This is á direct appeal from the circuit court’s order affirming the Administrative Law Court’s (ALC) summary dismissal of appellant James Furtick’s prison grievance matter. After we issued our original opinion in which we reversed, Furtick v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, Op. No. 26270 (S.C. Sup.Ct. filed February 20, 2007) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 6 at 89), respondent filed a petition for rehearing. We now withdraw our original opinion and issue this opinion. We deny respondent’s petition for rehearing and reverse the circuit court’s decision.
FACTS
In 2001, when Furtick was an inmate at Lee Correctional Institution, the Department of Corrections (DOC) charged him with possession of contraband.1 After a major disciplinary hearing was held, Furtick was found guilty of the offense and reprimanded. As a result of the reprimand, Furtick alleges he did not earn his good time credit for the month of the infraction. Furtick appealed from this disciplinary decision through the DOC’s internal grievance system; the DOC denied his grievance.
Furtick appealed the denial of his grievance to the ALC, and the DOC moved to dismiss the action based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finding that Furtick had no liberty interest in good time credits which he was unable to earn as a result of a rule violation, the ALC dismissed the matter.
Furtick sought review from the circuit court. The circuit court also found no liberty interest was implicated and therefore affirmed the ALC’s decision.
*337ISSUE
Did the circuit court err in finding the ALC lacked jurisdiction over Furtick’s claim?
DISCUSSION
Furtick argues that the circuit court erred by finding that the ALC lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review his grievance. We agree.
Through statute, the State provides that an inmate is “entitled to a deduction from the term of his sentence” if he “faithfully observe[s] all the rules of the institution and has not been subjected to punishment for misbehavior.” S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-210(A) (2007). However, “[i]f a prisoner ... violates one of the rules of the institution during his term of imprisonment, all or part of the good conduct credit he has earned may be forfeited in the discretion of the Director of the Department of Corrections.” Id. § 24-13-210(D).
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the United States Supreme Court explained that inmates have certain due process rights when good time credits are at issue:
It is true that the Constitution itself does not. guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison.... [The State] may have the authority to create, or not, a right to a shortened prison sentence through the accumulation of credits for good behavior, and it is true that the Due Process Clause does not require a hearing “in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest.” ... But the State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty’ to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.
Id. at 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (citation omitted); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (the States may, under certain circumstances, create *338liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause); Henderson v. Comm’rs of Barnstable County, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 455, 730 N.E.2d 362, 370 (2000) (“The entitlement to statutory good time credit is a liberty interest.”).
The USSC noted in Wolff that punishment in the form of “the forfeiture or withholding of good-time credits” affects the term of confinement. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 547, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (emphasis added). Additionally, in Superintendent, Mass. Corn Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), the USSC specifically stated the following: “Where a prisoner has a liberty interest in good time credits, the loss of such credits threatens his prospective freedom from confinement by extending the length of imprisonment. Thus the inmate has a strong interest in assuring that the loss of good time credits is not imposed arbitrarily.”
In Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000), we acknowledged that “[t]he statutory right to sentence-related credits is a protected ‘liberty’ interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, entitling an inmate to minimal due process to ensure the state-created right was not arbitrarily abrogated.” Id. at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 750 (citing Wolff, supra). We held in Al-Shabazz that the DOC’s disciplinary and grievance procedures are consistent with the due process standards outlined by the USSC in Wolff. See id. at 372-73, 527 S.E.2d at 751-52 (for extensive discussion on the DOC’s procedures for major disciplinary hearings). Moreover, we also held that an inmate generally could not raise a non-collateral claim, such as one involving the forfeiture of good-time credits, via the Post-Conviction Relief Act. Id. at 367-68, 527 S.E.2d at 749.
We held, however, that an inmate could pursue review of certain grievance decisions made by the DOC by filing an action in the ALC pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Alr-Shabazz Court stated that when an inmate challenges a disciplinary outcome, calculation of sentence-related credits, custody status, or other condition of imprisonment, he could bring “a contested case” under the APA. Id. at 375, 527 S.E.2d at 753. Thus, the ALC “sits in an appellate capacity to review” these types of decisions. Id. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754.
*339Furthermore, “[a]n inmate is entitled to judicial review of the final decision in a non-collateral or administrative matter, which includes a disciplinary hearing.” Id. at 377-78, 527 S.E.2d at 754. We explained that judicial review must be available to determine “whether prison officials have acted arbitrarily capriciously, or from personal bias.” Id. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756-57.
