concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority correctly distinguishes the present case from Hill v. State, 193 Ga. App. 280 (387 SE2d 582) (1989) (cert, den.), based on the trial court’s findings that the university police did not act alone in conducting the present search but were joined by three Clarke County detectives, one of whom made the initial entry into the residence with the warrant in hand. However, the court then goes on to overrule Hill, attributing to it a holding that university police are required to obtain *175local law enforcement assistance in obtaining as well as executing search warrants for premises located more than 500 yards off campus. While Hill may have implied the existence of such a requirement, there was clearly no such holding in that case.
The search at issue in Hill was held to be unlawful not because of the mere failure of the university police to involve the local police in the process of obtaining the warrant but because of their failure to involve the local police in any aspect of the investigation. (Although a local policeman was present on the scene at the time of the commencement of the search in Hill, “he left shortly after entry was gained into the residence, and neither he nor any other local law enforcement officer was involved in obtaining the warrant or in conducting the investigation which led to its issuance.” Id. at 280.) Our holding that the search was unlawful under these circumstances was based upon a conclusion that the General Assembly had not intended through its enactment of OCGA § 20-3-72 to bestow upon university police and security personnel “carte blanche authority to obtain and execute search warrants directed to residences or businesses located outside the immediate vicinity of university property” (emphasis supplied) but rather had expressed “a legislative intention to limit the law enforcement jurisdiction of such personnel to offenses committed upon property under the jurisdiction of the Board of Regents or located within 500 yards of such property.” Id. at 281.
Such a limitation on the powers of campus police is eminently reasonable in view of the fact that, unlike police officers employed by political subdivisions, they are not ultimately responsible to any elected official. Furthermore, contrary to the impression given by the majority opinion, the General Assembly in fact affirmed rather than disavowed the existence of such a limitation through its enactment of Ga. L. 1990, pp. 1980-82, for that legislation expressly limits, in a manner entirely consistent with Hill, the. authority of university police officers to execute search warrants for premises located off campus. Specifically, § 3 of the 1990 Act added a new subsection (d) to OCGA § 17-5-21 providing as follows: “Notwithstanding any provisions of Code section 17-5-20 or other provisions of this Code section to the contrary, with respect to the execution of a search warrant by a certified peace officer employed by a university, college, or school, which search warrant will be executed beyond the arrest jurisdiction of a campus policeman pursuant to Code Section 20-3-72, the execution of such search warrant shall be made jointly by the certified peace officer employed by a university, college, or school and a certified peace officer of a law enforcement unit of the political subdivision wherein the search will be conducted.” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 1990, p. 1982.
Under the facts of the present case, I fully agree that the defend*176ant’s motion to suppress should have been denied. However, as I continue to believe that the Legislature never intended to give university police and security personnel carte blanche authority to conduct off-campus searches in cases where no university property is involved, I must dissent to the overruling of Hill.
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope joins in this opinion as to the dissent.