concurring specially.
1. By supplemental brief, defendant asserts a violation of his state constitutional rights. It has earlier been observed that the underlying purpose of Georgia’s exclusionary rule, OCGA § 17-5-30, may be the protection of the right of privacy. State v. Johnston, 160 Ga. App. 71, 73 (286 SE2d 47) (1981), aff’d 249 Ga. 413 (291 SE2d 543) (1982) .
Even if a new ground could be raised in a supplemental brief, cf. Quick v. State, 166 Ga. App. 492, 493 (1) (304 SE2d 916) (1983), defendant merely cites the constitutional provision, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII. He supports it with no argument urging an independent state ground and cites cases dealing only with the federal provisions. Defendant ignores the United States Supreme Court instructions and principles of the federal structure of our government in this regard. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667 (102 SC 2083, 72 LE2d 416) (1982); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U. S. 727 (104 SC 2085, 80 LE2d 721) (1984), Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment; Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U. S. 1 (107 SC 1519, 95 LE2d 1) (1987). See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (103 SC 3469, 77 LE2d 1201) (1983) . Consequently, we can consider only whether there was a violation of federal constitutional rights and bypass the issues of whether there was violation of state constitutional or statutory law. Taylor v. State, 177 Ga. App. 624, 628 (3) (340 SE2d 263) (1986); Mitchell v. State, 173 Ga. App. 560 (327 SE2d 537) (1985).
2. United States Supreme Court holdings sculpt out three tiers of police-citizen encounters. See Allen v. State, 172 Ga. App. 663, 665 (324 SE2d 521) (1984); McAdoo v. State, 164 Ga. App. 23, 26 (1) (295 *208SE2d 114) (1982). This case encompasses the second type, the Terry1 stop, which “must be justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 854 (1) (363 SE2d 63) (1987).
Defendant’s stop and possible conversation in front of the house about to be searched for a controlled substance constituted a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion when considered in conjunction with defendant’s actions vis-a-vis the console in his vehicle. Thus the initial stop fell within the purview of Terry. That decision permits a frisk only if it is “supported by a reasonable belief that [the person is] armed and presently dangerous, a belief which [the United States Supreme Court] has invariably held must form the predicate to a patdown of a person for weapons. Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146; Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 21-24, 27.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 92 (100 SC 338, 62 LE2d 238) (1979). As the Court reiterated in Ybarra, supra at 93, “Under [the Terry] doctrine a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, supra. . . . Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized ‘cursory search for weapons’ or, indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons. The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion [of the presence of weapons] directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place.”
Unlike Ybarra, the State articulated circumstances, including context and the defendant’s actions, that would have justified a police officer at the scene in suspecting that Hayes was armed and dangerous. Although the trial court concluded that the rummaging in the console could not assist in supporting such a suspicion because Hayes explained it by producing his cigarettes, the ambiguous rummaging while defendant was evading the officer’s blue signal could also have been for the purpose of obtaining and hiding on his person a weapon before he stopped.
Thus the frisk was authorized, and it did not proceed to a search of the pocket before it could be said to have warranted a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the pocket contained a weapon. Terry, supra. Because the sole justification for the search is the protection of the police officer, an extended search exceeding the purpose of the search is constitutionally unreasonable. Wyatt v. State, 151 Ga. App. 207, 210 (1) (259 SE2d 199) (1979). Ordinarily the officer must *209pat down and then intrude beneath the surface only if he confirms his “reasonable belief or suspicion” by coming upon something which feels like a weapon. Smith v. State, 139 Ga. App. 129, 133 (3) (227 SE2d 911) (1976); Brown v. State, 181 Ga. App. 768, 770 (la) (353 SE2d 572) (1987). What is permitted is the use of the tactile sense to give the officer a reasonable belief that a concealed weapon is present. In this case, the act of the defendant interrupted the authorized pat-down.
Decided December 5, 1991. William E. Frey, for appellant. Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Albert B. Collier, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.After his hand was pushed away, the officer did not proceed with the pat-down to ascertain the existence of something which felt like a weapon, although the defendant’s hands were on top of the car and were placed back there. Instead, he confirmed that what defendant obviously was hiding was not a weapon by removing the item, which was a plastic bag, from defendant’s pocket. The person’s evasive movement, to keep what he had hidden from the officer’s knowledge, coupled with his earlier activity, constituted a substitute for a pat-down which raises a belief that a weapon is hidden, so as to permit an invasive search. Thus, the officer’s action was “within constitutionally permissible bounds.” Brown, supra at 771. Terry is inapplicable to aid an “evidence-gathering function.” Ybarra, supra at 94.
Whether the circumstances, including defendant’s protective movements, gave rise to probable cause to believe that drugs were in the pocket, is not at issue. The officer testified that his purpose for searching the pocket was for weapons so as to assure his safety. According to Ybarra, supra at 94-96, a reasonable suspicion or belief that the pocket contained narcotics would not authorize a search. The higher standard of probable cause would be necessary. Terry is inapplicable to aid an “evidence-gathering function.”
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968).