We emphasized in Al-Shabazz that any judicial review would be of a “limited nature” and that the courts of this State would adhere to a “hands off’ doctrine when reviewing the decision from a major disciplinary hearing in which an inmate has a protected liberty interest due to the potential loss of sentence-related credits. Id. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757. Finally, the Al-Shabazz Court recognized that most of these matters would be resolved without either ALC or judicial review, but nonetheless held that such review “must be available.” Id. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.2
Several subsequent decisions have reiterated Al-Shabazz’s holding that the ALC has subject matter jurisdiction over an inmate’s appeal when the claim sufficiently “implicates a state-created liberty interest.” Sullivan v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 443, 586 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1153, 124 S.Ct. 1155, 157 L.Ed.2d 1050 (2004); see also Furtick v. S.C. Dep’t of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 352 S.C. 594, 598, 576 S.E.2d 146, 149, cert. denied, 539 U.S. 932, 123 S.Ct. 2584, 156 L.Ed.2d 612 (2003) (in deciding whether Respondent was entitled to review of the Department’s parole eligibility decision, the Court evaluated whether Respondent had a liberty interest in gaining access to the parole board); Steele v. Benjamin, 362 S.C. 66, 606 S.E.2d 499 (Ct.App.2004) (the ALC’s subject matter jurisdiction depends on whether there is a sufficient, state-created liberty interest implicated).
*340Furthermore, in Slezak v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 361 S.C. 327, 605 S.E.2d 506 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1033, 125 S.Ct. 2266, 161 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2005), we clarified that the ALC has jurisdiction over all inmate grievance appeals that have been properly filed; the ALC, however, is not required to hold a hearing in every matter. We stated in Slezak that summary dismissal would only be appropriate “where the inmate’s grievance does not implicate a state-created liberty or property interest.” Id. at 331, 605 S.E.2d at 508. Thus, where a matter clearly implicates a loss of statutory sentence-related credits, the ALC may not summarily dismiss the action.3
Turning now to the instant case, we reiterate that the State of South Carolina clearly has created a liberty interest in good-time credits by enacting section 24-13-210. Without a doubt, these credits for good behavior may be withheld or revoked as punishment when an inmate commits an offense while incarcerated or otherwise violates the rules of the institution. S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-210(D). Nonetheless, such a loss of good-time credits is reviewable by the ALC pursuant to Al-Shabazz and its progeny. The matter is reviewable because the loss of good-time credits sufficiently “implicates a state-created liberty interest.” Sullivan, 355 S.C. at 443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. When a state-created liberty interest is implicated, the inmate is entitled to certain due process rights. Wolff, supra. While the DOC’s disciplinary policies comport with those due process requirements, the purpose of allowing review is to ensure that due process was, in fact, accorded to the inmate and the inmate’s right to the statutory credit was not “arbitrarily abrogated.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963; accord Al-Shabazz, supra.
We emphasize, however, that inmate litigation itself must comport with certain standards. If a court finds a prisoner has: (1) submitted a malicious or frivolous claim, or one that is intended solely to harass the party filed against; (2) testified falsely or otherwise presented false evidence or information to *341the court; (8) unreasonably expanded or delayed a proceeding; or (4) abused the discovery process; then the “prisoner shall forfeit all or part of his earned work, education, or good conduct credits in an amount to be determined” by the DOC. S.C.Code Ann. § 24-27-200 (2007); see also Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756.
In this case, Furtick sought review from the ALC and such review was denied by both the ALC and circuit court. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the ALC to hold a hearing on the denial of Furtick’s grievance claim.
REVERSED.
MOORE, BURNETT and PLEICONES, JJ., concur. TOAL, C.J., dissenting in a separate opinion.. According to Furtick, DOC guards entered his cell and seized numerous items of property, including his typewriter, various office supplies, and bleach. It appears the possession of contraband rule infraction was based on the possession of bleach.
. As to the facts of the petitioner's claims in Al-Shabazz, they involved his custody status and the loss of good-time credits incurred as a result of a major disciplinary proceeding. We held that these claims were non-collateral or administrative matters that could not be raised in a PCR application, but could be reviewed under the APA after the DOC reached its final decision. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
. Regarding Slezak’s grievance which asserted that the prison's practice of "triple celling” constituted a security and health hazard to inmates, the Slezak Court remanded to the ALC for a hearing because it "adequately state[d] a violation of appellant's liberty interest.” Slezak, 361 S.C. at 333, 605 S.E.2d at 508-09.