concurring specially.
Although I do not concur in the analysis, I concur in the judgment because the issue the court decides is moot insofar as this Court’s jurisdiction is concerned. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in reversing this Court, states at the end of its opinion that “[the statute of limitation] was tolled until April 23, 1994, by the written tolling agreement.” Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P. C. v. Frame, 269 Ga. 844, 851 (507 SE2d 411) (1998). The Supreme Court did not leave open the possibility that the agreement was subject to reformation to add a further extension to October 1 due to mutual mistake. As pointed out by it, the action was not filed until September 26. The Court held that the action was accordingly time barred. That forecloses the farther consideration of the contention that what was in fact intended by the parties was an extension to October 1.