dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s disposition, I dissent.
There were sufficient objective facts for Olson to have the requisite reasonable suspicion. He observed that the same person who had been a passenger in the previous cases where he had issued citations was in defendant’s car. This fact, taken together with Olson’s observation that the defendant’s silhouette and length of hair resembled a person whom he had cited earlier for driving while suspended, was sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime. I would hold that the stop was valid.
I would also hold that Olson’s request for identification was proper. ORS 807.570 requires a person to present and deliver a driver’s license to a police officer on request when lawfully stopped and detained while driving a vehicle. The officer’s right to request a license after a lawful stop does not immediately evaporate when the suspicion that led to the stop no longer exists. State v. Fleming, 63 Or App 661, 665 P2d 1235 (1983); State v. Brister, 34 Or App 575, 579 P2d 863, rev den 284 Or 521 (1978).1 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the fact that the stops in Brister and Fleming were under ORS 484.350(4) for traffic infractions and not, as here, under ORS 131.615 for crimes, is irrelevant. Statutes on the same subject should be construed as consistent with each other, whenever possible. Davis v. Wasco IED, 286 Or 261, 272, 593 P2d 1152 (1979). The specific provisions of ORS 807.570, allowing an officer to request a license, should be read together with ORS 484.350(4) and ORS 131.615.
The court decided Brister on a Fourth Amendment issue. However, because ORS 131.615 was intended as a partial codification of Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), which was decided under the Fourth Amendment, a similar analysis would be applicable under ORS 131.615.