(dissenting):
I dissent. In my opinion, the Utah District Court did have jurisdiction in this matter and, further, had a right to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)1 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA).
The majority opinion fails to adhere to the plain and unambiguous language of the UCCJA and the PKPA, as well as to their spirit and purpose, in its erroneous determination that the Utah District Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the matter that was before it.2
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to the UCCJA, there was constant conflict between custody orders of states having concurrent jurisdiction. This usually occurred when one parent moved from the state which granted the divorce to a different state, and then filed an action in the second state for custody of the minor children. Where the children were present with that parent, either by visitation or by having been taken there, that state naturally had jurisdiction to deal with their custody. If the decree entered was contrary to the decree of the original forum state, then the parties (and the courts) were faced with the problem of conflicting orders.
II. JURISDICTION UNDER THE UCCJA
A. Section 3 of the UCCJA3
To solve this problem, the UCCJA was proposed and has now been adopted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. It specifically recognizes that two states may have simultaneous concurrent jurisdiction, but directs how such jurisdiction shall be exercised:
(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the following paragraphs are met:
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child’s home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this state;
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state, and (ii) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
*1179(c) The child is physically present in this state, and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent; or
(d)(i) It appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with Paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987). (emphasis added).
“Home state” is defined by the UCCJA to mean:
the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months old the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-2(5) (1987).
The operation of section 34 was explained by the drafters of the UCCJA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, as follows:
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a)5 establish the two major bases for jurisdiction. In the first place, a court in the child’s home state has jurisdiction, and secondly, if there is no home state or the child and his family have equal or stronger ties with another state, a court in that state has jurisdiction. If this alternative test produces concurrent jurisdiction in more than one state, the mechanisms provided in sections 66 and 77 are used to assure that only one state makes the custody decision.
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Paragraph (2)8 comes into play either when the home state test cannot be met or as an alternative to that test. The first situation arises, for example, when a family has moved frequently and there is no state where the child has lived for 6 months prior to suit, or if the child has recently been removed from his home state and the person who was left behind has also moved away. See paragraph (l),9 last clause. A typical example of alternative jurisdiction is the case in which the stay-at-home parent chooses to follow the departed spouse to state 2 (where the child has lived for several months with the other parent) and starts proceedings there.
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Comment at 20-21 (1968) (emphasis added) (hereinafter Comment).
Thus, the plain language of section 310 and the comments thereto provide that State Two has jurisdiction if it meets one of the bases established in that section.
B. Other Sections of the UCCJA
Moreover, if Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987) is construed otherwise, the remaining sections of the UCCJA fail to make sense wherein they require that State Two shall stay proceedings if the matter is pending in another state, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(3) (1987); or may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the first state is a more appropriate forum, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7 (1987); or may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the petitioner is guilty of improper conduct, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-8(l) (1987); and shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify unless the interest of the child necessitates, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-8(2) (1987). All of the foregoing are indicia of jurisdiction: If a *1180court does not have jurisdiction, it does not have the power to stay proceedings, nor the power to decline to exercise its jurisdiction, nor the power to proceed with the proceedings even if to do so would be in the best interest of the children’s safety and well being. It would have no choice but to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
However, a court does have these choices because the UCCJA specifically confers jurisdiction on the second state where the child and a parent have been living for at least six consecutive months (home state), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(a) (1987); or when it is in the best interest of the child to assume jurisdiction because the child and at least one parent have a significant connection with the second state and there is substantive evidence in that state pertaining to the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(b) (1987); or in the case of an emergency, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(c) (1987); or when no other state has jurisdiction or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(d) (1987).
C. Utah Cases
The Utah Supreme Court’s holding in Tuttle v. Henderson, 628 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1981) offers additional insight into the issue of concurrent jurisdiction under the UCCJA. In that case, the trial court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction, but refused to exercise it under the circumstances of that case. Id. at 1276. Although Tuttle is a pre-UCCJA case, the court quoted extensively from the UCCJA and found that the UCCJA provided persuasive authority to support its affirmance of the trial court’s holding that it had concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 1276-77.
