specially concurs.
I concur in the result reached by the majority; however, I write separately to express my view that the trial court made a more fundamental error than that addressed by the majority. In my view, the trial court erred in holding that 13-21-117 limits a mental hospital’s duty to provide a safe environment for its patients. I do not believe that, in enacting that statute, the General Assembly intended such result.
The question whether a defendant owes a legal duty to the plaintiff is a question of law. Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo.1989). Thus, I do not consider us bound by the trial court’s conclusion with respect to whether the statutory scheme for treating the mentally ill creates a duty to protect an inpatient from physical injuries caused by another inpatient. See Felger v. Larimer County Board of County Commissioners, 776 P.2d 1169 (Colo.App.1989).
I note that a person generally does not owe a duty of care to protect another person from the actions of a third party. Felger v. Larimer County Board of County Commissioners, supra. However, such a duty may be imposed when a special relationship exists between either the defendant and a third party wrongdoer or between the defendant and the potential victim of the wrongdoer’s action. Perreira v. State, supra; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965).
Further, a duty to take affirmative protective action may arise in situations in which a person is legally required to take, or who voluntarily takes, the custody of another under circumstances which deprive the other of normal opportunities for protection. Perreira v. State, supra; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314(A) (1965). And, in some instances, a statute may create the requisite special relationship that imposes the duty. Felger v. Larimer County Board of County Commissioners, supra.
In determining whether a duty of care exists under Colorado’s statutory scheme, the primary task of a court is to determine and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. City of Aspen v. Meserole, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo.1990). In regard to such a determination, a guiding rule is that legislative grants of immunity, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed. City of Aspen v. Meserole, supra. Moreover, when two statutes deal with the same subject matter, a court must read them together in order to carry out their beneficent purposes. People in Interest of M.K.A., 182 Colo. 172, 511 P.2d 477 (1973).
Further, in determining the intent of the General Assembly, it must be presumed that a just and reasonable result was intended. Ingram v. Cooper, 698 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1985). Finally, if the intended scope of a statute is not clear, the consequences of a particular construction must be considered. Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo.1992).
Applying these principles here, I note that the declared purposes of Colorado’s statutory scheme for the care and treatment of the mentally ill include the following: to secure for each person the care and treatment suited to the needs of that patient; to insure that such care and treatment are skillfully and humanely administered with full respect for the person’s dignity and personal integrity; and to provide the fullest possible measure of privacy and dignity to persons undergoing care and treatment for mental illness. Section 27-10-101(1)(a) and (c), C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11B); Perreira v. State, supra.
Further, our supreme court has recently held that these purposes extend comprehensively to all mentally ill persons, including those who voluntarily receive mental health services. Goebel v. Colorado Department of Institutions, 830 P.2d 1036 (Colo.1992).
Conversely, having considered the legislative history of § 13-21-117 in light of the *236principle that grants of immunity are to be strictly construed, I cannot conclude that § 13-21-117 was intended to apply to claims arising from injuries suffered by a hospitalized inpatient which are inflicted by the violent acts of another inpatient. See Halverson I (Criswell, J. specially concurring); see also Perreira v. State, supra, (fn. 8) (Section 13-21-117 is instructive as to the duty of a psychiatrist in treating a voluntary outpatient); Dice, supra (the new statute is just a codification of the rule that a psychiatrist owes no duty to persons who are seriously injured by an outpatient if the outpatient had made no threats during the course of his treatment).
Finally, upon reviewing § 13-21-117 in relationship to the other statutes concerning the care and treatment of the mentally ill, it is my view that it would yield an unjust and unreasonable result to interpret § 13-21-117 as nullifying the duty of mental health care providers to treat their hospitalized patients humanely and with respect for the patients’ dignity, privacy, and personal integrity. See § 27-10-101(1)(a) and (c), C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11B).
Interpreting the statute as broadly as urged by the defendants would lead to consequences the General Assembly did not intend — i.e., barring suits by one inpatient for injuries inflicted by another inpatient. See Jones v. Cox supra. Thus, I would hold that § 13-21-117 was inapplicable to plaintiffs claims and would reverse on that broad ground.
To the extent that this view is contrary to the holding in Halverson I, I would respectfully decline to follow that decision.