Under Penal Code section 26, subdivision One,1 children under the age of 14 are presumed incapable of committing a crime absent “clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.” At issue here is what the Legislature meant by “clear proof.” Must the People establish the child’s *240knowledge of the act’s wrongfulness “beyond a reasonable doubt,” or will a lesser standard of “clear and convincing evidence” suffice? The majority opts for the latter standard.
I am not persuaded. I would hold, in accord with the majority of the published decisions that have addressed this issue, that the applicable standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
I
In this case, 11-year-old Manuel L. denied taking a bicycle owned by Linda Burrow. He admitted, however, that he had some parts of the bicycle and knew they were stolen. A few months later, in a separate incident, Manuel used either a slingshot or a rubber band to shoot sharp pieces of glass at some children. He was charged in juvenile court with receiving stolen property and with assault with a deadly weapon. The parties agreed the trial court could consider a psychiatric report that concluded Manuel knew it was wrong to commit the acts he was accused of committing. The court found that Manuel understood the wrongfulness of his conduct, rejecting defense counsel’s request that it apply a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in making that determination.
II
Section 26, enacted in 1872, provides that except for six enumerated categories, all persons are “capable of committing crimes.” The first of these exceptions pertains to “[cjhildren under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.” (Italics added.)2 As I mentioned at the outset, the issue here is what the Legislature intended by the term “clear proof.” Is it proof “beyond a reasonable doubt?” Or is it merely “clear and convincing evidence,” as the majority holds?
The majority looks to two cases in concluding that the words “clear proof,” as used in section 26, mean “clear and convincing evidence”: In re *241Michael B. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1073 [197 Cal.Rptr. 379] and People v. Terry (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 48 [4 Cal.Rptr. 597], These cases share two characteristics: In each the discussion of the issue was dictum, and the conclusion was subsequently repudiated by its author.
In In re Michael B., supra, 149 Cal.App.3d 1073, the body of the opinion equated the term “clear proof” with “clear and convincing evidence.” (Id. at p. 1087.) But then, in a footnote, the court observed: “A persuasive constitutional and statutory argument can be made that the ‘clear proof’ standard mandated by Penal Code section 26, subdivision One, means proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 1087, fn. 6.) The court declined, however, to decide which of the two standards was the correct one. Some three years later, the same justice who had authored Michael B. acknowledged that Michael B. was wrong in equating “clear proof” with “clear and convincing evidence,” and that the proper standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Francisco N. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 175, 179 [230 Cal.Rptr. 475].)
Equally misplaced is the majority’s reliance on People v. Terry, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 48, 59. There, the Court of Appeal cited People v. Williams (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 207, 209-210 [55 P.2d 223], as a case “declar[ing] that proof that the child understood the wrongfulness of the act must be clear and convincing.” But Williams says no such thing; it merely quotes the language of section 26, and makes no mention of a “clear and convincing” standard. Also, the Terry court’s observation regarding that particular standard was unsupported by analysis and, because it was unnecessary to the outcome of the case, was mere dictum. Moreover, in a later case, the justice who had authored Terry concurred that the words “clear proof” in section 26 meant proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Richard T. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 248, 252-253 [220 Cal.Rptr. 573].) That view is shared by a majority of the courts that have addressed this issue. (In re Billie Y. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 127,131 [269 Cal.Rptr. 212]; In re Francisco N., supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 179; In re Richard T, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at pp. 252-253; Shortridge v. Municipal Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 611, 618 [198 Cal.Rptr. 749].) These decisions have employed a variety of theories in reaching this conclusion, and none has analyzed the issue in depth; nonetheless, they represent a consensus that should not lightly be disregarded.
As I have shown, neither In re Michael B., supra, 149 Cal.App.3d 1073, nor People v. Terry, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 48, supports the conclusion of the majority in this case that the words “clear proof” in section 26 manifest a legislative intent that the People need establish a child’s knowledge of the *242wrongfulness of his or her acts merely by “clear and convincing evidence,” rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A review of pertinent case law, which I discuss below, strongly suggests that in 1872, when section 26 was enacted, “clear proof” was considered the equivalent of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The term “clear proof” can be traced to a case that is perhaps the most influential criminal decision rendered by a court in the 19th century: M’Naghten’s Case (hereafter M’Naghten) (1843) 8 Eng.Rep. 718. There, the court used the words “clearly proved,” the term at issue here, as follows: “[T]he jurors ought to be told in all cases that... to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason . . . as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing . . . .” (Id. at p. 722, italics added.)
Although the majority of jurisdictions in this country adopted the definition of insanity established in M’Naghten, controversy arose regarding the decision’s requirement that insanity be “clearly proved” by the defendant. Many American courts rejected this requirement as unnecessarily harsh; but irrespective of whether they accepted or rejected it, the courts agreed that “clearly proved” meant proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In his treatise entitled “Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense,” Professor Henry Weihofen provides an insightful analysis of this issue: “Use of the word ‘clearly’ has been the subject of dispute in a large number of cases. The early cases, English and American, looked upon the defense of insanity with some suspicion, and in order that it might not be abused, held that for a defendant to be acquitted on that ground, his irresponsibility must be ‘clearly’ proved. The rule was so stated in M’Naghten’s Case, the most famous decision on the subject of insanity in our law, and ‘clear’ or ‘clearly’ is given as the measure of proof in most of the early American cases.” (Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense (1954) The Burden of Proof, § 3, p. 222, fns. omitted.)
