dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority has broadened the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity in G.S. 41-10.1 so as to permit a betterments action against the State. To do so, they have broadly defined “claim of title” to include a claim for betterments. The majority bases its holding on the logic that since a claim for betterments can arise only “by virtue of’ a claim of title, it is included within the language of the waiver statute. I disagree with the majority’s loose reading of the statute.
Though the majority cites Mattox v. State, 21 N.C. App. 677, 205 S.E. 2d 364 (1974), it is instructive to note in Mattox “[t]he title not being in issue, the question before us is whether the plaintiffs may bring an action for damages under the statutory provisions of 41-10.1.” The court there held that, since title had already been settled, plaintiffs were not entitled to bring a separate action for damages. Similarly, here, title had been settled long before plaintiffs brought their action for betterments. This is not a case where, in the words of G.S. 41-10.1, “the State of North Carolina or any agency or department thereof asserts a claim of title to land.”
It is a fundamental principle that: “The right to sue the State is a conditional right, and the statutory provisions must be strictly followed.” Mattox, supra at 679. Here, the majority, in an effort to avoid an inequity, has interpreted the waiver statute too broadly and has winked at the admonition to strictly construe statutes which waive the benefits of the doctrine of sovereign im*558munity. Any broadening of the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity is properly a legislative function and ought not be undertaken through liberal statutory interpretation. I would vote to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of this action but only on the grounds that the State has not waived, but has asserted, sovereign immunity from this claim.