concurring specially.
While I completely concur with the resolution of these appeals, I believe it is important to recognize that in determining whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, there are factors to be considered other than just the time sequence in which the injury occurred. Such factors may include whether the site of the injury was the only means of the employee’s ingress and egress. (DeHowitt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 147 (108 SE2d 280) (1959)); *466whether there was a causal connection between the employment and the injury (Borden Foods Co. v. Dorsey, 112 Ga. App. 838 (3) (146 SE2d 532) (1965); Employers Ins. Co. v. Bass, 81 Ga. App. 306 (58 SE2d 516) (1950)); or whether a personal deviation has broken the link with employment (Chandler v. General Accident &c. Corp., 101 Ga. App. 597 (114 SE2d 438) (1960)). Thus, “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable interval depends not only on the length of time involved but also on the circumstances occasioning the interval and the nature of the employee’s activity.” 1 A Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, 5-42, § 21.60.
Decided July 12, 1989 Rehearing denied July 25, 1989 Dozier, Akin & Lee, L. Z. Dozier, for appellant. Jones, Cork & Miller, Wallace Miller III, for appellee.