dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s holding that in this case, the “minimum contacts which are absolutely necessary between the defendant and our state for North Carolina to invoke jurisdiction are missing,” I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly states the two-part analysis required for determining the existence of personal jurisdiction:
First, the North Carolina long-arm statute must permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the requirements of the North Carolina long-arm statute have been met. However, I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the due process analysis.
In a lengthy analysis, the majority narrowly focuses its personal jurisdiction due process inquiry to the defendants’ relationship with the plaintiff excluding all of defendants’ other related contacts with our State. Indeed, “there is no requirement that the cause of action, pursuant to which the jurisdictional claim is raised, be related to the activities of the defendant which give rise to the in personam juris*389diction.” Hankins v. Somers, 39 N.C. App. 617, 621, 251 S.E.2d 640, 643 (1979) (quoting Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enterprises, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1366, 1372 (M.D.N.C. 1973)); see also, ETR Corporation v. Wilson Welding Service, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 666, 386 S.E.2d 766 (1990) (where this Court considered activities related and unrelated to the legal action in that case to determine whether a basis for in per-sonam jurisdiction existed).
“In determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process, the crucial inquiry is whether the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. To generate minimum contacts, the defendant must have acted in such a way so as to purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the laws of North Carolina. Moreover, the relationship between the defendant and the state must be such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into a North Carolina court.” Filmar Racing, Inc. v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 668, 671-72, 541 S.E.2d 733, 736-37 (2001). “The existence of minimum contacts cannot be ascertained by mechanical rules, but rather by consideration of the facts of each case in light of traditional notions of fair play and justice. The factors to be considered are (1) quantity of contacts, (2) nature and quality of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of the cause of action to the contacts, (4) the interest of the forum state, and (5) convenience to the parties.” Marion v. Long, 72 N.C. App. 585, 587, 325 S.E.2d 300, 302 (1985).
In this case, the defendants had several contacts with North Carolina such that it would not be unreasonable for them to anticipate being haled into the courts of this State. Significantly, the defendants hired two other North Carolina law firms to represent them in North Carolina courts. The defendants hired Patton Boggs L.L.P., a law firm with offices in Greensboro and Raleigh, to represent them in the Eastern District of North Carolina. During this trial, the federal district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and the trial resulted in a $21,000,000 verdict against defendants. Steven Hedges, one of the trial attorneys, joined the plaintiff law firm after the trial in the Eastern District of North Carolina and in his sworn statement, Mr. Hedges alleges he handled several matters in defendants’ appeal. Defendants contend they did not hire Mr. Hedges or the plaintiff law firm to handle any appellate *390matters. Rather, they hired another North Carolina law firm, the Raleigh office of Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore to prosecute their appeal. The plaintiff alleges it assisted in the prosecution of defendants’ appeal by handling several matters including filing a motion and preparing and filing the docketing statement.
I would hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied in this case. By their business activities including retaining two law firms in this State to represent them on the underlying matters giving rise to this action, defendants have “purposefully [availed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within [North Carolina], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), see also, ETR Corporation v. Wilson Welding Service, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 666, 386 S.E.2d 766 (1990).