—I concur in the judgment. After review, I have found no error warranting reversal.
I write separately to explain my views as to a number of defendant’s contentions.
I
Defendant claims that trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance in violation of his rights under both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution.
The majority reject the point. I do too. I agree that counsel’s performance did not prejudice defendant. But I simply cannot agree that it was not deficient. Doubts about counsel’s conduct of the defense are raised by the unconscionably meager time he devoted to preparation. Those doubts are confirmed by his manifest, and fundamental, misunderstanding of two crucial matters: the law of felony murder—a doctrine familiar to every law student—and the scope of the felony-murder special circumstance. It appears that the trial court eventually corrected counsel’s mistakes. But it did so only after he ha.d tried the guilt phase laboring under those misapprehensions.
I shall not dispute at this time the current teaching that a court should evaluate counsel’s performance deferentially. But I must state what all should know: when, as here, a judgment is at risk, it is all too tempting for a court to conclude that counsel’s conduct was reasonable. It is salutary to recall that “ ‘[Djeference is not abdication’ [citation]; it must never be used to insulate counsel’s performance from meaningful scrutiny and thereby automatically validate challenged acts or omissions.” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].)
II
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to instruct on certain offenses. The court gave instructions on first degree felony murder and robbery. It should also have given instructions, according to defendant, on first degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, second degree murder, and grand theft.
The majority reject the point. I join in their result, but not in their reasoning.
*983“It is, of course, virtually axiomatic that a trial court must correctly instruct on such legal principles as are applicable to the evidence [citation]—and on such legal principles alone. The failure or refusal to do so constitutes error.” (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 799 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].)
I find no error in the trial court’s failure to instruct on first degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, second degree murder, and grand theft. My reason is simple: none of these offenses is supported by the evidence.
The majority attempt to invoke the doctrine of invited error as to first degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and second degree murder. They appear to assume that the trial court was under an obligation to instruct on those offenses sua sponte. Even if that assumption were valid, the doctrine would not be applicable unless counsel expressed a sound tactical basis for the decision that allegedly “invited” the claimed error. (E.g., People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 931-932 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676].)1 Here, it is true, counsel stated a reason for his request that the trial court instruct only on first degree felony murder. But in view of his manifest and fundamental misunderstanding of that doctrine, I cannot deem his reason “sound.”
Ill
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by instructing as it did on homicide. The majority are not persuaded. I am.
. As stated above, a trial court must correctly instruct on applicable principles and on applicable principles alone; otherwise, it commits error. Here, the instructions on homicide embraced both murder (including first degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and felony murder) and manslaughter. Only felony murder, however, was supported by the evidence. Hence, the court erred by going beyond that offense.
Be that as it may, I cannot conclude that reversal is required. Certainly, no prejudice appears. On this record, the extra instructions were “surplus-*984age and could not have adversely affected the verdict.” (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1311 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].)
IV
Defendant claims that the trial court committed error under Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], overruled by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], by giving instructions he asserts were ambiguous on the requirement of intent to kill for the actual killer under the felony-murder-robbery special circumstance.
The majority reject the point. I do too. But their discussion does little more than state the conclusion.
The trial court instructed the jury in relevant part as follows.
“If you find the defendant guilty of murder of the first degree, you must then determine if the murder was committed under the following special circumstance:
“That the murder was committed by defendant Henry Earl Duncan while he was engaged in the commission of robbery, in violation of section 211 of the Penal Code.
“A special circumstance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, it is your duty to find that it is not true.
“If defendant Henry Earl Duncan was an aider and abettor, but not the actual killer, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to aid in the killing of a human being before you are permitted to find the alleged special circumstance of that first degree murder to be true as to defendant Henry Earl Duncan.
“In order to find the special circumstance charged in this case to be true or untrue, you must agree unanimously.
*985“To find that the special circumstance referred to in these instructions as murder in the commission of robbery is true, it must be proved, one, that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery; [^[] two, that the defendant intended to kill a human being or intended to aid another in the killing of a human being; [fl] three, that the murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of robbery or to facilitate the escape therefrom, or to avoid detection, [fl] In other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the robbery was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.”
In addressing defendant’s claim, the crucial question is: Did the foregoing instructions adequately inform the jury of the requirement of intent to kill for the actual killer?
To resolve that question, a court must determine how a hypothetical “reasonable juror” would have, or at least could have, understood the charge. (See Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S._,_ [112 L.Ed.2d 339, 342, 111 S.Ct. 328, 329] (per curiam) [“could have”]; Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 315-316 [85 L.Ed.2d 344, 354, 105 S.Ct. 1965] [same]; and People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487 [247 Cal.Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218] [“would have”].)
In my view, the instructions in question did indeed adequately inform the jury of the requirement of intent to kill for the actual killer. A reasonable juror would have understood the charge as follows, and could not have construed it otherwise: a defendant can be liable under the felony-murder-robbery special circumstance as either the actual killer or an aider and abettor; his liability depends on the presence of intent to kill or intent to aid another in a killing; the liability of an aider and abettor demands the latter; and, therefore, the liability of the actual killer demands the former.
Defendant argues to the contrary. He asserts that a reasonable juror would have, or at least could have, been misled by the following sentence: “If defendant Henry Earl Duncan was an aider and abettor, but not the actual killer, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to aid in the killing of a human being . . . .” I disagree. A reasonable juror might perhaps have inferred from the quoted language that for the actual killer, there is no requirement of intent to aid another in a killing. But such a juror simply could not have inferred that for the actual killer, there is no requirement of intent to kill.
*986V
Accordingly, having found no prejudicial error in the claims discussed above or in any other, I am of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied August 14, 1991.
To the extent that the discussion in the majority opinion in People v. Cooper, ante, page 771 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865], is to the contrary (id. at pp. 827-831), it is unsound for the reasons stated in Justice Broussard’s dissenting opinion therein (id. at pp. 850-859).