(dissenting). I believe that the admonitions of the double jeopardy clause and due process clause of the Wisconsin Constitution,1 and the due process clause of the United States Constitution,2 *125apply in this case. Because I believe that allowing the State of Wisconsin (State) to pursue its criminal complaint against the respondent, Thomas J. Kramsvogel (Kramsvogel), would subject him to double jeopardy for his conduct in a manner offensive to notions of fundamental fairness, I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the criminal complaint. After a summation of what I view as the essential facts and developments in this case, I will set out below the double jeopardy and due process arguments which support this position.
On June 12, 1983, a municipal police officer responded to reports of excessively loud music at Kramsvogel’s home. After ignoring warnings to lower the volume, the officer ordered Kramsvogel into his squad car and proceeded to cite him for loud and unnecessary noise. As part of the procedure he ran a routine radio check on Kramsvogel and discovered two outstanding warrants. He then placed him under arrest. Kramsvogel became agitated, swore, and kicked out a window of the squad car. The officer subsequently issued a second citation for disorderly conduct. On the reverse side of that citation there appeared a full description of Kramsvogel’s actions, including the breaking of the window.
Later that day Kramsvogel pled guilty to the disorderly conduct citation, a civil offense, and was subject to a $122.00 forfeiture by the municipal court. Krams-vogel contends that he understood his plea to encompass all of his conduct as set out on both sides of the citation. His contention remains undisputed in the record and was accepted as fact by both the trial court and the court of appeals.
The next day the State filed a criminal complaint based on the same conduct. While there were variations in the language of the state criminal complaint as compared with the municipal citation, both the trial court and the court of appeals viewed the criminal complaint *126as proscribing the same conduct as the municipal citation. Kramsvogel filed a motion requesting dismissal of the complaint.
The trial court granted the motion, citing Krams-vogel’s right to protection from double jeopardy. The State appealed to the court of appeals which, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court’s ruling dismissing the complaint. The State then petitioned this court for review.
The record shows that the trial court relied on the following dicta contained in State v. Ramirez, 83 Wis. 2d 150, 265 N.W.2d 274 (1978), in making its original ruling:
“If the state grants to its subordinate municipalities the right to enact penal-type ordinances triable in a municipal court, it has the duty to correlate the prosecutions so as not to offend the constitutional double jeopardy provisions. In a nut shell, a prosecution for an offense based upon a state statute bars a prosecution for the same offense based upon the same identical acts in a municipal court on a municipal ordinance and vice versa.” Id. at 153.
I would likewise adopt and apply our statements in Ramirez as the rule to be applied in Kramsvogel’s case.
The majority does not agree, and instead chooses to distance itself from Ramirez. Rather than apply Ramirez, it reverses the ruling of the court of appeals upholding the trial court’s action and remands the cause to the circuit court, holding that “the double jeopardy clause prohibits only multiple criminal punishments.” State v. Kramsvogel, majority opinion, p. 103. Kramsvogel now finds himself subject to a state prosecution based on the very conduct for which he believed he answered long ago in the municipal proceeding. I believe this result is contrary to notions of fundamental fairness and can be challenged on both the explicit double jeopardy and the implicit due process grounds in Ramirez.
*127There is admittedly a certain attraction in the neat, almost mathematical structure underlying the reasoning in the majority’s opinion. The majority begins by deciding that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions which interpret the double jeopardy clause of the Federal Constitution should control in all cases involving double jeopardy issues brought under Wisconsin constitutional law. In so doing, it adopts the federal rule that the double jeopardy clause protects against two attempted criminal prosecutions as the applicable rule in cases arising under the state double jeopardy provision as well. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938). The majority then correctly points out the violations of municipal ordinances, regardless of the nature of the conduct they proscribe, are presumptively civil, both by state statute and by case law; only the state has the authority to create crimes.
In addition the majority places considerable reliance on Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585, 590, 213 N.W. 335 (1927), where this court said that “[n]o rule is better settled in Wisconsin than that a prosecution under a city ordinance does not bar a prosecution for the same act under a state statute or under the common law.” Because the municipal offense to which Kramsvogel pled guilty was and could only be civil, the majority concludes that the trial court and court of appeals acted improperly in respectively dismissing, and upholding the dismissal, of the state criminal complaint on double jeopardy grounds.
I take issue with the majority’s analysis in three key respects. First, the rule of Milwaukee v. Johnson was explicitly called into question by the United States Supreme court in Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), as well as by the statements in Ramirez set out above. Second, I do not agree that it is necessary or appropriate to view United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the federal double jeopardy clause as controlling, *128in all respects, our state constitutional double jeopardy-provision. Third, unlike the majority I would, for purposes of double jeopardy analysis under the Wisconsin Constitution, use the opportunity afforded by this case to develop, rather than distance myself from, a third category of penal-type or quasi-criminal municipal offenses — a category that has already appeared, for some constitutional purposes, in both federal and state case law alongside the more familiar criminal and civil categories. Each of these points shall now be considered in turn.
