The State Board of Workers’ Compensation ordered ATC Healthcare Service, Inc. (“ATC”) to pay workers’ compensation benefits to Rita Adams. Both the appellate division and the superior court affirmed the award. We granted ATC’s application for discretionary review, and for reasons that follow, we reverse.
In reviewing a decision of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation, we construe the evidence and all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party prevailing before the board.1 We will affirm the board’s decision if any evidence supports it.2
So viewed, the record shows that ATC is a staffing agency that provides nurses to hospitals, including the Augusta State Medical Prison. In July 2000, ATC hired Adams, a registered nurse, to fill nursing positions on an “as needed” basis. Shortly thereafter, ATC sent Adams to the prison for a three-day training class conducted by Adam Baswell, a Department of Corrections employee.
On the first day of the course, Adams arrived at the prison and attended the morning session. At approximately 11:30 a.m., Baswell released the class for a lunch break, instructing the attendees to return at 1:00 p.m. The prison did not have an available lunch facility, so Adams and several classmates drove to a nearby Cracker Barrel for lunch. While in the restaurant, Adams slipped and fell, injuring her right knee. Two days later, she underwent knee surgery. Three weeks after the surgery, Adams returned to work. Although ATC had no available positions to offer her, she secured employment in a hospital emergency room.
Adams filed a workers’ compensation claim against ATC, seeking temporary total disability benefits for the three-week period between her injury and her return to work as an emergency room nurse. She also requested medical benefits and attorney fees. ATC disputed the claim, asserting that Adams’ injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. In particular, ATC argued that Adams was on a regularly scheduled lunch break at the time she fell, precluding her claim.
*793The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) rejected that argument, finding that the lunch break was not regularly scheduled and that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. It thus awarded Adams temporary total disability benefits for the requested period, medical benefits, and attorney fees. The appellate division and the superior court affirmed.
To fall within the Workers’ Compensation Act, an injury must arise out of and in the course of employment.3 And we have consistently held that
where a scheduled rest break or lunch break is provided to employees during which the employee is free to use the time as he chooses, making it personal to him, an injury occurring during the break period arises out of an individual pursuit and not out of his employment and is not compensable.4
The evidence shows that Adams’ injury occurred during a scheduled lunch break.5 Baswell, who conducts the three-day training course every two weeks, testified that the class has an agenda setting forth the topics covered before and after lunch each day. He further testified that the training class takes a lunch break every day “[approximately at the same point” and that “at lunch time [the class goes] to lunch [,] no matter what.” According to Baswell, the class usually adjourns for lunch at 12:00 p.m. and returns at 1:00 p.m., “but sometimes if the class [does not] have questions or things move a little bit faster, [the class is released] at 11:30 [a.m.] or so.” Furthermore, on the first day of training, he generally begins the lunch period at 11:30 a.m. to give the participants extra time to find a place to eat.
Baswell acknowledged that, if something in class causes the discussion to extend into the break, the lunch period might be cut short. Typically, however, Baswell covers the required topics before the *794planned lunch period. And the record shows that, on the day of Adams’ injury, the class commenced its lunch break at the normal time. Baswell further testified that he neither requires the trainees to seek lunch at a particular place nor conducts training activity during the break. He simply releases them for lunch and tells them what time to return.
Adams did not recall receiving a training schedule when she arrived for the course, but she understood that the lunch hour would last from 12:00 p.m. until 1:00 p.m. She testified, however, that Bas-well released the class at 11:30 a.m. because they finished the morning training early. Adams admitted that she could use her lunch break in any way she pleased and that neither ATC nor the prison controlled what she did with that time. The evidence further shows that ATC did not compensate Adams for the lunch period.
Based on this testimony, the ALJ concluded that Adams’ lunch break was not regularly scheduled because “the orientation schedule each day . . . determine [d] when the lunch break would occur.” We find that the ALJ construed the lunch break rule too narrowly. The training program adjourns for lunch at “around the same time every day,” after the class covers specified topics. And although the number of questions asked during class might alter that schedule to some extent, we cannot agree that these alterations render the lunch break “unscheduled.”
We recognize that a lunch break is not scheduled when its timing each day depends entirely on the employee’s changing workload.6 The evidence shows, however, that Baswell’s training agenda anticipated a lunch break at a particular time. Baswell further testified: “[I]f we don’t cover everything in the morning and if it’s noon and we still haven’t covered everything or there [are] questions about something, we’ll still go to lunch anyway.” Finally, the record contains no evidence that the lunch break ever ended at a time other than 1:00 p.m. Under these circumstances, it strains logic to view the break as anything but scheduled.
As the dissent notes, we must liberally construe the Workers’ Compensation Act to bring employers and employees within its provisions.7 Nevertheless, the Act only covers injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.8 And the record demonstrates that Adams slipped and fell at a restaurant while on a scheduled lunch break. It further shows that she was free to use her break in any manner she wished and that ATC exercised no control over her activ*795ities during that period.9 Accordingly, her injury arose “out of [her] individual pursuit and not out of [her] employment.”10 Because no evidence supports a contrary conclusion, we must reverse.
Judgment reversed.
Smith, C. J, Andrews, P. J., and Johnson, P. J., concur. Barnes, Miller and Adams, JJ, dissent.See Pitts v. City of Rome, 256 Ga. App. 278 (1) (568 SE2d 167) (2002).
See id.
See OCGA § 34-9-1 (4); Blair v. Ga. Baptist &c. Ministries, 189 Ga. App. 579, 580 (1) (377 SE2d 21) (1988).
Edwards v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 23, 24 (1) (202 SE2d 208) (1973); see also Rockwell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 248 Ga. App. 73 (545 SE2d 121) (2001) (“Generally, where an employee is on a scheduled break and is not conducting her employer’s business, the Workers’ Compensation Act does not apply.”).
Although we need not address the issue here, it is unclear whether an unscheduled lunch break taken off the employer’s premises, during which the employee is free of work obligations, arises out of the course of employment. See Rampley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 612, 614 (1) (239 SE2d 183) (1977) (holding that “once a claimant has introduced evidence establishing that the accident or injury occurred on the employer’s premises during the regularly scheduled work day, even though the claimant was on break when it happened, it falls on the employer’s shoulders to introduce evidence to show that the break was a scheduled one during which the claimant was not subject to the employer’s demands or control”) (emphasis supplied).
See Miles a Brown Transport Corp., 163 Ga. App. 563, 564 (294 SE2d 734) (1982); Rampley, supra at 613.
See OCGA § 34-9-23.
See Blair, supra.
Cf. Swanson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 181 Ga. App. 876, 878 (1) (a) (354 SE2d 204) (1987) (“Clearly, even if the employee is on a scheduled break and even if the employee is free to use the break time as he pleases, if the employee is in fact engaged in employment-related activities, the injury is compensable under the Act.”).
Wilkie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 714, 715 (185 SE2d 783) (1971). See also Aetna Cas. &c. Co. v. Honea, 71 Ga. App. 569, 572-573 (31 SE2d 421) (1944) (injury that occurred during claimant’s 45-minute lunch period, which she could take at any time between 12:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., did not arise out of employment).