(dissenting). The question presented is whether Wayne County is subject to liability for failure to post school warning signs. I would hold that it is.
The highway exception to the governmental tort liability act1 provides that a governmental agency shall be subject to liability for failure to keep a *140highway under its jurisdiction "in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel . . .
The majority states that the "highway exception abrogates governmental immunity at 'points of special danger to motorists . . . ”2 For reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Chaney v Dep’t of Transportation,3 the county is obliged to post signs necessary to keep the road "in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.” Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458, 460; 42 NW 50 (1889); McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich 172, 176; 98 NW 1006 (1904); Kowalczyk v Bailey, 379 Mich 568; 153 NW2d 660 (1967); Tuttle v Dep’t of State Hwys, 397 Mich 44; 243 NW2d 244 (1976); Salvati v Dep’t of State Hwys, 415 Mich 708; 330 NW2d 64 (1982); Mullins v Wayne Co, 16 Mich App 365; 168 NW2d 246 (1969).
The obligation to keep the road "in condition *141reasonably safe and fit for travel” extends not only to motorists and their passengers, but also to pedestrian travelers, and, indeed, to others injured as a result of the failure of a governmental agency to discharge its duty to keep the road "in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.”
In Mechay v Detroit, 364 Mich 576, 578-579; 111 NW2d 820 (1961), this Court held that the City of Detroit was subject to liability, under a statutory provision containing language identical to that reenacted in the highway exception, to a worker injured when a streetlight pole broke, throwing him to the ground, and said:
In Rufner v City of Traverse City, 296 Mich 204 [295 NW 620 (1941)], and Cabana v City of Hart, 327 Mich 287 [42 NW2d 97 (1950)] (19 ALR2d 333), we ruled that CL 1948, § 242.3 (Stat Ann 1958 Rev § 9.593), requires cities to maintain in reasonable repair electric street light poles as part of their duty to keep in reasonable repair streets, highways, sidewalks, et cetera, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. The argument is made by defendant that whether or not street light poles are required to be maintained in repair by that statute, the duty to do so does not extend to anyone except travelers and, since at the time of injury plaintiff was not traveling upon the adjoining street, defendant’s statutory duty did not extend to him.
We disagree. The reference to public travel[4] contained in the statute quoted above is not a restriction upon the persons to whom the duty is owed but, rather, deñnes the standard by which the duty is measured: "to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.”
*142Liability is imposed upon municipalities in favor of "any person or persons” injured by reason of the municipality’s breach of its statutory duty. We have not squarely held that the beneñts of this section of the statute are limited only to travelers, nor do we see any ground upon which we should do so now. The opinion in Beaudin v Bay City, 136 Mich 333 [99 NW 285 (1904)] (4 Ann Cas 248, 16 Am Neg Rep 108), reasonably may be construed to suggest that the statutory cause of action is limited only to travelers lawfully upon the street, because it refers to cases outside Michigan which had so construed somewhat similar statutes and because the Court determined that the child plaintiff was entitled to recover so long as he was not unlawfully using the street. To the extent that there is any inference in that case inconsistent with this opinion, it is expressly overruled. [Emphasis added.]
Although the fourth sentence of the highway exception5 provides that the county is not obliged to repair and maintain crosswalks or sidewalks, it does not follow that the fourth sentence relieves counties from liability for failure to keep the roadway "in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel” for all travelers, including pedestrians. "The defect alleged by the plaintiff” is not a defect in crosswalks,6 but rather a failure of the county to discharge its obligation to keep the roadway "in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel” by a child on his way to school.
The fourth sentence imposes on cities and townships the duty to keep crosswalks and sidewalks "in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.” *143The fourth sentence does not thereby relieve the state or the county of its obligation under the first and second sentences to keep the roadway "in condition reasonably safe, and fit for travel.”
Cities and townships are obliged under the first, second, and fourth sentences of the highway exception to provide signs and traffic signals reasonably necessary for pedestrian travel on city and township roads, sidewalks, and crosswalks, and also on sidewalks and crosswalks of state and county roads. But the state and the county have the obligation under the first and second sentences to provide signs and traffic signals respecting use of the highway reasonably necessary for the protection of motorists, their passengers, and other travelers, including pedestrians.
The majority errs in stating, as a matter of law, that "a school does not present a special danger to vehicles,” and that "a school crossing is not a danger to vehicles and the vehicle passengers.”7 School advance signs, school crossing signs, school speed limit signs, school pavement markings, overhead walkways, and flashing red stoplights are installed at schools for the protection of motorists and their passengers, as well as for the protection of school children, to guard against the risk of collisions resulting from diversion of vehicles from the line of travel to avoid hitting a child.
Outer Drive at this school crossing is a busy thoroughfare. Outer Drive is a boulevard for approximately a mile preceding the east boundary of the school, and for approximately a mile preceding the west boundary of the school. But it is not a boulevard for the few blocks immediately east and immediately west of the school. The speed limit is thirty-five miles an hour, but actual speeds exceed *144forty-five miles an hour. The need for special precautions is apparent. Minimally, the county could have stenciled across the roadway "school” in each lane of travel—a precaution seen throughout the metropolitan area.' Such a school advance warning would not be an "other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” under the fourth sentence.
As the Great Depression was about to descend on this nation, this Court observed that a highway authority "cannot confine its citizens in a traffic groove. It must take into account the natural inclination of children to run about in play and the perverse insistence of adults to cut corners and cross streets and grass plats instead of following precisely the beaten or provided path. Such departure from the sidewalk is not negligence per se in the individual, nor does it relieve the city of the duty to keep its streets in proper condition for travel at the places where people may reasonably be expected probably to walk. Lincoln v City of Detroit [101 Mich 245; 59 NW 617 (1894)];[8] Baker v City of Grand Rapids, 111 Mich 447 [69 NW 740 (1897)]; Finch v Village of Bangor, 133 Mich 149 [94 NW 738 (1903)]. In all of these cases pedestrians were injured when off the side or crosswalks.” Jablonski v Bay City, 248 Mich 306, 310; 226 NW 865 (1929).
The majority’s disposition makes it unnecessary, in this dissenting opinion, to consider the other issues addressed in the briefs of counsel.
Mallett, J., concurred with Levin, J._Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him from such governmental agency. The liability, procedure and remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission shall be as provided in section 21, chapter 4 of Act No. 283 of the Public Acts of 1909, as amended, being section 224.21 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed *140for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. No action shall be brought against the state under this section except for injury or loss suffered on or after July 1, 1965. Any judgment against the state based on a claim arising under this section from acts or omissions of the state highway department shall be payable only from restricted funds appropriated to the state highway department or funds provided by its insurer. [1964 PA 170, § 2, MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).]
The text of 1909 PA 283 is set forth in Chaney v Dep’t of Transportation, 447 Mich 145, 202, n 55; 523 NW2d 762 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting). 1948 CL 224.21 carries forward, without change, the operative language of the 1909 act:
It is hereby made the duty of the counties to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all county roads, bridges and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control and which are open to public travel.
Ante, p 135.
Chaney, supra, pp 178 ff (Levin, J., dissenting).
See n 1 for text 1948 CL 224.21, which contains language substantially the same as 1948 CL 242.3.
See n 1 for text.
The majority states:
The highway exception specifically excepts the state and counties from liability for defects in crosswalks, the defect alleged by the plaintiff .... [Ante, p 135.]
Ante, p 135.
[Tjt is not either extraordinary or negligent for pedestrians, in crossing the street, to cross at other points than the crosswalks, and to pass over such manholes, using due caution .... [I]t was a question for the jury whether the place in question was reasonably safe. [Id., p 248.]