(dissenting) — Under this state's constitution and statutes, elected officials are subject to recall whenever they commit misfeasance, malfeasance or a violation of the oath of office. Despite the unrestricted language of these provisions, the majority creates a new exception immunizing legislators from recall when their misconduct consists of words spoken in debate. This holding inexcusably restricts the rights of citizens to recall their elected officials. Accord*960ingly, I dissent.
The state constitution provides that elected public officers are subject to recall whenever a petition is filed reciting that the officer "has committed some act or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance while in office, or . . . has violated his oath of office". Const, art. 1, § 33 (amend. 8). The statute enacted to carry out this constitutional provision uses the same all-encompassing language. RCW 29.82.010. This broad language gives no indication that any exceptions to this recall power exist. Rather, legislators are subject to recall for any misconduct that rises to the level of misfeasance, malfeasance or violation of the oath of office.
Moreover, statutory and constitutional recall provisions such as these should be liberally construed and any limitations should be strictly construed. 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 190 (1984). In this state, we have phrased this rule in a slightly different form, holding that recall provisions are to be construed in favor of the voter, not the elected official. Pederson v. Moser, 99 Wn.2d 456, 462, 662 P.2d 866 (1983); McCormick v. Okanogan Cy., 90 Wn.2d 71, 78, 578 P.2d 1303 (1978).
Despite the lack of any qualifying language in the recall provisions and the rules of construction discussed above, the majority holds that legislators cannot be recalled for words spoken in debate. The majority bases this holding on the constitutional section establishing the freedom of legislative debate, which reads as follows: "No member of the legislature shall be liable in any civil action or criminal prosecution whatever, for words spoken in debate." Const, art. 2, § 17. Recall proceedings, however, are by no means civil actions or criminal prosecutions. Recall is an "electoral process" rather than a judicial action. See Teaford v. Howard, 104 Wn.2d 580, 583, 707 P.2d 1327 (1985); Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wn.2d 268, 270, 693 P.2d 71 (1984). Therefore, the very terms of the legislative debate privilege show that it does not apply to recall proceedings. Keeping in mind that we must construe recall provisions in favor of the voter, the majority's interpretation in favor of the leg*961islator is indefensible.
The majority attempts to justify its holding not on grounds of proper interpretation of statutes, but rather on policy grounds. According to the majority, application of the debate privilege to recall proceedings is necessary to protect "free and vigorous debate in all legislative bodies". However, this protection is already largely provided in the recall process. Recall elections cannot be held until a court has passed on the petition's legal and factual sufficiency, thereby protecting officials from the harassment that results from the filing of frivolous charges. Greco v. Parsons, 105 Wn.2d 669, 671, 717 P.2d 1368 (1986); Cole v. Webster, 103 Wn.2d 280, 283, 692 P.2d 799 (1984). The purpose behind the legislative debate privilege is likewise to enable legislators to function freely without fear of harassment. 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories and Dependencies § 55 (1974). Admittedly, the debate privilege would provide even greater protection from harassment than would the current system, because it would insulate legislators from even nonfrivolous recall charges. Surely, however, the protection from frivolous petitions that currently exists is more than sufficient to preserve free and vigorous debate. Additionally, the majority ignores the tremendous costs associated with its holding. That decision deprives the citizens of this state of their right to recall officials who have covered up corruption, lied, or otherwise engaged in spoken misconduct. These costs outweigh the marginal benefits of increased protection for legislative debate.
In conclusion, this state's recall provisions should be interpreted in the straightforward manner in which they are written. Legislators should be subject to recall for any misconduct, spoken or otherwise, that constitutes misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office. I dissent from the majority's unjustified limitation of these recall principles.
Callow, J., concurs with Durham, J.