dissenting.
Because I believe that the state violated ORS 135.815(1) by failing to give Moore’s notes to defendant, and because I further believe that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Dean’s testimony as a sanction for that violation, I respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes that the state had no obligation to disclose Moore’s notes about the 9-1-1 call or Dean, because it did not intend to introduce that evidence through Moore. The majority bases that conclusion on an interpretation of ORS 135.815(1) that is incorrect and that is not supported by our established rules of statutory construction.
Whether a party has committed a discovery violation is a question of law. State v. Lindquist, 141 Or App 84, 88, 917 P2d 510 (1996). The majority is correct that a party is not required to provide the information specified in ORS 135.815(1) for people it does not intend to call as witnesses. State v. Pena, 108 Or App 171, 175, 813 P2d 1134, rev den 312 Or 526 (1991). Where the majority errs, I believe, is in interpreting the term “relevant” in that statute to refer only to the material about which a particular witness is expected to testify.
Of initial concern is the fact that the majority’s approach to statutory interpretation cannot be reconciled with the approach required under PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). Under PGE, we are to determine the purpose of a statute from its words, unless those words, in context, are ambiguous. Here, the majority fails to take that first important step. By its terms, the statute requires the production of “relevant written or recorded statements or memoranda of any oral *685statement 3” of any witness that the state intends to call. The central issue in this case is the meaning of the word “relevant.”
The assumption that underlies the construction requirements of PGE is a simple one — the courts and, by extension, everyone else, should be able to divine the legislature’s intent in enacting a particular statute by looking no further than the words that it used in it. For that reason, the first step in the analysis is always to read the text, in context, giving words of common usage their natural, plain and obvious meaning, unless they are otherwise defined in the statute.1 See Perez v. State Farm, Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 289 Or 295, 299, 613 P2d 32 (1980). This step also includes reference to well-established legal meanings for terms that the legislature has used. McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 431, 909 P2d 846 (1996). For the term “relevant,” the common and legal definitions are strikingly similar. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1917 (unabridged ed 1993) defines relevant as:
“[Blearing upon or properly applying to the matter at hand[;] affording evidence tending to prove or disprove the matters at issue or under discussion[;] pertinent.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1291 (6th ed) provides a legal definition in its discussion of the concept of relevant evidence:
“[Relevant evidence is] evidence tending to prove or disprove an alleged fact. Evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
The Oregon Evidence Code contains a similar definition:
“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
OEC 401.
*686Although I believe that a simple reading of the statute with those definitions in mind reveals that the legislature intended “relevant written or recorded statements or memoranda of any oral statement of [persons to be called as witnesses]” to include any information tending to prove or disprove the charges against the defendant, any doubt is banished by an examination of the statute in context.
In this case, the context of the statute includes not only the companion subsections cited by the majority, but prior case law interpreting the statute. See Fred Meyer v. Hayes, 325 Or 592, 595-96, 943 P2d 197 (1997). Ironically, the same subsections and case law cited by the majority in support of its analysis provide the context that, under a proper PGE analysis, shows that the legislature intended “relevant” in ORS 135.815(1) to have a much broader scope than the majority assumes. In State v. Bray, 31 Or App 47, 569 P2d 688 (1977), we stated that the purposes of ORS 135.815(1) were “[1] to minimize surprise, [2] avoid unnecessary trials, [3] provide adequate information for informed pleas and [4] to promote truthful testimony by allowing examination based on prior inconsistent statements.” Id. at 51.2 The majority has seized on the fourth purpose at the expense of the others. In this case, the statement sought would have revealed the existence of an important witness, the knowledge of whom could have had enormous influence on the course that defendant chose to take in response to the charge against her, thus implicating the first three purposes of the disclosure statute.
The majority points to subsections (3) of ORS 135.815 and subsection (2) of ORS 135.835 to bolster its argument that subsection (1) of ORS 135.815 refers to the testimony of specific witnesses whom the state intends to call, rather than to statements of general relevance to the case. 152 Or App at 679-80. The majority’s reliance on those subsections is, frankly, puzzling. Both deal with the testimony of expert witnesses and require disclosure of any reports or *687statements, including test results, of such witnesses that either the state or defense intends to offer at trial. Both differ markedly from ORS 135.815(1) in that both specifically refer to evidence that a party intends to offer at trial through the testimony of witnesses, in that case experts. Had the legislature intended ORS 135.815(1) to apply only to statements relevant to trial testimony, it is clear from the drafting of the companion subsections that the legislature knew how to say that.
In essence, the majority’s interpretation adds terms to the statute that are not there, contrary to the prohibition in ORS 174.010 against doing so.3 Its interpretation rewrites the statute to require production of
“[t]he names and addresses of persons whom the district attorney intends to call as witnesses at any stage of the trial, together with their relevant written or recorded statements or memoranda of any oral statement of such persons on the facts that the district attorney intends to elicit from such persons.”
Consequently, under the majority’s interpretation, a district attorney could redact a witness’ statement to exclude information relevant to the charge, as long as the redacted information was not information that the district attorney intended to elicit from that witness.
Furthermore, the majority’s approach to the statute makes little sense. Discovery in criminal cases differs significantly from discovery in civil cases, but discovery in both is intended to give parties a reasonable opportunity to get relevant information about the factual issues in a case. The majority’s approach denies criminal defendants discovery of relevant information that the state has gotten from people whom the state intends to call as witnesses. I can think of no reason why the legislature would establish a discovery system for criminal cases that works that way.4
*688Finally, my belief that the rules requiring disclosure should be read broadly is supported by the fact that the legislature has provided statutory protections for those instances where disclosure would cause more harm than good. ORS 135.855(l)(a), which is cited by the majority, 152 Or App 680, protects work product, legal research, records, correspondence, reports and memoranda to the extent that those materials contain the opinions, theories or conclusions of the attorneys, peace officers or their agents in connection with the investigation, prosecution or defense of a criminal action. ORS 135.815(b) prevents the disclosure of the identity of informants when that identity is a prosecution secret and failure to disclose the identity will not infringe the constitutional rights of the defendant. Finally, the possibility that sensitive information, such as the existence of an ongoing investigation, might be revealed or jeopardized by premature disclosure is obviated by ORS 135.873(1), which allows the court, for good cause shown, to issue a protective order denying, restricting or deferring disclosure. To read the disclosure provisions as narrowly as the majority does would make those statutory protections superfluous.
Because the majority concludes that the notes were not discoverable, it does not address whether the state had possession or control of them. The state acknowledges that discoverable information may constructively be in the prosecution’s control if another arm of the state possesses or controls it. It argues, however, that a party does not have control of discoverable materials under ORS 135.815 until it becomes aware of the materials and that it was not aware of the officer’s notes until the deputy district attorney learned of the witness and decided to have him testify. Defendant argues that the trial court correctly ruled that any evidence *689that the police possess or control is within the control of the prosecution, regardless of whether the prosecution knows of its existence. Defendant is correct.
If the police have materials that are discoverable under ORS 135.815, then the prosecution is deemed to have control of them at that time. State v. Warren, 304 Or 428, 433, 746 P2d 711 (1987). That is because “the police are properly considered a part of the prosecution for the purposes of [ORS 135.815].” Id. at 433 n 5. “[Statements or memoranda ofwitnesses[5] are subject to the disclosure requirements of ORS 135.815 regardless of whether they ever actually came within the possession of the prosecutor[.]” State v. Johnson, 26 Or App 651, 655-56, 554 P2d 624, rev den 276 Or 555 (1976).
Nonetheless, the state argues that our decision in State v. Fleischman, 10 Or App 22, 32, 495 P2d 277, rev den (1972), supports its argument that the prosecution must know of the existence of discoverable material before its duty to disclose arises. In Fleischman, we concluded that the state could not refuse to disclose information held by another agency when the prosecutor knew of its existence. As an initial matter, we note that Fleischman and the cases on which it relied were based on the federal Due Process Clause, rather than on ORS 135.815. Id. at 31. But, more importantly, even if the analysis under the two provisions were the same, the Supreme Court decided Warren after our decision in Fleischman. The court concluded in Warren that “information that the prosecutor may obtain directly is within the prosecutor’s ‘control’ as well, even if it was not in the prosecutor’s physical possession.” 304 Or at 433 (emphasis supplied); see also Johnson, 26 Or App at 655-56 (notes that were burned by police officer and not given to prosecutor were discoverable). The state is required to be diligent in determining whether there is discoverable material within its control; otherwise, it could avoid its duty under the statutes simply by avoiding asking certain questions or investigating certain subjects. See id. at 654 (prosecutor cannot avoid obligation under discovery statute by destroying evidence before filing a charging instrument); see also Warren, 304 Or at 433 (information is *690within state’s control if the prosecutor “may obtain [it] directly”).
Although the trial court found that the prosecution had acted in a timely manner “once [it was] aware of [the] information[,]” it is clear that the prosecution should have been more diligent in determining whether the officer had any written statements that could be relevant to the case. The prosecutor’s only explanation for the failure to provide the notes is that she did not know that they existed. The prosecutor knew that the officer was involved in the investigation and that she intended to call him to testify, yet nothing suggests that she attempted to determine before the night of the trial whether he had notes relevant to the investigation. Although I recognize the time constraints under which prosecutors work, those time constraints cannot relieve the state of its obligation to locate and produce discoverable materials in a timely manner. See State v. Morrison, 33 Or App 9, 19 n 1, 575 P2d 988 (1978) (Joseph, J., dissenting) (“The duty to famish discovery implies a correlative duty to collect and protect evidence the prosecution reasonably ought to know will be part of its case.”). That did not occur here. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that a discovery violation had occurred.
Finally, I also would conclude that the trial court’s exclusion of the witness’ testimony was an appropriate sanction for the violation. Trial courts have broad discretion to choose appropriate sanctions for discovery violations. See State v. Kull, 298 Or 38, 44, 688 P2d 1327 (1984); Johnson, 26 Or App at 656. The sanctions that a court can impose for a violation include allowing the opposing party to inspect the withheld materials, granting a continuance to allow the opposing party time to respond to the new material or information, refusing to allow the evidence to be admitted or the witness to testify or any other order that the court considers appropriate. ORS 135.865. We review the sanction that a trial court imposes for an abuse of discretion. ORS 135.865; Lindquist, 141 Or App at 89.
In this case, the witness was the manager of a video store located near the scene of defendant’s arrest. He testified that, on the night of the arrest, he had told a police officer *691that a man had come into the store just before closing and had asked another employee to get the manager. He testified that he had been at the rear of the store and had not seen the man come in. He explained that, when he saw the man, the man was out of breath and flushed, looking as if he had been running. The man pointed to defendant’s car and told the witness that the woman in the car had almost run over him. He said that the woman had insisted that she needed to continue on. He said he was concerned because the car had two flat tires and the woman seemed to be very intoxicated. He asked the witness to call 9-1-1. The witness looked out of the store window and saw a black car sitting off of the shoulder of the road. He could see that someone was sitting in the driver’s seat of the car. He could not identify the person. He went to the rear of the store to call 9-1-1. When he returned, the man was gone. The employee told the witness that the man had left in a direction opposite from the car. The witness did not know the man’s name or how to reach him. The witness testified that the officer was taking notes during their conversation.
Defendant’s attorney argued that, because three months had elapsed since defendant had been charged, exclusion of the witness’ testimony was the only practical sanction because defendant had suffered serious prejudice as a result of the delay in getting information about the witness’ statement. He said that a continuance would not remedy the prejudice because it was unlikely that the man who had spoken with the witness could be found, because the trail was “cold.” He also argued that defendant would be less likely to get reliable information from the coemployee, who had first seen the unknown man and who had seen the encounter between the man and the witness.
The trial court found that defendant would have used the information in the officer’s notes to locate other witnesses and to prepare to cross-examine the witness. Those findings are supported by evidence in the record and we are bound by them. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968). The trial court concluded that granting a continuance would be “a reward to the state, at great prejudice to the defense.” The trial court continued:
*692“If we are to ever get the reporting officers to do the job that the statute requires them to do, so that the state can do the job that [it is] required to do, it is not to set it over to fix it. And so, I believe that, based upon what I read in [State v. Dyson, 292 Or 26, 34-35, 636 P2d 961 (1981)], the appropriate result here is not to allow [the witness] to testify in this case. He was clearly known, and the content of his testimony was clearly known, and it was not disclosed to the defendant’s prejudice.”
The opportunity to prepare to cross-examine a witness is “of inestimable benefit to the examiner and cross-examiner.” State v. Mai, 294 Or 269, 279, 656 P2d 315 (1982); Bray, 31 Or App at 51. Likewise, the opportunity to locate and speak with all potential witnesses is of great benefit. Mai, 294 Or at 279. The trial court correctly concluded that defendant was prejudiced by the delay.
Additionally, the trial court properly considered whether there was any meaningful alternative to exclusion. See State v. Gill, 96 Or App 358, 361, 772 P2d 957 (1989) (trial court must consider the benefits and detriments of a particular sanction); see also State v. Moss, 147 Or App 658, 663, 938 P2d 215, rev den 325 Or 491 (1997) (trial court considered the prejudice to the defendant and whether alternate sanctions to exclusion would suffice). It concluded that a continuance would not alleviate the prejudice and that exclusion was necessary to impart to police officers the importance of providing all potentially valuable information to the prosection. To that, I would add that to exclude the officer’s testimony, as we did in Johnson, but allow the witness’ testimony, would render the. sanction meaningless. See Moss, 147 Or App at 663 (where exclusion is the only meaningful sanction available, it is not an abuse of discretion to exclude a defense witness).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the witness’ testimony as a sanction for the state’s failure to provide the officer’s notes. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Riggs and DeMuniz, JJ., join in this dissent.A subpart of this rule, which is not at issue in this case, is that the court may go beyond the common meaning of a word if the common meaning is inappropriate within the context of the remaining text of the statute.
That statement of statutory purpose is based on the commentary to the statute by the Oregon Criminal Law Revision Commission. See Oregon Criminal Law Review Commission, Proposed Oregon Criminal Procedure Code § 322, at 186 (1972).
ORS 174.010 provides:
“In the construction of a statute, the office of a judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted!.]”
In contrast with civil litigants, a criminal defendant does not have the ability to depose people who have information about the defendant’s case. Consequently, *688the defendant in this case could not depose the officer to learn the identity of the witness. Conversely, however, a criminal defendant is entitled to get the names and addresses of state witnesses, which is information that civil litigants are not required to share with each other, and a criminal defendant is entitled to get witness statements from the state without making the showing required of civil litigants to get comparable statements. Compare ORS 135.815(1) with ORCP 36 B(3). I believe that ORS 135.815(1) gives criminal defendants the right to get witness statements from state witnesses that are equivalent to the witness statements that a civil litigant could get under ORCP 36 B(3) under appropriate circumstances. Those statements are statements that contain relevant information, not statements that contain information that a party intends to elicit from witnesses.
In that context, the reference to witnesses is to people who have witnessed a crime.