I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, a capital defendant who will interpose a diminished capacity or insanity defense is entitled to voir dire the jurors whether they entertain any bias against such a defense. In fact, this Court has already recognized the appropriateness of such inquiry. See State v. Poindexter, 314 S.C. 490, 431 S.E.2d 254 (1993), footnote 2. The trial judge, of course, must be careful not to allow such questioning to veer into improper “pre-edueating or indoctrinating,” but I cannot agree with the majority’s absolute ban. Moreover, I am not clear what evidence the majority believes was available to appellant to demonstrate either the impact of the denial of his voir dire request, or that the jury was in fact biased or incapable of following the instructions. Having been *580denied the opportunity to probe potential jurors’ bias, I would not require that appellant demonstrate its existence in order to obtain relief.
I agree with the majority that the issue whether the jury should have been charged on the statutory mitigating circumstance found in S.C.Code Ann. § 16 — 3—20(C)(b)(7) is not preserved for our review and therefore the merits should not be addressed on direct appeal. State v. Stone, 376 S.C. 32, 655 S.E.2d 487 (2007). Moreover, since South Carolina is not a “weighing” state, State v. Simmons, 360 S.C. 33, 599 S.E.2d 448 (2004), the fact that the jury found five statutory aggravators is simply not relevant to whether appellant was prejudiced by the absence of a single mitigator, and I specifically decline to join that part of the majority’s decision which cites this as a fact in support of its decision to affirm the unpreserved issue.
I would reverse appellant’s convictions and sentences, and remand for a new trial.