award of $1.75 million on a compensatory damages award of $65,000 "is shocking.to the conscience of the court." Applying the BMW test, particularly the requirements that punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages and possible criminal penalties for comparable misconduct (there, as here, $10,000), and noting that the case (like this one) involved economic injury only, this court concluded that the $1.75 million punitive damages award "is excessive and therefore a violation of due process, because it is more than is necessary to serve the purposes of punitive damages." Management Computer Servs., 206 Wis. 2d at 196.
¶ 113. It is true that there is no "mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable" for purposes of comparing punitive damages to compensatory damages or comparable civil or criminal penalties. BMW, 517 U.S. *382at 583. Management Computer Services' 30:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages and 175:1 ratio of punitive damages to comparable criminal penalties was "shocking to the conscience of the court" and excessive to the point of violating due process. Management Computer Servs., 206 Wis. 2d at 196. I can find no principled way to reach a different conclusion in this case, which presents a 200:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages and a 350:1 ratio of punitive damages to comparable criminal penalties.
¶ 114. Accordingly I would reverse the court of appeals' decision to the extent that it upheld the award of punitive damages in this case, and remand the entire matter for a new trial on bad faith liability as well as punitive damages.
¶ 115. I am authorized to state that Justices JON E WILCOX and DAVID T. PROSSER JR. join this dissent.
While the majority applies a de novo standard of review (as it must under Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 (2001)), it sows some potential for confusion by citing certain language from Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 626, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997): "[w]e are reluctant to set aside an award merely because it is large or we would have awarded less." Majority op., f 46. De novo review requires independent evaluation by the reviewing court, which may indeed result in a substitution of the reviewing court's opinion for that of the jury, contrary to the quoted language in Jacque.
In discussing the standard of review, the majority notes that in Management Computer Services v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 206 Wis. 2d 158, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996), this court faulted the circuit court for setting forth only "conclusory reasons" and failing to "analyze the evidence" on a punitive damages issue. Majority op., ¶ 48. The majority makes the same mistake here *378in its evaluation of the second BMW factor. It says that "Tower introduced evidence that the only potential damage in this case was $17,000." Majority op., ¶ 65. Actually, the $17,570 figure definitively represents the actual — not "potential"— compensatory damages in this case. The majority then notes that "Trinity introduced evidence of a [potential] harm of $490,000," and goes on to conclude that "[t]he punitive damages award represents a 7:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, if Trinity's position is applied." Id. (emphasis added). Apparently the majority is adopting "Trinity's position," although it does not say so directly (there is the qualifier "if'), and it gives no reasons for doing so.
The Supreme Court reiterated in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S._, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 1520 (2003), that "[t]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to classify arbitrariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due process — of the law in general — is to allow citizens to order their behavior. A State can have no legitimate interest in deliberately making the law so arbitrary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based solely upon bias or whim." The Court also stated that "[t]he principles set forth in Gore must be implemented with care, to ensure both reasonableness and proportionality." Id. at 1525-26. The majority's summary and vague apparent adoption of Trinity's position lacks the clarity of analysis required by the de novo due process review the Supreme Court has mandated.
The majority cites certain language from Campbell regarding the third BMW factor, but it does so incompletely. *381Majority op., ¶ 66. After indicating in Campbell that a criminal penalty may have "less utility" when used to determine the amount of punitive damages, the Supreme Court went on to emphasize that "[g]reat care must be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a criminal trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards of proof. Punitive damages are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive damages award." Campbell, 123 S.Ct. at 1526. As this additional language from the decision makes clear, the Court in Campbell was cautioning against using the existence of an applicable criminal penalty as grounds to sustain a punitive damages award, not the converse.