(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority decision. It is my view that we are required to construe M. S. A. 176.241 together with § 176.225. These statutes, which were enacted at the same session of the legislature, being in pari materia, should be construed harmoniously and together in an endeavor to ascertain the intent of the legislature. It is presumed that such acts are imbued with the same spirit and actuated by the same policy and should be construed so as to harmonize and give force and effect to the provisions of each. 17 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 8984. In Reichert v. Victory Granite Co. 249 Minn. 407, 414, 82 N. W. (2d) 497, 502, we said:
“That the Workmen’s Compensation Act, within practical limits, is to be liberally construed has been so often expressed in the decisions of this court that it does not need at this time either restatement or citation to support it. We take it that the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, if they are to be applied liberally as intended, must be considered supplementary to each other; that they must be construed together whenever reasonable and practical and not violative of law or statutory construction in order to give effect to the purpose for which the act was originally enacted and subsequently broadened in scope and improved upon.”
Section 176.225 provides that where an employer has instituted a proceeding, as he has done here, for the purpose of terminating compensation payments and does not present a real controversy but one which is frivolous or for the purpose of delay, or one which unreasonably or vexatiously delays payment, the commission is empowered to award additional compensation up to 25 percent of the total amount of the award. The majority opinion holds that the sanctions of this *129statute may be avoided by § 176.241, which relates to “Notice to Commission of Intention to Discontinue Compensation Payments.” This particular statute emphasizes that where an employee “claims that the right to compensation continues, or refuses to sign or objects to signing a final receipt for compensation” the employer may, by filing a notice of intention to discontinue payments to the employee “accompanied by whatever medical reports are in the possession of the employer bearing on the physical condition of the employee at the time of the proposed discontinuance,” suspend payments pending investigation, hearing, and determination of the matter by the commission.
It is clear from the provisions of § 176.225 that it is designed to penalize the employer for arbitrarily and without good cause delaying or refusing to make compensation payments. It seems to me that a fair interpretation of § 176.241 leads to the conclusion that it applies to a situation where a malingering or recalcitrant employee who has recovered from his injuries “refuses to sign or objects to signing a final receipt for compensation.” Under its provisions the employer is not required to submit additional evidence that the employee has recovered. It is only necessary that the notice “be accompanied by whatever medical reports are in the possession of the employer bearing on the physical condition of the employee at the time of the proposed discontinuance.” It seems to me that this statute is designed as a shield to give the employer a means of terminating the proceeding where the employee has in fact recovered, and it was not intended as a weapon which the employer might use to harrass an employee who in fact is disabled and relies upon compensation payments as a substitute for his employment. To hold otherwise would be to say that the employer may arbitrarily under § 176.241 terminate compensation payments at any time. This proceeding could be repeated any number of times without subjecting the employer to the risk of penalty for arbitrary action. Under the interpretation adopted by the majority, the necessitous employee, subjected to the arbitrary interruption of his compensation payments, would under the pressure of need be forced to return to work before he has recovered. Such an interpretation is contrary to the spirit of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
*130The facts in this case point out the evil of interpreting § 176.241 without reference to the sanctions provided by § 176.225. There is no evidence in the record to the effect that the employee had recovered from the effects of his injuries.
From an examination of the medical reports I am satisfied that the employer had no medical opinion upon which to justify its action. The medical opinion upon which it acted was to the effect that “some type of light work” or “doing something active with his hands, and using them” would have a therapeutic value in bringing about his recovery. They knew at the time they discontinued the payments that the employee was at least entitled to temporary partial disability under § 176.101, subd. 2. The Industrial Commission in its majority opinion stated:
“* * * This statute is a part of our law just as much as the temporary total disability statute. We can concede that the defendant may have been in good faith in refusing to pay the plaintiff compensation for temporary total disability on the ground that there existed a bona fide dispute between them as to whether compensation was due for such disability. However, there existed no bona fide dispute between them as to the petitioner’s temporary partial disability and thus the defendant could not have been in good faith when he discontinued all compensation payments in May of 1954. The employer did not pay compensation under the temporary partial provision, and thus forced the petitioner to litigate, although the employer knew from the medical reports in his possession that compensation was due for at least the temporary partial disability, and that in all probability the employe would have permanent partial disability. There was no question of the employer over-paying relative to any permanent partial disability prior to his being able to secure a determination as to the extent of his liability, inasmuch as the maximum healing period had not been paid. It is therefore quite apparent, that the employer’s delay of payment in this matter, if not vexatious, was at least unreasonable. We therefore hold that the employer is subject to a penalty under the provisions of the act.”
I think that the interpretation set forth in the majority opinion here is contrary to our policy, which is to the effect that the employee should have the benefit of a rule of construction that the Workmen’s Com*131pensation Act must always be construed most liberally in favor of the injured workman. McCourtie v. United States Steel Corp. 253 Minn. 501, 93 N. W. (2d) 552; Reichert v. Victory Granite Co. 249 Minn. 407, 82 N. W. (2d) 497.
