dissenting. I am unable to agree with the majority opinion, and must therefore respectfully dissent.
The majority rejects plaintiff’s contention that K.S.A. 60-206(a) controls this case. This, I feel, is improper. Both equitable principles and the express language of 60-206(a) require that the provisions of that statute apply here.
K.S.A. 60-206(a) pertinently provides:
“(a) Computation; legal holiday defined. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this chapter, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday ora legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
As the majority opinion indicates, the bringing of this action was originally controlled by the one-year statute of limitations enunciated in K.S.A. 60-515(a). The series of agreements executed by these parties extended the application of that statute of limitations. The majority chooses to differentiate between an “extension” of the statute and a waiver to assert that statute as a defense. This is a distinction without a difference. Semantical play aside, the true effect of the parties’ agreements was to.extend the period *523of time called for in 60-515(a). The agreements expanded, if you will, that original one-year limitation period. Unfortunately for plaintiff, the expanded period fell one day short of being timely, or so the majority finds.
My point is this: K.S.A. 60-515(a) was part and parcel of this case. The trial court granted summary judgment solely on the basis that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Were it not for the statute, the trial court would have had absolutely no basis for dismissing the suit. Contrary to what the majority finds, this suit was not dismissed because the parties’ contract was a waiver of the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations (K.S.A. 60-208[c]). The statute of limitations controlled the outcome of this case, not the parties’ contract. 60-515(a) was, therefore, an “applicable statute”; accordingly, the provisions of 60-206(a) were activated.
The majority opinion also indicates that there was no period of time to be computed. I, likewise, cannot agree with this. The period of time requiring computation is obvious. It is that time period commencing January 16, 1974 (plaintiff’s 18th birthday) and ending on a date after which plaintiff was barred from bringing suit. That time period, as lengthened by the parties, was a “period of time prescribed or allowed by this chapter . . . or by any applicable statute,” and required computation. I am unable to reach any other conclusion but that the terms of 60-206(a) governed that computation.
A result similar to that which I have proposed was reached in the recent case of Bledsoe v. Department of Hous. & Urban Development, 398 F.Supp. 315 (E.D.Pa. 1975). There, the federal district court was faced with the government’s contention that plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court rested upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) (the federal counterpart to 60-206[a]) in finding that the statute had not run. The court said:
“Rule 6(a) does not, by its terms, apply to the computation of statutory limitation periods, generally, nor to the six month limitation period of [the Federal Tort Claims Act], specifically. Nevertheless, the method of computation, set out therein, may, of course, be borrowed and utilized by a court for computation purposes, at least with respect to federal statutory limitation periods, where there is no contrary legislative intent. . . (p. 320.)
Likewise, this court should “borrow” that method of computation announced in 60-206(a) with respect to limitation periods.
*524Further, the United States Supreme Court, in Union Nat. Bank of Wichita, Kansas v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 93 L.Ed. 1190, 69 S.Ct. 911, found that “the considerations of liberality and leniency which find expression in Rule 6(a)” should apply when computing time for perfecting an appeal to the high court. The court used the “any applicable statute” language of Rule 6(a) in reaching their conclusion.
Finally, numerous cases have applied general time computation statutes to suits involving the computation of time under statutes of limitation. These cases are listed at 20 A.L.R.2d 1249, 1256, § 5, and supplemented by A.L.R.2d Later Case Service, p. 284. Included in the list is Hood v. Bixby, 13 Kan. 164.
Inasmuch as I have concluded that K.S.A. 60-206(c) is applicable herein, this action was timely filed, regardless of how the phrase “until March 1” is interpreted. This is so because, even assuming such phrase was exclusive and therefore the last day for filing was the last day of February, 1976, that day fell on a Sunday. Consequently, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-206(a), plaintiff had until the end of the “next day” (March 1, 1976) before the deadline expired. The issue of whether the term “until” is exclusive or inclusive, in my view, is totally moot.
This result is in complete accord with public policy considerations as set forth in Dobson v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 152 Kan. 820, 107 P.2d 676.
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, it is the public policy of this state that Sunday is not a day for the transaction of business, and where the last day of a period within which an act may be done falls on Sunday, the act may be rightfully done on the following secular or business day.” (Syl. 3.)
Accord: State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365.
One final point. Plaintiff filed a first amended petition below in which plaintiff alleged an additional cause of action for fraud. The alleged fraud took place at the time the waivers were executed. The first waiver of the statute of limitations was executed January 14, 1975. The first amended petition was filed March 18, 1976, some fourteen months after the execution of the first waiver. Kansas has a two-year statute of limitations for actions based on fraud. (K.S.A. 60-513[a] [3].) Thus, plaintiff’s fraud count was not barred by any statute of limitations, and the trial court erred in dismissing that count.
I would reverse and remand for trial on the merits.