(concurring). The majority opinion prudently limits a bystander's cause of action *663for negligent infliction of emotional distress to those instances where the bystander witnesses or comes immediately upon the scene of a close relative's serious or fatal injury. Because these public policy limitations effectively help to ensure the authenticity of bystander claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, I concur with today's result. I am concerned, however, that other aspects of the majority opinion, when applied to situations where these constraints do not exist, will lead to fraudulent claims, excessive liability, and unnecessary litigation.
Courts have long recognized the need to assure the validity of claims for emotional distress. Over time, and across jurisdictions, this need has revealed itself in various prophylactic rules, such as the requirement that plaintiffs suffer "physical impact," or that bystanders be in the "zone of danger," or that there is some physical manifestation of emotional distress. In a perfect world, such rules would not be necessary. Today, for instance, I believe the public policy limitations the majority places on bystander recovery are more rational and evenhanded than Waube's zone of danger rule.
Still, I do not share the majority's unsupported view that medical science has now advanced to the point that we can easily distinguish genuine claims for emotional distress from the feigned.1 As a result, I think the majority unwisely and unnecessarily declares that from this point on, "regardless of the fact situation," claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress need only satisfy the standard elements *664of negligence, i.e., breach of duty, injury, and cause-in-fact, in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Given that on motions for summary judgment, every reasonable inference must be accorded the nonmoving party's pleadings, see, State v. American TV, 146 Wis. 2d 292, 300, 430 N.W.2d 709 (1988), the majority's approach virtually assures that every claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress will go to the jury.
Perhaps if such an outcome entailed no cost to those who will now be forced to defend themselves against highly speculative claims, and were it also not true that court dockets are already overburdened, this court might be justified in leaving all claims for emotional distress to the adversarial process. I, however, think that such costs, combined with the long-recognized risk of fraud in these cases, makes it incumbent upon this court to continue to impose some type of public policy constraints on this cause of action.
I would simply require that in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs have the burden of producing some extrinsic, verifiable evidence to support their claims. I would not require physical impact on the person. Wisconsin, has consistently rejected that requirement. Nor must there be physical manifestation of emotional distress. Nevertheless.! plaintiffs need more than their own uncorroborated claims of emotional injury to survive a motion to dismiss.
An example illustrates my concerns. Take the case of a person who claims that while crossing the street, they were nearly struck by a passing motorist, and that the fright occasioned by this near miss has caused them great emotional distress. If, as the majority instructs, the standard elements of negligence apply to this claim, the plaintiff will almost certainly survive a *665motion for summary judgment. I do not think this is appropriate. The potential for fraud is simply too great.
Life in our society is full of near misses, as anyone who has run the gauntlet of rush-hour traffic can attest. These experiences can be extremely distressing. Nevertheless, people should not be able to convert such occurrences into a source of monetary recovery. Nor do I believe that Wisconsin has ever allowed recovery in these cases when the complained-of emotional distress was not accompanied by some extrinsically-ascertainable proof of the offending event.2
My concern is that the trial courts of this state will take from today's case the view that claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are to be handled precisely like any other type of negligence claim. I do not think that should be the case.
*666I am authorized to state that Justices Roland B. Day and Donald W. Steinmetz join in this concurring opinion.
As the majority concedes, most states continue to require bystanders claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress to either have been in the zone of danger and/or exhibit some physical manifestation of their emotional distress.
This is not to say that Wisconsin requires proof of physical impact on the plaintiffs body. But in all the previous reported cases in this area, the plaintiffs alleged injury resulted from an event which was susceptible to extrinsic verification. For instance, in Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) the defendant's car struck and killed the plaintiffs daughter. In Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 595, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957), the plaintiff suffered emotional distress when the defendant's truck struck her house. In Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 147-48, 123 N.W. 120 (1909), the plaintiff was riding with several other people when the coach in which they were passengers was forced off the road by the defendant's negligent driving. In Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970), the plaintiffs house caught on fire due to the defendant's negligent construction of a fireplace. In Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 122 Wis. 2d 223, 226, 362 N.W.2d 137 (1985), a police car ran over the plaintiffs brother, causing him severe and permanent injuries.