In Waller, the United States Supreme Court found “that the Florida courts were in error to the extent of holding that — ‘even if a person has been tried in a municipal court for the identical offense with which he is charged in a state court, this would not be a bar to the prosecution of such person in the proper state court.’ ” Waller, 397 U.S. at 395. This, in substance, is much like the rule of Milwaukee v. Johnson which nevertheless figures prominently in the majority’s opinion. Moreover, in a footnote the Court listed the decisions of states which appeared to follow the Florida rule at the time Waller was decided. Waller, 397 U.S. at 391-92 n. 3. Milwaukee v. Johnson is included in that list, making its holding suspect in the post-Waller period.
I turn next to the second objection raised above to the majority’s argument. The majority rightly points out that the federal prohibition against double jeopardy3 has been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). At a minimum this means that defendants in state actions are entitled to the protections made explicit in United States *129Supreme Court decisions interpreting the federal double jeopardy clause. The majority, however, limits this court’s ability to provide for greater protection under our state constitutional provision by a wholesale adoption of the holdings of United States Supreme Court decisions on federal double jeopardy law. Footnote three of the majority opinion reads as follows: “Due to the similarity of these two [double jeopardy] provisions, we have accepted decisions of the United States Supreme Court as governing the double jeopardy provisions of both constitutions. State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 61 n. 7, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980).” State v. Kramsvogel, majority op., p. 107. In Rabe, this court stated: “Because of the similarity between the federal and Wisconsin provisions, this court has accepted, where applicable, decisions of the United States Supreme Court as governing the double jeopardy provisions of both constitutions.” Rabe at 61 n. 7. (Emphasis added.)
Rabe dealt with whether the state and federal double jeopardy provisions prevented the state from charging four counts of homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle where the defendant allegedly caused the four deaths by a single act of negligence. This court framed the issue as one of multiplicity; that is, was the defendant charged in more than one count for a single offense? We held that each count related to a separate and distinct offense and did not violate either double jeopardy provision. Under these facts we found that the reasoning contained in federal decisions to be applicable to our interpretations of the state double jeopardy provision.
I would not, however, find federal double jeopardy decisions applicable to our state constitutional provision in every instance. Notwithstanding the federal rule which allows for simultaneous or successive criminal and civil sanctions for the same offense, I would afford greater protection under the state constitutional double *130jeopardy provision for individuals in Kramsvogel’s position.
It is well-established that state courts, under state law, are always free to take a more expansive view of individual rights than do federal courts under federal constitutional law. See e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Comment, Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 (1982); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977); Comment, Rediscovering the Wisconsin Constitution: Presentation of Constitutional Questions in State Courts, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 483 (1983).
Moreover, while the wording of the two double jeopardy clauses are similar, they are not identical. The state provision provides that no person “for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment"; the federal provision, that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb.” Because individual rights are involved, I opt for a broad reading of punishment as it appears in the state double jeopardy provision; certainly this language is broader than the federal “life and limb” counterpart. Fines and imprisonment are punishments for violations of criminal law. By contrast, forfeitures, as the majority implies, are civil punishments. In my view these various punishments are different in degree but not in kind. Kramsvogel, in being assessed a $122.00 forfeiture for the municipal citation, was subject to punishment. If, as both the trial court and court of appeals found, the state criminal complaint filed against Kramsvogel described substantially the same offense as the municipal civil citation to which he pled guilty, then the double jeopardy provision of the Wisconsin State Constitution demands the dismissal, under state law, of the State’s complaint in Kramsvogel’s case. This result would not *131necessarily follow under the federal constitutional double jeopardy provision, however, since it does not appear that a civil forfeiture equates to “jeopardy of life and limb” under federal law.
Finally, it is my view that jeopardy should at the very least attach to convictions and acquittals entered pursuant to “penal-type ordinances.” Ramirez, at 153. While Ramirez did not reach the question of what constitutes a penal-type ordinance, the term would appear to encompass at a minimum any municipal civil ordinance proscribing an offense as set out in a state criminal statute.
Additional guidance on the question is provided by the United States Supreme Court, which recently labeled a municipal ordinance, “quasi-criminal” because of its “prohibitory and stigmatizing effect” even though imposing only civil penalties. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 499, n. 16 (1982). The defendant in Hoffman Estates challenged a municipal ordinance, imposing civil penalties for the sale of drug paraphernalia, as void for vagueness under federal constitutional doctrine. In its analysis the Court acknowledged a “greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.” Id. at 498-99. But the “quasi-criminal”- nature of the Hoffman Estates ordinance and “its prohibitory and stigmatizing effect may warrant a relatively strict test [under the vagueness doctrine].” Id. at 499. The mechanical decision to discard constitutional double jeopardy considerations in all cases involving dual prosecutions under a criminal statute and a civil ordinance is the antithesis of the stricter constitutional scrutiny “quasi-criminal” civil ordinances should attract.
