(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision affirming Profit’s conviction for the murder of Renee Bell.
I.
The murder of Renee Bell on or about May 21,1996, was one of a series of murders that occurred during the summer of 1996 in or near Theodore Wirth Park in Minneapolis. It is readily apparent from the record before us that during its investigation of the killings in or near Theodore Wirth Park, the state considered the murders to have been committed by one person. Law enforcement officials investigated these crimes as signature crimes, believing that they were dealing with a serial killer who also was attempting to destroy evidence of sexual assault. The state created a task force to investigate the killings and relied upon the serial nature of the crimes when seeking search warrants. One police affidavit described the crime scenes in the Keoourdorn Phothisane murder and an earlier murder as “almost identical.” In its presentation of evidence to the grand jury, the state referred to the suspect as a “serial killer.” All of the victims were alleged to be prostitutes and their bodies were either burned, or in the case of Bell, packed with mud, arguably to hide evidence of sexual assault. Police considered Profit to be a suspect in these serial killings.
The only direct evidence that Profit murdered Bell consisted of (1) fibers found in the trunk of Profit’s car which were similar to fibers in the ligature used to strangle Bell, and (2) the discovery of Profit’s wallet more than 50 days after Bell’s murder in an area close to where Bell’s body was found. At trial, Profit and members of his family testified that Paul Kelly had access to and drove Profit’s car around the time of Bell’s killing. Testimony also was presented that Profit always kept his wallet in his automobile. In his closing argument, Profit’s defense counsel argued that the evidence pointed to Paul Kelly’s involvement in the murder of Bell.
Before trial, the state moved to exclude evidence of the other serial killings from Profit’s trial and also moved to preclude all testimony from Kelly. The trial court granted the motion except as to Kelly, ruling that Kelly could testify regarding the Bell murder and the Johnson assault, but not as to unre*470lated, uncharged offenses. This ruling prevented Profit from calling Kelly to testify about a letter that Kelly wrote to KARE 11 TV in which he confessed that he killed, broke the neck of, and burned, one of the serial victims, Phothisane, a male transvestite. Phothisane’s body was found on July 20, 1996, 1½ blocks away from where Bell’s body was found.
The issue, then, is whether the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Profit could not call Kelly to testify concerning his confession to the Phothisane murder, and, if error occurred, whether it was prejudicial.
Trial court decisions concerning the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Gustafson, 379 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Minn.1985). Constitutional errors are reversible unless they are found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Fossen, 282 N.W.2d 496, 511 n. 12 (Minn.1979) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). An error is prejudicial if there is “ ‘reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 824 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)).
Our Minnesota and United States Constitutions are protectors of the basic right to present a defense in a criminal trial. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Minn. Const, art. I, § 7. A defendant’s right to present a defense includes providing a forum for the defendant to develop his or her own version of the facts. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). “The right to offer the testimony of witnesses * * * is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.” State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Minn.1992) (quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920). Trial courts must allow defendants to present favorable evidence which is material to their eases. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867-68, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982).
We have made clear that when evidence of other crimes is relied upon by the state to prove identity, the defendant is also entitled to introduce similar other crime evidence to cast doubt upon the state’s identification of the defendant as the individual who committed the charged crime. State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 458, 39 N.W.2d 887, 892 (1949). In Bock, we stated:
Where the state has introduced evidence of other crimes to establish identity, the defendant is entitled to rebut the inference that might be drawn therefrom by showing that the crimes have been committed by someone else. He should also have the right to show that crimes of a similar nature have been committed by some other person when the acts of such other person are so closely connected in point of time and method of operation as to cast doubt upon the identification of defendant as the person who committed the crime charged against him.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Kelly’s written confession that he killed Phothisane is “other crimes” evidence and its admissibility is all the more compelling because the state relies upon an “other crimes” analysis to justify joinder of the Bell and Johnson cases.1 Profit, accused of a murder that is part of a serial pattern, should have been allowed to present to the jury evidence that Kelly confessed in writing2 to killing a *471victim under nearly identical circumstances a few weeks later, 1⅜ blocks away from the site where the victim in the charged crime was found. That such evidence should have been admitted is particularly compelling when, as here, there is evidence circumstantially linking Kelly to the Bell murder; namely, that Kelly drove Profit’s car and had access to Profit’s wallet.
Furthermore, the court’s analysis allows the Bell murder and the Johnson assault to be considered signature crimes for purposes of analyzing the impact of improper joinder but does not allow Profit the opportunity to present as part of his defense the serial nature of the Bell and Phothisane killings. This analysis is troubling, particularly when the crime confessed to by Kelly, the killing of Phothisane, has more similarities to the Bell murder than does the Johnson assault.