Also instructive is the Utah Supreme Court’s holding in Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985), a post-UCCJA case. In that case, an action was filed by the Coppedges in Oregon, to make them guardians of their grandson, who was living with them in Oregon. In response, a custody action by the child’s parents was subsequently filed in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court ordered the district court “to stay the Utah action to the extent that it seeks to determine custody under the Uniform Act” and “to communicate with the Oregon Court ... to determine the propriety of further proceedings in Oregon.” Id. at 1122. The district court was further instructed that “[i]n the event that the Oregon court stays its proceedings after such communication, then the Utah court may proceed to adjudicate the custody matter.” Id. If Utah did not have jurisdiction, then the district court could not have been ordered to stay'its proceedings nor to proceed after communicating with Oregon. On the other hand, if Oregon did not have jurisdiction, then the Utah Supreme Court would have simply concluded such and ordered the district court to proceed. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this case is the existence of concurrent jurisdiction. See also State in Interest of W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Utah App. 1989) (under the facts of that case, Utah and California had concurrent jurisdiction); Rawlings v. Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327, 1331 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., concurring) (under the facts of that case, Utah had primary jurisdiction and Washington had secondary jurisdiction), cert. denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
III. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
Once the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA have been met, our inquiry then turns to the exercise of that jurisdiction. Just because a state has jurisdiction does not mean that it can exercise it as to custody. State Two “shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning custody of the child was pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdic-tion_” Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(l) (1987). In such case, State Two “shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum....” Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(3) (1987). Secondly, a court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it finds that it is an inconven*1181ient forum. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7(l) (1987). Thirdly, where State Two has jurisdiction, it generally cannot modify the custody decree of State One unless it appears to the court of State Two that State One “does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional requirements substantially in accordance with [the UCCJA] or has declined to assume jurisdiction[.]” Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l)(a) (1987).11 Thus, even if jurisdiction is established under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-6, -7, and -14 (1987) govern the exercise of that jurisdiction.
However, if both parents and the children move from the state of the original decree, deference to that state’s jurisdiction is no longer required. State in Interest of D.S.K, 792 P.2d 118, 124 (Utah App.1990) (citing Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 Fam.L.Q. 203, 214-15 (1981)). As the drafters’ comment to section 1412 states:
Courts which render a custody decree normally retain continuing jurisdiction to modify the decree under local law. Courts in other states have in the past often assumed jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state decree themselves without regard to the preexisting jurisdiction of the other state. See People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903 [91 L.Ed. 1133] (1947). In order to achieve greater stability of custody arrangements and avoid forum shopping, subsection (a) declares that other states will defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the court of another state as long as that state has jurisdiction under the standards of the Act. In other words, all petitions for modification are to be addressed to the prior state if that state has sufficient contact with the case to satisfy section 3.13 The fact that the court had previously considered the case may be one factor favoring its continued jurisdiction. If, however, all the persons involved have moved away or the contact with the state has otherwise become slight, modification jurisdiction would shift elsewhere. Compare Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 Mich. L.Rev. 795, 821-22 (1964).
For example, if custody was awarded to the father in state 1 where he continued to live with the children for two years and thereafter his wife kept the children in state 2 for 6½ months (3½ months beyond her visitation privileges) with or without permission of the husband, state 1 has preferred jurisdiction to modify the decree despite the fact that state 2 has in the meantime become the “home state” of the child. If, however, the father also moved away from state 1, that state loses modification jurisdiction interstate, whether or not its jurisdiction continues under local law. See Clark, Domestic Relations 322-23 (1968).
Comment at 32.
Additionally, if the stay-at-home parent fails to assert his or her custody rights, then State One’s jurisdiction ceases:
[I]f the father in the same case continued to live in state 1, but let his wife keep the children for several years without asserting his custody rights and without visits of the children in state 1, modification jurisdiction of state 1 would cease. Compare Brengle v. Hurst, 408 S.W.2d 418 (Ky.1966).
Id.
IV. APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, there is no question but that the Utah District Court has jurisdiction under the plain language of the UCCJA. Utah is the home state of the children because they have lived here with their mother for over two years, substantially longer than the six *1182months required by the UCCJA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(1)(a) (1987). Furthermore, the children and Mrs. Crump have significant connection with Utah and substantial evidence exists in Utah concerning their training, care, protection and personal relationships. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45e-1(1)(c), 3(1)(b) (1987). “Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, [appellate courts] will not look beyond to divine legislative intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a statute should be construed according to its plain language.” Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted). Thus, we should hold that according to the plain language of section 78-45c-3, the Utah district court and this court have jurisdiction to hear this case.
Furthermore, although Mr. Crump has continued to live in Montana, he came to Utah, docketed the Montana judgment in Utah, petitioned the Utah Court to modify the Montana decree, and then appealed that judgment to this court. The Utah District Court had before it the children and mother who had lived in Utah for over two years, and the father who petitioned the Utah court seeking to modify the Montana custody decree. Such a scenario was the subject of the drafters’ comment to section 3,14 wherein it stated: “A typical example of alternative jurisdiction is the case in which the stay-at-home parent chooses to follow the departed spouse to state 2 (where the child has lived for several months with the other parent) and starts proceedings there.” Comment at 21. That is exactly what we have in this case: Mr. Crump (stay-at-home parent) chose to follow Mrs. Crump (departed spouse) to Utah (where the children have lived for over two years with their mother) and commence proceedings in Utah. This offers further support for concluding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear this case.
