(dissenting) :
Being unable to agree with the reasoning of the majority, I respectfully dissent. Mr. Justice Bussey’s dissenting opinion is generally impelling, but I disagree with his construction of League v. National Surety Corporation, 198 S. C. 289, 17 S. E. (2d) 783. The instant case, unlike League, is factually unrelated to the officer’s “accoutrements and insignia of office.” My dissent springs from the majority’s failure to give substantial weight to the salutary effect of off-duty use of highway patrol vehicles and their characterization of the Department’s derivation of benefits therefrom as “remote”.
The majority quite correctly stated the general principle that under existing case law any statutory waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed. Accordingly, in the instant case, waiver would result only when the operator of the State owned vehicle was “in and about the official business of such governmental entity.”
For purposes of this appeal the official duty or business of the State Highway Department is the utilization of its personnel and equipment as it “may deem necessarily proper for the enforcement of the traffic and other related laws.” S. C. Code of Laws, § 46-851 (1962). Pursuant to this *380statutory authority, the Highway Department has, for a long standing period of time, permitted patrolmen to use patrol vehicles during so called “non duty” hours. Anyone who has driven on state highways over the past fifteen years has observed this practice. Since it is a matter of common knowledge that the Highway Commission has adopted this policy, this Court may take judicial notice of same. See, Deese v. Williams, 236 S. C. 292, 113 S. E. (2d) 823 (1960); Sylvan v. Sylvan Bros., Inc., 225 S. C. 429, 82 S. E. (2d) 794 (1954); Pitts v. Brown, 215 S. C. 122, 54 S. E. (2d) 538 (1949) ; Green v. City of Bennettsville, 197 S. C. 313, 15 S. E. (2d) 334 (1941); Holliday v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 314 F. (2d) 682 (4th Cir. 1963).*
When a duly authorized state commission adopts a policy, such act is presumed to be in furtherance of the faithful discharge of its duty. South Carolina National Bank v. Florence Sporting Goods, Inc., 241 S. C. 110, 127 S. E. (2d) 199 (1962); Whitmire v. Cass, 213 S. C. 230, 49 S. E. (2d) 1 (1948). There was no testimony adduced at trial that the above policy was not calculated to demonstrably assist in the enforcement of the traffic laws of this State. Indeed, the majority opinion observed that the obvious benefits conferred upon the Department’s discharge of its duties are “impressive” and aid in attaining the statutory objective of safe highway travel.
The majority opinion has taken liberty with the facts in this case and stated them in a light most favorable to the Department. They have constrictively interpreted the Government Motor Vehicle Tort Claims Act, [Sections 10-2621 et seq.'] and in so doing, they have frustrated the clear intendment of said Act as Justice Bussey cogently reasons in his dissenting opinion.
*381This Court’s reluctance to yoke the Tort Claims Act with rigid constructions ill calculated to further the purposes of the Act was clearly demonstrated in Trues dale v. S. C. Highway Department, Smith’s Advance Sheets, April 16, 1975.
“It is true that the decisions of this Court have uniformly stated, if not held, that statutes waiving the State’s immunity from suit, being in derogation of sovereignty, must be strictly construed. The Court has been just as consistent, however, in pointing out that this is only one rule of construction and that it is subservient to the cardinal rule of construction that the legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, which must be construed in the light of the intended purpose. Stated differently, this rule of strict construction is subject to the principle that all rules of statutory construction are merely for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent as expressed in the statute. Accordingly, a statute in derogation of sovereignty is never to be so strictly construed as to defeat the legislative intent. The act, as a whole, must receive a practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design and policies of the law makers and must be construed in the light of the evil which it seeks to remedy and in the light of conditions pertaining at the time of its enactment.”
It is a matter of common knowledge that the Highway Commission has adopted policies which seek maximum presence of patrol cars on the highway. It is obvious that policy is reasonably calculated to achieve the end of promotion of vehicular safety. It is uncontroverted here that the patrolman was operating his patrol car pursuant to the above policy and was not unlawfully operating the vehicle or operating it without due authorization. The patrolman was in uniform and authorized to make arrests. I think, as a matter of law, the patrolman was “in and about the official business” of the Highway Department or at the very least, the issue was properly submitted to the jury whose *382resolution of same against the Department finds abundant support in the record. The other ground asserted by the Department is patently without merit and accordingly, I would affirm.
Since the trial judge charged that the patrolman was conducting the business of the Department only if said activity was within the scope of his duty, it is apparent that the jury was well aware of the policy of the Department of which I take judicial notice.