The court’s opinion does not dispute that the trial court’s ruling on the state’s motion to exclude the testimony of Kelly prevented Profit from calling Kelly to testify concerning Kelly’s handwritten confession in which he admitted that he killed Phothisane. The court concludes, however, that the handwritten confession of Kelly is inadmissible because it is hearsay. I agree that without Kelly’s testimony, the confession is hearsay, but it is made inadmissible hearsay only by the trial court’s ruling, affirmed by the court, which denied Profit the right to call Kelly to testify concerning the confession.3
In my opinion, the trial court committed prejudicial error when it ruled, in response to a pretrial motion of the state, that Profit could not present “other crimes” evidence regarding the KARE 11 confession and Kelly’s involvement in the murder of Phothisane. The trial court should have allowed Profit to present the testimony of Kelly to the jury and should have allowed the jury to determine the truth of the matter.4 The trial court’s ruling, now affirmed by the court, denied Profit his constitutional right to present a defense. On review, there is a reasonable possibility that the trial court’s error might have contributed to the conviction of Profit for the murder of Bell. Therefore, I would remand the Bell case to the district court for a new trial.
I would affirm Profit’s conviction for the assault against Johnson based upon the overwhelming direct evidence of guilt presented at trial. The error that I write of is not prejudicial as to Profit’s conviction for assault against Johnson because there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to Profit’s assault conviction.
II.
The manner in which the jury was instructed with regard to the joined cases is also troubling. If the trials had been severed but evidence of the other crime had been admitted as Spreigl evidence, the jury would have been cautioned against using one alleged crime to convict Profit of the other. See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 2.01 and 3.16 (3d ed.1990).
Here, no such cautionary instruction was given regarding the Bell and Johnson charges, even though the trial court did instruct the jury that “other crimes” evidence from acts committed in 1981 had been admitted for the limited purpose of assisting the jury in determining if Profit committed the crimes charged. The jurors were instructed that they could not convict Profit on the basis of “other crimes” that occurred in 1981.
In State v. Knight, we rejected a defendant’s argument that joinder was prejudicial *472based upon — -at least in part — the fact that the trial court separated the issues and instructed the jury to treat the two offenses separately. 260 N.W.2d 186, 187 (Minn.1977). Similar instructions should have been given here. Instead, the instructions given by the trial court did not direct the jury to treat the Bell and Johnson cases separately. This error is compounded by the fact that the trial court instructed the jury on how to regard the 1981 “other crimes” evidence, but left the jury to speculate as to how the evidence of the Bell murder related to the evidence of the Johnson assault, and how evidence of the Johnson assault related to the evidence of the Bell murder. This jury could have deliberated with the understanding that the strong evidence of guilt in the Johnson case could be used as evidence that Profit committed the Bell murder even though the evidence of identity in the Bell case was circumstantial and weak.5 Minnesota’s jury instruction guidelines does not contain a cautionary instruction when crimes have been joined for trial, but I would urge trial judges to give a jury instruction patterned after the federal jury instruction when charges are joined.6
. For purposes of this dissent, I accept the court’s analysis that evidence of the Bell murder and evidence of the Johnson assault would have been otherwise admissible to prove identity and modus operandi under an "other crimes” analysis had these cases been tried separately. However, I question whether evidence of the Bell murder would have been admissible as Spreigl evidence in the Johnson assault case, given the overwhelming evidence of Profit's identity in the Johnson case.
. While the court would like to characterize Kelly’s participation in the investigation as cooperative so as to imply his innocence, it is not disputed that Kelly only told investigators that he authored the KARE 11 confession after a state handwriting expert identified the handwriting as Kelly’s.
. The court rejects the KARE 11 confession on grounds that it lacks “indicia of trustworthiness.” On its face, it seems apparent that a handwritten confession, by itself, is sufficient to allow the evidence to be presented to a jury. The trial court made no findings regarding the trustworthiness of the confession.
. The court points to the circumstantial evidence linking Profit, not Kelly, to the serial killings, writing: “If the record contained additional or different evidence implicating Kelly as Phothi-sane's killer, our conclusion concerning Ae district court's exclusion of Ae KARE letter might well be different.” The trial court's ruling on Ae state’s motion in limine made no findings and contained little analysis regarding Profit’s attempt to introduce the KARE 11 confession and other evidence of Kelly’s involvement in Ae Theodore WirA Park killings. Instead, Ae trial court rejected Ae evidence Aat Profit sought to introduce on grounds Aat it was not relevant.
. The court concludes that "[w]hen a defendant is charged with and may permissibly be convicted of both crimes, there is less danger that the jury will try to punish the defendant for one crime by convicting him of the other.” The court cites no precedent for this statement. If there is danger that "other crimes” evidence will prejudice a jury so that we require trial courts to instruct jurors on how to view this evidence, it seems logical to require similar safeguards when the offenses are joined.
. A sample federal jury instruction for a single defendant charged with multiple counts reads: "A separate crime is charged in each count of the indictment. Each charge, and the evidence pertaining to it, should be considered separately by the jury. The fact that you may find [the] defendant guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged.” Edward J. Devitt, et al., 1 Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 12.12 (4th ed.1992). The model instruction used by the Eighth Circuit states: "Keep in mind that each count charges a separate crime. You must consider each count separately, and return a separate verdict for each count." Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions (Criminal), § 3.06 (1996).