(dissenting). For purposes of this dissent I assume, arguendo, that there is no violation of state or federal constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. I point out, however, that if a *124forfeiture is not paid, the violator may be imprisoned. Sec. 66.115, Stats. 1983-84. See “Justice Denied,” Milw. J., Apr. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 1985, May 5, 1985.
Even assuming no double jeopardy violation, I would affirm the circuit court and the court of appeals dismissing the criminal complaint.
First I am not persuaded that the town is authorized to adopt an ordinance prohibiting conduct the same or similar to that prohibited by the state statute penalizing criminal damage to property. See secs. 66.051(3), (4), 943.01, Stats. 1983-84. See also 66 Op. Att’y Gen. 58 (1977); State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 602-603, n. 6, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979).
Second, in light of the language of secs. 66.051 and 66.-115, Stats. 1983-84, I cannot believe that the legislature intended that a person could be subject to two separate actions and two separate sanctions — one criminal by the state and one “civil” by the town — for a single act of misconduct.
Third, I conclude that double prosecution on these facts is contrary to the concept of fundamental fairness as found in the due process clause of art. I, sec. 8, of the Wisconsin State Constitution. Cf. State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 612, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979).
For these reasons, I dissent.