I concur in the majority’s conclusion that appellant is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding. I write separately because I believe a violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(0(1) (2003) is not subject to a harmless error analysis.
I agree with the majority that the prison conditions testimony by Mr. Sligh violated our rule that evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial must be relevant to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. More importantly, this inadmissible evidence infused an arbitrary factor into the jury’s decision to return a death sentence. Once an arbitrary matter has been presented to the jury, this Court cannot uphold the death sentence if we are to fulfill our statutory duty under S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(0(1). State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 209-210, 255 S.E.2d 799, 807 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
The dissent argues that the statute’s prohibition against imposing a death sentence obtained under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor merely recites the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. As a result, although not finding the evidence in this case to introduce an arbitrary subject to the jury, the dissent would subject violations of § 16-3-25(0(1) to a harmless error analysis.3
*490In my opinion, this Court should not apply a standard of review for constitutional errors to statutory violations. The dissent ignores the plain language of the statute, which requires this Court to “determine whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16 — 3—25(C)(1) (emphasis added). We are not required to determine if appellant’s cross-examination of Mr. Sligh was able to remedy any error. Once improper evidence of any kind injects an arbitrary factor into the jury’s consideration, this Court cannot uphold the death sentence under § 16 — 3—25(C)(1). Moreover, a review for harmless error is unnecessary because by definition, evidence that implicates an arbitrary factor is prejudicial.
We must honor the General Assembly’s prerogative to establish the procedure which it deems necessary to the fair administration of the death penalty. Where the legislature requires this Court to review a death sentence for possible arbitrariness, that directive should be conscientiously honored. I would thus not engage in a harmless error analysis which could potentially uphold a death sentence returned under the influence of an arbitrary factor. Accordingly, I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse the death sentence and remand for resentencing.
. This Court has acknowledged the appropriateness of harmless error analysis in capital cases where a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated. See Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992).