dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the pleadings were constructively amended by *826implied consent pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. of Pldg. in Civ. Actions 15(b) (rev. 2003). I also agree that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Blinn’s breach of contract claim. However, I respectfully dissent from the judgment reached by the majority because it has extended what I believe to be an incorrect rule that promissory estoppel may form the basis for claims involving at-will employment. See Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999) (Stephan, J., dissenting).
Until today, the clear rule in Nebraska has been that unless constitutionally, statutorily, or contractually prohibited, an employer, without incurring liability, may terminate an at-will employee at any time with or without reason. Jackson v. Morris Communications Corp., 265 Neb. 423, 657 N.W.2d 634 (2003); Malone v. American Bus. Info., 262 Neb. 733, 634 N.W.2d 788 (2001). This rule is subject to an exception that an employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy. Id. Oral representations may constitute a promise sufficient to create contractual terms which could modify the at-will status of the employee. Walpus v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 248 Neb. 145, 532 N.W.2d 316 (1995); Hamersky v. Nicholson Supply Co., 246 Neb. 156, 517 N.W.2d 382 (1994). However, such oral representations must be sufficiently definite to meet the prerequisites of a contract in order to modify an employee’s at-will status. As noted in the majority opinion, the employee’s subjective understanding of job security is insufficient to establish an implied contract of employment to that effect. See, Hamersky, supra; Hillie v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 245 Neb. 219, 512 N.W.2d 358 (1994). In Hamersky, we held that oral assurances of employment in a specific position until retirement were insufficient as a matter of law to contractually modify the at-will status of an employee.
In this case, it is undisputed that Blinn was an at-will employee. There is no claim that he was terminated in violation of any constitution, statute, or public policy. The majority thus correctly determines that the record “does not establish sufficient evidence to conclude that any employee of Beatrice intended to offer a contract of employment on terms other than *827employment at will.” In my view, this should end the analysis because the evidence does not fall within any of the previously recognized exceptions to our “clear rule” regarding the employer’s right to discharge an at-will employee “at any time with or without reason.” Jackson, 265 Neb. at 425-26, 657 N.W.2d at 636.
However, the majority goes on to conclude that under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, an at-will employment relationship may be transformed into employment for a specific duration by the employee’s reliance upon oral statements made by the employer which are too indefinite to constitute a contractual meeting of the minds. This is new law in Nebraska. I agree with the majority that Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999), does not directly compel this holding if it is limited to its facts, which involved the withdrawal of an offer of at-will employment before the employment relationship began. But I respectfully submit that if the majority has not extended the holding of Gojf-Hamel by design, it has done so by necessary implication, because there is no other precedent for the application of principles of promissory estoppel to the facts presented in this case.
Of the cases cited by the majority in its analysis of the promissory estoppel issue, only Merrick v. Thomas, 246 Neb. 658, 522 N.W.2d 402 (1994), involved an at-will employment relationship. In that case, a deputy sheriff was discharged after working for approximately 4 months. She asserted a wrongful discharge claim on an alternative theory of promissory estoppel, alleging that she left her previous employment in reliance upon the offer of employment in the sheriff’s office. Noting that the plaintiff was an at-will employee and that she worked for a short time prior to her discharge, the court concluded that “the situation which we find is that the promise was one to offer at-will employment, which promise was kept, and estoppel is not available.” Id. at 665, 522 N.W.2d at 408. Merrick was distinguished but not overruled in Goff-Hamel. In my view, Merrick should control the resolution of this case. Because the alleged oral statements are insufficient as a matter of law to modify Blinn’s at-will status, they can be regarded as nothing more than a promise of continued at-will employment.
*828Goff-Hamel is the only case in which this court has recognized promissory estoppel as the legal basis for a claim alleging wrongful withdrawal of an offer of at-will employment. The instant case is the first in which this court has recognized promissory estoppel as the basis for a claim of wrongful termination of at-will employment. As a result of today’s decision by the majority, our “clear rule” regarding termination of at-will employment has become quite murky. Now, as I understand the majority opinion, (1) an employer may lawfully discharge an at-will employee whenever and for whatever reason it chooses, so long as that reason does not contravene a constitution, statute, contract, or public policy; (2) one is an at-will employee unless there is a contract for employment for a specific duration; and (3) general oral assurances of continued employment which create a subjective understanding of job security are insufficient as a matter of law to create such a contract; but (4) a legally enforceable entitlement to employment for a specific duration can be implied on the basis of the employee’s subjective understanding of and detrimental reliance upon oral assurances which are too indefinite to constitute a contractual modification of the employee’s at-will status.
In my dissent in Goff-Hamel, I expressed the view that where parties to an employment relationship have not chosen to impose contractual obligations upon themselves, a court should not utilize the principle of promissory estoppel to impose the subjective expectations of either party upon the other. My view has not changed. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
Connolly, J., joins in this dissent.