dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent to the Court’s decision in this case. The Appellant appears to have abandoned her standing to object to the search when she replied to Officer Kinney’s question regarding what was in the box, “[g]o ahead, it’s not mine. I don’t know what’s in it”. In addition, the Court fails to consider the facts which reveal Officer Kinney was in fresh pursuit of Appellant based on his knowledge and observations. The facts presented provided a sufficient basis for a stop and detention for further investigation. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).
However, the facts of this case reveal Officer Kinney did not stop Appellant. It was Appellant who stopped and confronted the officer. Needless to say, the officer did the appropriate thing when he identified himself as a police officer, both from the standpoint of relieving Appellant’s anxiety regarding his identity and to preclude a dangerous situation from developing. Appellant’s actions and statements once the officer identified himself deprive her of the standing to object to the evidence seized. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).
I find it interesting the Court fails to even discuss the concept of fresh pursuit in this case. Especially when the evidence reveals Officer Kinney maintained surveillance throughout the entire transaction. I find it more persuasive to look to the definition of “fresh pursuit” as defined by the Oklahoma Legislature, rather than the basis of consent as defined by courts of New Jersey, in addressing this issue. The Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit is codified in 22 O.S.1981, § 221 et seq. This Act specifically deals with the powers of law enforcement officers from other states who enter this state in fresh pursuit of a person. Therefore, the language of the Act is not controlling in this situation where a city law enforcement officer crosses into another jurisdiction in fresh pursuit of a person whom he has probable cause to believe has committed an offense in his jurisdiction. However, the definition of “fresh pursuit” is relevant for this Court to review in establishing the scope of authority of law enforcement officers who act in like circumstances. Section 225 states
*595The term “fresh pursuit” as used in this act shall include fresh pursuit as defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a person who has committed a felony or who is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony. It shall also include the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony, though no felony has actually been committed, if there is a reasonable ground for believing that felony has been committed. Fresh pursuit as used herein shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
The actions of Officer Kinney are definitely within the scope of this definition. If Appellant had been followed into Oklahoma from another state, rather than from Tulsa to Broken Arrow, the actions of the officer under the facts presented here would be affirmed. I cannot fathom why the citizens of Oklahoma should not be provided the same protections through the abilities of Oklahoma law enforcement officers to act in “fresh pursuit” as are provided the citizens of other states whose law enforcement officers may follow an offender into Oklahoma. It appears the analysis in this case should be based on the facts of the case rather that the unnecessary analogy to arrest by a private citizen. I must therefore dissent to the Courts decision in this case.