Professor Weihofen then observes: “But ‘clearly’ is an ambiguous word. It may mean either beyond reasonable doubt, or some lesser degree of proof. The use of this term has caused some confusion. Thus, in the early cases which held that the defense of insanity must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the courts usually cited in support of their decision cases which held that the defense must be ‘clearly’ proved, arguing, with much reason, that an issue cannot be said to have been clearly proved so long as a reasonable doubt remains.” (Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, supra, The Burden of Proof, § 3, at p. 222, fn. omitted.)
*243Professor Weihofen continues: “But the great majority of courts were unwilling to go so far as to require the defense of insanity to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and many of them, agreeing that the term ‘clearly’ was equivalent to ‘beyond reasonable doubt,’ held that the former was also incorrect, and that instructions telling the jury that this defense must be ‘clearly’ proved were erroneous.” (Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, supra, The Burden of Proof, § 3, at p. 223, fn. omitted.)
In 1881, California joined the jurisdictions that equated the words “clearly proved," as used in M’Naghten, with “beyond a reasonable doubt,” when this court decided People v. Wreden (1881) 59 Cal. 392. In that case, the defendant, who was charged with murder, asserted the defense of insanity. The trial court instructed the jury that “ ‘insanity must be clearly established by satisfactory proof ....’” (Id. at p. 395, italics omitted.) On appeal, we held that the instruction was tantamount to telling the jury that the defendant must show insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it was therefore erroneous. We observed: “In a late case (People v. Wilson [1874] 49 Cal. 13), it was held to be well settled . . . that insanity . . . need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but that it might be established ‘by mere preponderating evidence.’ Is not the expression ‘clearly established by satisfactory proof’ the full equivalent of ‘established by satisfactory proof beyond a reasonable doubt’? How can a fact be said to be clearly established so long as there is a reasonable doubt whether it has been established at all? [1] There can be no ‘reasonable doubt’ of a fact after it has been clearly established by satisfactory proof.” (People v. Wreden, supra, 59 Cal. at p. 395.)
Our decision in People v. Wreden, supra, 59 Cal. 392, filed shortly after the Legislature’s enactment of section 26 in 1872, reflected the general view of 19th century American jurisprudence that the terms “clear proof” and “clearly established by satisfactory proof” were the equivalent of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The likelihood is great that the Legislature, too, shared that view when it used the phrase “clear proof” in its 1872 enactment of section 26.
It is most likely that when drafting section 26, the Legislature’s concern was not with the quantum of proof, but with the allocation of the burden of proof. Except for subdivision One, all of the subdivisions of section 26 created affirmative defenses; that is, they place on the defendant the burden of establishing facts essential to the defense. (In re Ramon M. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 422 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524] [idiocy]; People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963, 964, fn. 9 [127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 544 *244P.2d 1335] [unconsciousness and duress]; People v. Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 599 [233 Cal.Rptr. 207] [mistake of fact]; People v. Thurmond (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 865, 871 [221 Cal.Rptr. 292] [misfortune or accident].) Thus, in stating in subdivision One of section 26 that a child under the age of 14 is presumed incapable of committing a crime “in the absence of clear proof” of the child’s knowledge of the wrongfulness of his or her acts, the Legislature simply intended to clarify that the burden of proving that knowledge remained with the prosecution.
The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is the norm in criminal cases (Evid. Code, § 501; Pen. Code, § 1096) as well as in juvenile delinquency matters (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 701). Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, a departure from that standard generally violates due process: “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375, 90 S.Ct. 1068].) This court should not reject this standard in the absence of “clear proof” that the Legislature intended to do so. In this case, the majority has failed to demonstrate such legislative intent.
As noted earlier—in my discussion of Professor Weihofen’s treatise (see ante, pp. 242-243)—the term “clear proof” is ambiguous: does it mean clear and convincing evidence, or is it proof beyond a reasonable doubt? “When language which is susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law, the policy of this state is to construe the statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstance of its application reasonably permit. The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of a statute.” (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].) Ignoring this rule of statutory interpretation, the majority chooses to impose on the People the less stringent standard of proving the child’s knowledge of the wrongfulness of his acts by “clear and convincing evidence.” I would, consistent with the pertinent canon of statutory construction, resolve the ambiguity in the statutory language in favor of the child, by holding the People to a standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”3
The trial court in this case erroneously refused to employ the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof in deciding that the minor understood *245the wrongfulness of his conduct. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and direct that court to remand the matter to the trial court, so it can decide whether the evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Manuel understood the wrongfulness of his actions.
Mosk, J., concurred.
Unless otherwise stated all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Section 26 provides in full: “All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [5] One—Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness. H] Two—Idiots. [1] Three—Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent. [I] Four—Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof. [|] Five—Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence. H] Six—Persons (unless the crime be punishable with death) who committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused."
The minor also argues that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof is compelled by Welfare and Institutions Code section 701, as well as the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. Because I conclude that section 26 itself requires the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor understood the wrongfulness of his conduct, I do not reach these issues.