dissenting,
with whom Mowbray, J., joins:I am not in accord with the views expressed by the majority and cannot acquiesce in the reversal. The effect of the majority opinion is that should the State decide to institute a third prosecution of appellant, it must hope for the continued cooperation of accomplice Swift within the framework of gratuitous limitations set forth by the majority proscribing the use of his prior testimony and further expend, in my view, unnecessarily, substantial public funds in a protracted trial in an effort to again prove appellant’s guilt.
Essentially, appellant charges error premised upon the fact that Swift, the admitted slayer, was permitted to plead to a charge of second-degree murder in exchange for testimony against her and that such plea was permitted only after his testifying. Appellant cites People v. Medina, 116 Cal.Rptr. 133 (Cal.App. 1974), for the proposition that such prosecutorial tactics violate a defendant’s right to due process. Medina, however, is easily distinguishable from our facts. There the witness was granted absolute immunity on the express condition that he testify precisely in accordance with the prior statements given to police. In that context, the district court of appeals justifiably held that “a defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution’s case depends substantially upon accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either by the prosecution or the court, under the strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion.” Id. at 145.
In the instant case, there was no such express condition compelling specific recitation of testimony. The majority attempt to fabricate compulsion by stating that “[ujnder threat of a death sentence, Swift ultimately recited a version of events. . . .” Such speculation is without support from the record. Appellant equally was under threat of a death sentence but instead received life imprisonment. This Court should not attempt to gauge the length of incarceration the Parole Commission and our correctional authorities might set for Swift. He is potentially imprisoned for life and there exists no basis to contend *228that the sentences of Franklin and Swift were so disproportionate as to shock the conscience at such violation of due process. Compare, Farmer v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 535, 569 P.2d 939 (1977).
There is a marked distinction between compulsion to testify as instructed and a reduction of charges conditioned upon a person’s testifying fully and honestly pertaining to the facts surrounding the crime. Examination of the cases cited by the majority finds them clearly distinguishable on their facts. Each involved either absolute immunity or ultimate expungment negotiated for promised testimony. See, e.g., People v. Green, 228 P.2d 867 (1951). The existence of the bargain or the expectation of leniency affects the credibility of the testimony not its admissibility. State v. Quinn, 142 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. 1940); accord, Darden v. United States, 405 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1969); Diaz-Rosendo v. United States, 357 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Rainone, 192 F.2d 860 (2nd Cir. 1951); People v. Bowley, 382 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1963). “The fact that [Swift] may have hoped for leniency affected only the weight which the jury should accord his testimony.” Diaz-Rosendo, supra, 357 F.2d at 130.
What occurred here is little different from a trial court deferring the imposition of sentence after accepting a plea pending the defendant’s giving the bargained-for testimony. Such court practice has received general judicial approval. See, e.g., United States v. Vida, 370 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1966). Here, the full plea bargain was disclosed to the jury, emphasized on cross-examination, argued as an issue of accomplice credibility, and ultimately the subject of jury instuctions.1 Cf. Darden, supra; Diaz-Rosendo, supra; Minkin v. United States, 383 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1965).
I remain unimpressed in this factual context that the use of testimony offered by an accomplice unpled and unsentenced deprives a defendant of due process. Neither am I here disposed to establish yet another technicality in criminal procedure hitherto unknown to Nevada criminal jurisprudence, *229particularly so where the sentence of the defendant and the accomplice are not too disparate, the testimony of the accomplice is sufficiently credible and supported by other substantial evidence. This is especially true in view of what I glean from our Legislature’s then intent to treat the initiator of a contract in such willful, deliberate, premeditated, and vicious homicides as primarily culpable.
Swift’s testimony given as early as the preliminary examination and throughout all proceedings, including the trial, was quite consistent and was a reiteration of his prior video tape statements made to the police and at least one other person prior to his arrest. The statements initially given to the police preceded any offer of concessions by the authorities.2 This testimony thereby achieved a high degree of credibility.
The two young children of appellant provided corroborative evidence supporting Swift’s testimony. Not only did their testimony parallel Swift’s version of the facts, but the combined testimony of all three witnesses was markedly sharp in contrast to appellant’s discrepant statements. Appellant originally told police that someone had broken into the home, although there was no indication of a forced entry. She stated that she had seen no one nor had she heard any yelling or scuffling in the kitchen where her husband was murdered. Later, in the presence of police officers, she told a neighbor that her husband was stabbed by the black man who had been “hanging around” the house for several days. When questioned by police about her statement, she denied any knowledge of the black man, although Swift’s employers testified that he received a number of phone calls after the homicide from an adult female identifying herself as “Mrs. Wellman,” appellant’s then name.
Her children, however, testified that on the night of the murder a black man came to the home and talked with appellant before going into the kitchen to kill their father. The children *230further testified that they heard sounds of fighting emanating from the kitchen and heard their father calling for help from their mother. They stated that they wanted to go render assistance to their father but that appellant held them on the couch and continued to watch television. The children saw the black man leave through the front door and testified that their mother then called the police. After adamant denial, appellant eventually admitted acquaintance with Swift. Such fabricated and contradictory statements alone may constitute corroborative evidence. People v. Santo, 273 P.2d 249 (Cal. 1954); People v. Simpson, 275 P.2d 31 (Cal. 1954).
Confronted with this substantial evidence, still, my brethren •feel that appellant’s right to due process was offended. While I agree here with the majority that “a court should not accept a negotiated plea of guilty which would not serve the public interest,” it seems in the best interests of the public, however, to convict two guilty coconspirators rather than merely one, possibly none at all. Prosecutorial etiquette, assuring that “justice is done,” SCR 181(3), would demand nothing less.
In LaPenav. State, 92 Nev. 1, 6, 544P.2d 1187, 1190(1976), this Court held that although the accomplice’s “participation in the crimes may have warranted a more serious charge than second-degree murder, plea bargaining is permissible.” Thus, grants of immunity are generally permissible “[u]ntil legislatively [or otherwise] forbidden.” Id. at 6, 544 P.2d at 1190. See also, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). This is not the case for such prohibition. In the instant case, I observe no compulsion for rehearsed testimony effected by negotiation and consequently find no error. I hasten to caution, however, that if circumstances in future cases are any less cogent than those presently before the Court, I would not hesitate to remand for new trial despite considerations of time, convenience, expense, and unavailability of witnesses or evidence.
I would affirm the judgment of conviction.
Instruction No. 15 read in part: “In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has been removed from the case. You must then determine whether there is any remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. If there is not such independent evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, the testimony of the accomplice is not corroborated.”
Instruction No. 16 read in part: “Apart from the issue of corroboration, it is further the law that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with suspicion and caution. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case.”
During trial, the following exchange between Deputy District Attorney Root and witness Swift occurred.
Direct Examination by Mr. Root:
“Q. And what if in fact were the negotiations entered between you and through Mr. Beatty, your attorney, and the District Attorney’s office?
A. ...
Q. But that was done after you gave the video tape statement; was it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the video tape statement, did you relate basically what you have related to the jury today?
A. Basically, yes, sir.
Q. Now, at the time you did give that video statement to the police here in Las Vegas, had any promises been made to you?
A. No, sir, no promises.”