The majority passes up the opportunity to expand upon and clarify the language appearing in Ramirez and Hoffman Estates for purposes of double jeopardy analysis under state constitutional law. Nevertheless, the *132municipal citation, as set out in the majority opinion, would appear to meet what guidelines do exist for demonstrating a double jeopardy violation. The record reveals that the offense charged under the municipal ordinance in this case was substantially the same offense as that proscribed by the state statute under which Krams-vogel was subsequently charged. The wording of the ordinance is clearly prohibitory and conviction under the ordinance would, in the eyes of the ordinary citizen, have a stigmatizing effect on the reputation of a defendant.
I conclude the state double jeopardy clause demands the affirmance rather than the reversal of the court of appeals’ decision upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the criminal complaint in this case. I therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion.
I further believe that the due process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions prohibit the result which follows from the majority holding. “Fair play is an important factor in the consideration of due process of law. Truly, the concern of due process is fundamental fairness.” State ex rel. Lyons v. De Valk, 47 Wis. 2d 200, 205, 177 N.W.2d 106 (1970). (Footnote omitted.) Fairness in the legal process is usually not difficult to recognize, although it may sometimes be difficult to explain. The procedure followed by municipal and state authorities in the instant case is completely devoid of the requisite fairness.
On June 12, 1983, Kramsvogel, through his conduct, allegedly violated both municipal and state law. The municipality’s charging authorities elected to cite him for this conduct under its municipal ordinance. Krams-vogel, believing he was answering for all the unlawful conduct incident to the day’s events, pled guilty and was assessed a forfeiture. The very next day the State brought a criminal complaint charging a violation of a state criminal statute, a complaint based on the very same conduct he thought he had answered for the day *133before. The record is silent as to whether he was warned at the time of pleading to the municipal citation that subsequent state criminal charges could be brought against him for the same conduct; we must presume he was not.
I would hold that this chain of events is violative of substantive due process. I am further concerned with the status of Kramsvogel’s civil conviction in the subsequent criminal proceeding against him. Can this conviction, a matter of public record, be entered as State’s evidence in the subsequent criminal case ? At what point is the constitutional protection against self-incrimination implicated ? Should Kramsvogel have been advised of his right to remain silent and his right to the assistance of legal counsel before pleading to the charges contained in the municipal citation? Though the majority leaves these important questions unanswered these questions are at the heart of due process.
There are no hard and fast rules concerning the specific procedures required to ensure adequate due process in every case. Communications Comm’n v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 275 (1949). “The Fifth Amendment guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights.” Labor Board v. Mackay Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938). I believe that, at a minimum, Krams-vogel had the right to know at the time of his pleading to the municipal citation that he continued to be subject to state criminal charges for the same conduct. This court has noted, moreover, that municipal and state authorities have “the duty to correlate the[ir] prosecutions so as not to offend the constitutional double jeopardy provisions.” Ramirez at 153.
Because in this case these authorities failed to inform the defendant of his subsequent exposure to the state criminal complaint and did not correlate their prosecutions so as not to offend the Wisconsin Constitution, their procedure was fundamentally unfair to Krams-*134vogel. Municipal and state law enforcement officials can, and normally do, cooperate. For example, in 1974 the Wisconsin municipality of Brookfield had an ordinance prohibiting the same conduct which violated sec. 161.41 (3), Stats., (dealing with possession of a controlled substance). State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979). In Karpinski, this court approvingly set out the procedure that Brookfield and state authorities followed in that case when faced with circumstances similar to those presented here:
“[W]hen a person is arrested for possession of marijuana in the city of Brookfield, the procedure followed by the police is that the matter is referred to the Waukesha county district attorney for review. The Waukesha county district attorney decides whether a criminal prosecution should be initiated. If the Waukesha county district attorney determines that there should be a criminal prosecution, the case remains in the district attorney’s office. If the Waukesha county district attorney decides not to prosecute, the case is referred to the office of Brookfield’s city attorney. The Brookfield city attorney then determines whether there should be a prosecution under the city ordinance.” Id. at 612.
Finally, dismissing the State’s complaint would have salutary effects beyond the immediate benefit to Krams-vogel in this case. The court of appeals, in the closing paragraph of its unpublished opinion, quoted the closing paragraph of the trial court’s decision. It bears repeating here:
“It would appear to this Court that in the interest of good criminal administration, municipal law enforcement agencies should yield to State prosecutors matters which apparently or arguably contain complaints of conduct of criminal behavior. They should not preempt prosecution by the issuance of a municipal ordinance citation thus frustrating attempts by the district attorney later to prosecute under state law.”
*135In the interest of individual justice, and in the interest of the orderly administration of our criminal justice system, I would affirm the court of appeals’ decision upholding the dismissal of the criminal complaint against Kramsvogel in this case.
Article 1, Sec. 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: “No person may be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and no person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment. . . (Emphasis added.)
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in part, as follows: “No person shall be . . . subject for the some offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . .” (Emphasis added.)