(concurring, but with exception).
I concur in affirming the dismissal as to Salt Lake County. But in regard to the remand for further proceedings as to defendants Larsen and Andrus make the following comments:
I respectfully disagree with the statement that the governmental immunity act “applies only to entities and does not include individuals.” I know of no entity that can act otherwise than through individuals, i. e., officials, officers, or employees. If the public official is immune in performing his official duties, and the employee performing the duty for him is not immune, the unfairness and deprivation of equal protection of the laws is obvious. Sparing any further exposition as to the harmful effects such a rule would have on governmental operations and personnel, I think that the proposition which is sound in policy and in conformity with law and justice is: that so long as a public official, or his subordinate, or his employee, is acting honestly and in good faith within the scope of his authority in performing his public duties, he is entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity, unless he is guilty of some conduct which transcends such good faith performance of his duty, by a wilful or malicious act, which he knows or should know would likely result in injury.1 This is subject only to exceptions expressly provided by statute. I see nothing in Sheffield v. Turner (footnote 8 main opinion) inconsistent with that position.
*929However, I also concur with the observations of Chief Justice Ellett in his concurring opinion that the statutory provisions he refers to appear to be applicable to this particular case and impose upon the driver of a police vehicle the duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances for the safety of others.
. See discussion of pros and cons on this subject in Prosser, Law of Torts 4th ed., Chap. 26, Sec. 131 and 132.