dissenting, with whom URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, joins.
I am painfully aware we have given wide latitude and discretion to the PSC with respect to its interpretation of the certificates of public convenience and necessity which it issues. This does not mean, however, that we must “rubber stamp” the PSC’s interpretations when such interpretations do not require the PSC’s expertise and experience. We have repeatedly stated that whether or not a writing is ambiguous is a question of law to be decided by this Court. It is crystal clear to me that the words,
[A] Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity ... is hereby [ ] issued to Union Telephone Company ... authorizing it to construct, operate and maintain a modern dial telephone system for the purpose of furnishing dial exchange telephone service to [its customers,]
give Union unchallengeable authority to provide intrastate interLATA service to its customers. This is especially clear when *565such certificate is preceded by the statement:
Union has, since its organization in 1914, provided telephone service to the inhabitants of [Sweetwater and Uinta Counties] .... A connection for long distance telephone service is made at Mountain View with The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company.
There is nothing in the certificate which would in any way put one on notice that intrastate interLATA service would not be included within Union’s certificate of public convenience and necessity.
It appears that, if the PSC intended to except intrastate interLATA service from Union’s certificate, it could have easily said so.
I agree with the majority and the PSC that AT & T’s authority to provide intrastate interLATA service is limited to that authority held by Mountain Bell prior to the effective date of the divestiture. I cannot, however, find any predivestiture certificated authority permitting Mountain Bell to provide long distance service to Union’s customers.
I am concerned that this Court has given too much latitude and discretion to the PSC to apply strained interpretations to the language contained in Union’s and Mountain Bell’s certificates of public convenience and necessity under the guise of a standard of review which has no application when the meaning is clear. It is quite obvious the PSC failed to use its alleged expertise in interpreting the certificates in question in this instance. The certificates simply do not say what the PSC says they say!
It is the duty of this Court to use its expertise and experience to determine questions of law, and we should not abrogate that duty. The PSC’s order is unlawful and should be reversed.