Since this dissent was written, the majority opinion has been extended to include a discussion of certain rules of statutory construction. The majority opinion now complains that the dissent ignores the rule that construction lies wholly in the domain of ambiguity and that where the words in a statutory provision are clear and free from ambiguity the language used by the legislature must be given its ordinary and usual meaning. If we were dealing only with the provisions of one independent enactment, I would agree that this criticism would have some merit. The trouble with the majority opinion is that it insists upon looking only at the provisions of § 176.241, which give the employer the right to suspend payments upon certain conditions, and ignores the clear provisions of § 176.225, which penalize the unwarranted suspension of compensation payments. Both of these sections derive from L. 1953, c. 755 (§§ 34 and 31, respectively), approved April 24, 1953. Chapter 755 is a codification and revision of the laws of this state relating to workmen’s compensation. It should be kept in mind that the proceedings before us were instituted to invoke the sanctions of L. 1953, c. 755, § 31, now M. S. A. 176.225. Springborg v. Wilson & Co. 245 Minn. 489, 73 N. W. (2d) 433.
Since both of these sections relate to the subject of the suspension of compensation payments, it is not reasonable to assume, as applied to the issue before us, that we can ascertain the intention of the legislature by considering them separately, apart from their subject matter and the relation each bears to the other as part of the entire enactment. Statutes are presumed to have been passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject. 17 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 8927. It is unreasonable to assume that the legislature would provide for sanctions to penalize arbitrary discontinuance of payments in one section of the statute and in the next provide that such penalty might be avoided merely by filing a notice of discontinuance together with available medical reports. Both provisions are part of a comprehensive system of law relating to workmen’s compensation. *132Under the well-recognized rules of statutory construction, statutes are not to be considered as isolated fragments of law but as a whole or parts of a single and complete statutory arrangement. The sections under consideration, which derive from the same legislative enactment (L. 1953, c. 755), must be considered together. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, §§ 349, 350; 82 C. J. S., Statutes, § 367. It is the duty of this court to seek the intent of the legislature by a consideration of all of the legislation bearing on the subject of discontinuance of compensation payments and not by consideration of a portion only. In State ex rel. Hughes v. Reusswig, 110 Minn. 473, 476, 126 N. W. 279, 280, in quoting Mr. Chief Justice Ryan of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, we pointed out that the court will not allow judicial interpretation to usurp the place of legislative enactment but that:
“* * * ‘We owe great deference to the legislative authority. It is our duty to give effect to all its enactments, according to its intention, as far as we have constitutional right and power; and to that end it behooves us, as far as we are able, to place such a construction on statutes as will reconcile them to the constitution, and to give them effective operation, under the constitution, according to the intention with which they are passed. It would be palpable violation of judicial duty and propriety to seek in a statute a construction in conflict with the constitution or with the object of its enactment, or to admit such a construction when the statute is fairly susceptible of another in accord with the constitution and the legislative intention.’ ”
In holding that statutes relating to the same subject and having the same purpose should be construed together and that no part should be singled out for consideration apart from all legislation on the subject, we said in Foley v. Whelan, 219 Minn. 209, 211, 17 N. W. (2d) 367, 369:
“* * * Statutes relating to the same subject matter, especially where they have the same purpose in view, are in pari materia and are to be construed together the same as if they constituted but one statute. No act, or part of any act, or any section should be singled out for consideration apart from all the legislation on the subject. The object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the legislature, and *133it proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes were governed by one spirit and policy and consequently were intended to be consistent and harmonious in their several parts and provisions.”
See, also, Halverson v. Elsberg, 202 Minn. 232, 277 N. W. 535; Ausman v. Hoffmann, 208 Minn. 13, 292 N. W. 421; State ex rel. Lum v. Archibald, 43 Minn. 328, 45 N. W. 606; Huffman v. Independent Consol. School Dist. No. 11, 230 Minn. 289, 41 N. W. (2d) 455; Wold v. Bankers Surety Co. 133 Minn. 90, 157 N. W. 998; In re Improvement of County Ditch No. 11, Martin County, 253 Minn. 367, 91 N. W. (2d) 657; State ex rel. Carlton v. Weed, 208 Minn. 342, 294 N. W. 370.
If we view both of these provisions as related parts of an entire legislative enactment, we should reach the conclusion that the legislature did not intend by enacting § 176.241 to nullify or repeal the provisions of § 176.225. It seems clear to me that under the provisions of § 176.241 the employer may, by filing a proper notice of discontinuance, suspend payments only where such action is taken reasonably and not vexatiously or for the purpose of delay. The policy of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is to provide to the injured workman prompt and certain compensation which will in part compensate him for his medical bills, injuries, and loss of income and at the same time free the employer from the hazards of the larger liability to which he might be subjected under the common law. “It provides a simple method for that purpose, operating without delay or unnecessary formality. * * * The policy of this law is to hasten not to delay proceedings thereunder.” Strizich v. Zenith Furnace Co. 176 Minn. 554, 556, 223 N. W. 926, 927.
If we fairly construe both of these sections together in light of the object which the legislature seeks to accomplish, it seems apparent that § 176.241 gives the employer the right to suspend payments of compensation only when it acts in good faith on reasonable belief that its liability has been terminated. Where, however, the employer exercises its rights under § 176.241 and suspends workmen’s compensation under circumstances where it is still liable, it acts at the risk of violating the standard set up by § 176.225. It is my view that these sections complement and supplement each other. The injured employee is protected from arbitrary action on the part of the employer by § 176.225. The *134employer, as has been pointed out, is given the right to suspend compensation payments under § 176.241 where his liability has in fact terminated or where he has reasonable grounds to believe that his liability has terminated.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.