Having found that the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA have been met, our inquiry turns to whether or not the Utah court could exercise its jurisdiction. As noted above, if Mr. Crump had, of his own volition, moved from Montana, Utah 'would then be able to exercise its jurisdiction. Also, if Mr. Crump, of his own volition, had never asserted his custody rights in Montana, Utah would then be able to exercise its jurisdiction. The question which remains for us is whether Utah should be able to exercise its jurisdiction when Mr. Crump, of his own volition, chooses to follow Mrs. Crump to Utah and bring suit here.
This very question was answered in Williams v. Williams, 555 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1990).15 In that case, the father lived in Indiana with one child and the mother lived in Illinois with the other child. She filed a petition in Indiana for custody of both children. The Indiana court awarded custody of both children to the father. The mother appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that because Illinois was the home state of the one child, Indiana lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJA to deal with custody.
The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the court of appeals, stating:
Once a court possesses subject matter jurisdiction to consider the general class or kind of case, its specific jurisdiction over a particular case within the general class is subject to waiver. In [State ex rel. Hight v. Marion Superior Court, 547 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind.1989)] we observed:
Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-3(a) and (b) empower a trial court to hear causes of action for dissolution and for child support.
Within this grant of subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine child support. (Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-12), child custody (Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-20), and visitation (Ind.Code § 31-*11831-11.5-24). By filing the dissolution action, [the wife] engaged the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear dissolution cases, which includes the authority to decide issues of child support and visitation.
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Resolution of the subject matter jurisdiction issue involves determining whether the claim advanced falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon the court by the constitution or statute. The authority to hear child custody cases is not directly granted by the UCCJA. Rather, Sec. 3(a) merely operates to restrict the existing power of courts to hear custody cases. Ind.Code § 31-l-11.6-3(a) begins:
A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make child custody determination by initial remodification decree if: [emphasis added]
The source of this competency to decide child custody matters is found in Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-20 and is an incidental grant of specific authority within the general grant of subject matter jurisdiction to hear actions for dissolution and child support. The jurisdictional limitations imposed by the UCCJA are not equivalent to declarations of subject matter jurisdiction, but rather are refinements of the ancillary capacity of a trial court to exercise authority over a particular case. This exercise of authority is waivable.
Because of the voluntary conduct of Bonnie in affirmatively engaging the Indiana courts to determine custody, and expressly consenting to the trial court’s authority to determine custody, we find that she has waived any question regarding the authority of the court to decide the issue of custody under the facts of her case and has thus waived the trial court’s jurisdiction over her particular case.
Id. at 144-45 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Also persuasive is the Indiana Court of Appeals’ holding in Schneider v. Schneider, 555 N.E.2d 196 (Ind.App.1990). In circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, the court held that under the UCCJA, Indiana had jurisdiction to modify a Wisconsin custody decree because the stay-at-home parent “voluntarily submitted himself to the trial court’s jurisdiction,” id. at 199, thereby raising an inference that the parties considered Indiana to be the more appropriate forum. Id.
In the present case, this court raised sua sponte an objection to jurisdiction, and now bases its decision on a lack thereof. Instead, we should infer from Mr. Crump’s decision to come to Utah, docket the Montana judgment here, petition the Utah Court to modify the Montana decree, and then appeal that judgment to this court, that the parties before us consider Utah the more appropriate forum in which to litigate this action. See also In re Marriage of Slate, 181 Ill.App.3d 110, 129 Ill. Dec. 844, 536 N.E.2d 894 (1989) (“Under the UCCJA, jurisdiction refers not to the due process limitations of potential subject matter or personal jurisdiction, but instead to the legislature’s discretionary limitation upon the exercise of existing jurisdiction. Thus the Act permits some discretion in the trial court’s determination of its jurisdiction to ensure that jurisdiction takes place in the forum where the ties between the State and the child and his family are the closest.” Id. 129 Ill.Dec. at 846, 536 N.E.2d at 896 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); In Re Marriage of Weinstein, 87 Ill.App.3d 101, 42 Ill.Dec. 243, 408 N.E.2d 952 (1980) (“[W]here both prospective custodians are present in a state and there is an opportunity for a full hearing on the custody issue, the jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform Act may be satisfied.” Id. at 956 (citing Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207, 1229 (1969)).
In our case, the district court was competent to decide child custody matters under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp.1991) (“The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.”); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(1) (1989) (“Proceedings in divorce are com*1184menced and conducted as provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided by this chapter.”); and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-l(5)(d) (1989) (“In all actions the court and the judge have jurisdiction over ... the custody and maintenance of minor children[.]”). See also Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5. Moreover, Utah has jurisdiction to make child custody determinations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987). Since Mr. Crump voluntarily and affirmatively engaged the Utah courts to modify the Montana decree, in doing so he waived any question regarding authority of the Utah courts to decide the issue under the facts of this case and has thus waived any objection to the district court’s authority to exercise its jurisdiction over this particular case.
Furthermore, the majority opinion misconstrues the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) in reaching its erroneous conclusion that the said section strips Utah courts of jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) provides:
If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this act or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the court of this state has jurisdiction.
The plain language of this section recognizes that both states can have concurrent jurisdiction: Montana has jurisdiction because it made the custody decree, and unless Utah also has jurisdiction under another section of the act, subsection (b) above is meaningless. Thus, it is clear that this section does not contain qualifying language that strips Utah courts of jurisdiction, but instead addresses the exercise of that jurisdiction.16
Although the majority opinion correctly states that acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court, such is inapplicable here. The parties are not purporting to confer jurisdiction upon the Utah courts. As shown above, Utah already had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987). By coming to Utah, docketing the Montana judgment here, petitioning the Utah District Court to modify the Montana custody decree, and appealing that judgment to this court, Mr. Crump did not purport to waive Montana’s jurisdiction, but simply waived any objection to Utah’s authority to exercise its jurisdiction.
V. JURISDICTION UNDER THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT
Nor is Utah’s jurisdiction prohibited under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991). In fact, both the plain language of the statute and its. spirit and purposes support the conclusion that Utah has jurisdiction. Subsection (f) of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991) contains language similar to that found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987).17 Subsection (f) provides:
A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of another State, if—
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other state no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.
As is the case with section 78-45c-14, this section does not strip Utah courts of juris*1185diction, but merely addresses the exercise of that jurisdiction. The majority opinion acknowledges as much wherein it states that the jurisdictional prerequisites of subsection (1) have been met. Nonetheless, the majority opinion then seems to contradict itself by reaching the conclusion that despite the fact that subsection (1) has been met, the Utah courts do not have jurisdiction.
Secondly, an examination of the purposes of the act support Utah assuming jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case. Those purposes include: (1) deterring interstate abductions, (2) determination of custody by the state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child, (3) facilitating the enforcement of custody decrees of sister states, and (4) promotion of greater stability of home environment. See generally Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3569 (1980). First, the case at bar does not concern a parent that has abducted a child and moved elsewhere to find a more favorable forum. Instead, we have a very different scenario in which the stay-at-home parent has affirmatively chosen to follow the departed spouse to the home state of the children and bring suit there. Secondly, as discussed above, since Mrs. Crump and the children have lived in Utah for over two years, Utah is in the best position to decide the case in the interest of the children. Thirdly, since the Utah District Court did not modify the custody portion of the Montana decree, its decision does facilitate enforcement of that decree. Lastly, rather than promoting greater stability of home environment, the majority opinion instead promotes the excessive litigation that the act was created to curb.
VI. CONCLUSION
I would hold that the trial court had jurisdiction, as well as the right to exercise its jurisdiction in this matter. Accordingly, I would hold that this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and that the matter should proceed on appeal.18
.In Utah, the UCCJA is set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-l to -26 (1987 and Supp.1991). At all times relevant to this case, the statutory language found in the 1987 version of the statute governs. For the sake of consistency and clarity, all sections of the UCCJA are cross-referenced to the corresponding sections as set forth therein.
. In order to properly understand the state and federal responses to conflicts between states having concurrent jurisdiction, one must be aware that the UCCJA was first proposed in August 1968, while Congress did not enact the PKPA until December 1980. Accordingly, these two documents will be addressed chronologically-
. Utah Code Ann. § 78^15c-3 (1987).
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987).
. Utah Code Ann. § 78^t5c-3(l)(a)(i), (ii) (1987).
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-6 (1987).
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7 (1987).
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(a)(ii) (1987).
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(a)(i) (1987).
.Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987).
.State Two may nonetheless proceed with matters other than custody. As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78^t5c-7(6) (1987), “[t]he court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce on another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceedings.”
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14 (1987).
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987).
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987).
. Although Williams concerns an initial custody determination, rather than modification of custody, it is nonetheless persuasive because the UCCJA establishes the same jurisdictional standards for child custody determinations by initial or modification decree. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l) (1987).
. Additionally, it should be noted that the Utah district court did not modify the Montana decree as to custody. While the Utah court had jurisdiction to modify the Montana custody decree, it chose not to because there had not been a substantial change of circumstances.
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) provides:
If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this act or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the court of this state has jurisdiction.
. While the result in this case in no way compels either party to petition for certiorari in Utah, or modification in Montana, resolution of this controversy may require such. This possibility is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that the children have already appeared twice before judges in two states.