Jehnings v. Allison

*416RIGGS, J.

pro tempore.

Defendants appeal from a judgment for plaintiffs in this quantum meruit action for the reasonable value of landscaping goods and services. Defendants contend that the trial court erred in failing to grant them a directed verdict on the theory that plaintiffs’ action is barred by ORS 671.625. That section provides:

“(1) The board shall by rule adopt minimum standards for written contracts and billings of the landscaping businesses. The standards shall set forth requirements for information that must be contained in contracts and billings. The information required shall be any information the board determines is necessary to provide protection for consumers of the services and materials provided by landscaping businesses.
“(2) Work by a landscaping business subject to ORS 671.510 to 671.710 shall only be performed subject to a written contract. Any contract or billing for such work must conform to the standards adopted under subsection (1) of this section.
“(3) A contract that does not substantially comply with this section may not be enforced by a landscaping business in any court or other proceedings within this state.”

The evidence in this case shows that plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of ORS 671.625(2) in that there was no written contract. We agree with defendants that a claim for compensation for any landscaping work performed by plaintiffs pursuant to an oral agreement therefore cannot be the subject of litigation. This result is compelled by the plain language and the underlying purpose of ORS 671.625. The statute provides that landscaping work “shall only be performed subject to a written contract[,]” and that a contract not in substantial compliance may not be enforced in court by a landscaping business.

The legislature clearly intended that landscaping businesses make their contracts in writing in order to avoid disputes about the value of services and to allow for better regulation of the industry. To permit a quantum meruit recovery would nullify the statute and contravene the public policy expressed by the legislature.

Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment of dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint.