dissenting.
I would hold the finding that a change in custody is in the best interests of the child in this case to be clearly erroneous because it was induced by an erroneous view of the law, and any significant change of circumstances does not “compel or require ... a change of custody.” Barstad v. Barstad, 499 N.W.2d 584, 587 (N.D.1993).
It is clear to me that the reason for the change of custody is not Lynne’s move, but Lynne’s “contemptuous conduct” in moving to Iowa City without first obtaining court approval. I say that because a custodial parent’s move to another state, by itself, is not a changed circumstance that requires a change in custody. Barstad, 499 N.W.2d at 587, citing Gould v. Miller, 488 N.W.2d 42, 44 (N.D.1992), especially when the move is one to gain economic advantage.1 See Hedstrom v. Berg, 421 N.W.2d 488 (N.D.1988).
That is so because of the primary importance of custodial stability. See Silseth v. Levang, 214 N.W.2d 361 (N.D.1974). Maintaining “continuity and stability in the custodial relationship” is the “most compelling factor” when considering a change of custody. Alvarez v. Carlson, 524 N.W.2d 584, 589 (N.D.1994). “The child is presumed to be better off remaining with the custodial parent....” Id. Overcoming this presumption is, and should be, a difficult task for the noncustodial parent. See Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 837 (N.D.1993) (Levine, J., concurring) [stating that “noncustodial parents challenging custody” face “a daunting, arduous task.”]. Ultimately, “[t]he trial court should change custody only when the reasons for transferring custody substantially outweigh the child’s stability with the custodial parent.” Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 687 (N.D.1994).
While it may be advantageous for children to stay in the same town with friends and noncustodial parent, the desire for environmental stability does not outweigh the presumption in favor of custodial stability. See Klose v. Klose, 524 N.W.2d 94 (N.D.1994); Alvarez, 524 N.W.2d at 590; Hagel v. Hagel, 512 N.W.2d 465 (N.D.1994); accord Dalin, 512 N.W.2d at 687; Barstad, 499 N.W.2d at 587.
Treating this case for the moment as though Lynne had properly requested permission to move, she would have had to prove her move was in the child’s best interests. McRae v. Carbno, 404 N.W.2d 508 (N.D.1987); Olson v. Olson, 361 N.W.2d 249 (N.D.1985). Custodial stability and economic advantage in conjunction with an extended summer vacation and other holiday visitation schedule for Rick would fully support the move. See Hedstrom, 421 N.W.2d at 490; McRae, 404 N.W.2d at 511-12 (Meschke, J., dissenting); see also Holder v. Polanski, 111 N.J. 344, 544 A.2d 852, 856-57 (1988) [custodial parent need only show a “sincere, good-faith reason” for move and court considers whether move is inimical to best interests of child and whether it will “adversely affect” visitation rights. “Not every change in a visitation schedule will prejudice those rights.... ”].
Assuming, then, that the referee properly considered the importance of maintaining the stability the child enjoys with the custodial parent and the economic gain derived from the new job, he could not, in my view, base a change of custody on the fact that Lynne’s move would frustrate Rick’s visitation. Thomas v. Thomas, 446 N.W.2d 433 (N.D.1989). See also Holder, 544 A.2d at 857. Nor could he change custody on the basis that Lynne’s work interfered with her ability to take Nicholas to the ballpark and the barber. Aside from the obvious fact that Lynne, as a custodial parent, was responsible for the daily nurture, care, supervision and direction of Nicholas, with which no fault was found (aside from the absence of extra-curricular activities), I assume the referee surely recognized the overriding importance and success of Lynne’s day-to-day educational, moral and physical nurture and care of the child as contrasted with Rick’s contributions to the child’s participation in extra-curricular athletics and haircuts. See Barstad, 499 N.W.2d at 588. I, therefore, am confident *205that the referee determined to change custody primarily, if not exclusively, to punish Lynne for her unapproved move to Iowa, in part because of her alleged past frustration of visitation.
The referee found that by her move, Lynne was determined to “make visitation difficult if not impossible.” However, the record does not support this finding.2
The only past interference with visitation that was proved in court occurred on September 15, 1989, when Rick was unable to exercise visitation on one occasion because Lynne and the child were not at home when he arrived to pick up the child. Lynne claimed that she had requested that Rick have visitation on weekends corresponding with her employment schedule and that her schedule changed from the first and third weekends to the second and fourth weekends and that Rick refused to accommodate this change. She asked that the alternating weekend schedule begin over with September 8, 1989, as the first weekend.
The referee held Lynne in contempt of court and the trial court confirmed. This 1989 order is the only finding of interference with visitation and the only time Lynne was found to be in contempt for frustration of visitation. All the other alleged past visitation violations cited by the majority, as justifying a change of custody, are taken from Rick’s affidavits that accompanied a motion dated July 2, 1990, in which Rick sought a change of custody, claiming visitation interferences and other allegations, including Lynne’s failure to provide him with the name and address of her day-care provider. The referee appointed a guardian ad litem who recommended not only no change in custody, but also that the parties, “particularly [Rick] cease manipulating the child in regard to the custody issue.” In denying the motion to change custody,3 the referee rejected all of Rick’s claims of a “pattern of visitation denial” (as well as Lynne’s allegations that Rick was harassing her) and found also that Rick had coached the child to tell the guardian ad litem he wanted to live with Rick. That the majority should detail those very same allegations of misconduct that took place, if at all, before the December 1991 custody adjudication and were rejected by the referee, and elevate them to “facts” that justify the present change of custody is startling.
It is obvious from the referee’s December 1991 findings that he rejected Rick’s allegations of visitation interference. Specifically, the referee found:
“IX
“That at the heart of this dispute is visitation; that the Plaintiff [Rick] alleges a pattern of denial of visitation; that the Defendant [Lynne] alleges that no such pattern of denial exists and that Plaintiff is in fact fabricating this charge both for purposes of harassment and to bolster an otherwise thin claim to custody; that although only one side can be telling the truth in this matter, neither is clearly more credible than the other and neither presents significant support evidence for their respective position.”
The majority, however, suggests that the referee chose not to make findings on Rick’s visitation interference allegations because he wanted to use “methods other than a change of custody to try to resolve a custody dispute.” Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the referee did make findings: he found no “significant support” for the visitation interference allegations. Nor would a change of custody have been mandatory or appropriate had the referee found the visitation interference allegations to be credible. See Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607 (N.D.1992). The fact is that the referee did not find Rick’s evidence of visitation interference “significant.” That tells me that the majori*206ty is reaching, to say the least, when it relies on the very evidence the referee found not “significant.”
The majority also notes that the referee, in his 1991 order, instructed the guardian ad litem to report on any further visitation problems. And so he did. But the guardian made no such report, nor is there any evidence of visitation problems between the conclusion of the previous custody action and the initiation of the present action — a span of almost three years. The record shows, however, that in the same period, the court was forced to threaten Rick with contempt three times because he failed to make child support payments.
The only adjudicated visitation frustration took place in 1989, a long time ago. Can it be seriously disputed that one instance of interference with visitation cannot serve as justification, even in part, for changing custody? Indeed, even if it were not so remote or isolated an event, we have held that a recent pattern of frustration of visitation rights is not enough in itself to warrant a change of custody. Miller v. Miller, 305 N.W.2d 666 (N.D.1981); Ebertz v. Ebertz, 338 N.W.2d 651 (N.D.1983). Problems with visitation do not justify a change of custody unless there is a finding that there has been a negative effect on the best interests of the child. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 610. Even when visitation is a problem, less drastic remedies than changing custody should be considered first. Id. Here, the single prior visitation problem found to have occurred took place before the referee imposed his contempt sanction in 1990. That sanction obviously worked. Rick acknowledges that since 1990, he has not missed visitation once. So, when the dust settles, we are left with the “contemptuous” move to Iowa.
A move without court approval is forbidden. But, Lynne’s unauthorized move was neither vindictive nor otherwise in bad faith. She would earn twice as much in Iowa City as she did in Fargo. The job offer required an immediate transfer and she jumped at it. There is nothing in this record to suggest that the reason for Lynne’s move was anything but economic. Nor is there any suggestion that Rick offered, or Lynne refused, additional child support to enable Lynne to stay in Fargo and forgo doubling her modest income.
Transfer of custody only should be used as a last resort “to remedy a recalcitrant parent’s habitual interference with visitation.” Johnson 502 N.W.2d at 837 (Levine, J., concurring). One prior instance of visitation interference five years before, and a hasty move out of state to grab an opportunity to double one’s income, do not make for either “a recalcitrant parent” or “habitual interference with visitation.” A move without court approval is a serious affront, but the sanction for that violation should not be a change of custody, at least under the circumstances of this case.
I would reverse and reinstate custody in Lynne.
MESCHKE, J., concurs.. Rick earns. about $45,000 a year. Lynne earned $16,000 a year in Fargo and about $32,-000 a year in Iowa. Lynne was on public assistance for almost a year before she found work with her current employer.
. The majority's statement that Lynne “has repeatedly interfered with or denied Rick's visitation” is unfortunately blatantly wrong. It overstates the referee's findings and it is contrary to the referee’s prior rejection of the very evidence the majority relies on.
. The majority says the record is unclear over the disposition of the July 2, 1990, motion. I find no lack of clarity. The motion was not disposed of until December 27, 1991, because of the delay engendered by the appointment of a guardian ad litem and the guardian's investigation and report.