concurring.
The city’s motive in enacting the ordinance is irrelevant. As the United States Supreme Court stated when it first applied time, place, and manner restrictions to symbolic speech, motive does not matter: “It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”1 The critical issue is whether the ordinance’s incidental restrictions on the symbolic speech of nude dancing are no greater than necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests in preventing crime and decreased property values. I agree with the majority that the ordinance is narrowly drawn and therefore constitutional.
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (88 SC 1673, 20 LE2d 672) (1968); see also State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 672, n. 3 (398 SE2d 547) (1990) (rejecting argument that anti-mask statute violated free speech because the legislature enacted it to unmask the Klan).