(dissenting). The question presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that this prosecution is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We would hold that it did not, and would affirm.
A probate court jury found that the court did *166not have "jurisdiction” of defendant Gregory Steven Gates’ daughter. The majority concludes that the verdict of the probate court jury did not "determine”1 that Gates had not committed the act of sexual abuse of his three-year-old daughter charged both in the information in the instant case and in the petition filed by the Department of Social Services in the earlier tried probate court proceeding. That conclusion is premised on the manner in which the jury was instructed.
We would hold that the entire record in the probate court proceeding — the charge set forth in the petition, all the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and the instructions read as a whole— should be assessed in deciding whether the verdict of no jurisdiction constituted a determination by the jury that Gates had not sexually abused his daughter. That decision cannot properly be premised on a construction of a single sentence in the instructions viewed in the abstract, separate and apart from the entire record.
i
The judge instructed the jury, in the form of the statute2 and the standard instructions developed by probate judges,3 that the jury must find, from all the evidence, whether the child’s home or environment, by reason of criminality, was an *167unfit place for her to live. The question, so posed, viewed in the abstract, did indeed permit the jury to find that the criminal conduct charged did not render her home unfit. It is possible that the jury understood the instructions as authorizing it to render a verdict that the home was fit although it was convinced that Gates had in fact sexually abused his daughter. And that the jury found that Gates had in fact sexually abused his daughter but nevertheless found that her home was fit. Possible, but not likely.
A
The language of the statute4 and the phrasing of the instructions reflect recognition that some acts of criminal misconduct might not render a home unfit for a child. A parent who circulates counterfeit money, embezzles, pollutes the environment, or commits other crimes that some might view as more or less serious, may nevertheless provide a fit home for his children. The statute does not permit the probate court to assume jurisdiction unless the jury finds that the criminal act renders the home unfit.
The jury was thus properly instructed that "[w]hether a parent’s violation of the criminal law renders the home or environment of the child an *168unfit place for the child is for you to decide based upon all of the evidence in the case.” (Emphasis supplied.)5
B
There was, however, no evidence or argument— separate and apart from the evidence tending to show that Gates had committed the act of sexual abuse and the evidence to the contrary — focusing on or tending to show whether the home or environment was or was not fit. Thus, assuming arguendo that the jury understood that it was authorized to find the child’s home fit although it found that her father had sexually abused her, there is no reason to suppose that the jury in fact found that Gates had sexually abused his daughter but nevertheless found that her home was fit.
*169The amended petition filed in the probate court alleged that Gates had touched his daughter’s genitals for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.6 All the evidence introduced by both parties was directed to the primary allegation in the petition: that Gates had touched his daughter’s genitals.7 Neither Gates nor his lawyer contended, expressly or by innuendo, during the examination of witnesses or during oral argument, that even if the jury found that Gates had so touched his daughter’s genitals for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, her home was nevertheless a fit place for her to live.
A different question would be presented if three issues had been litigated: whether the child had been so touched, whether Gates had so touched her, and, if so, whether her home was nevertheless a fit place for her to live. Because no evidence was introduced focusing on whether the home was fit, even were the jury to find that the criminal conduct alleged in fact occurred, the majority’s assertion that factors other than Gates’ guilt or inno*170cence may have been the basis of the "no jurisdiction” verdict is tenuous at best.8
ii
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that "the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the State from criminally trying the defendant on charges of sexual assault and related offenses when, in a prior civil proceeding based upon the same alleged incidents, the court dismissed the action on the ground that the State had failed to prove that the defendant had committed the acts.” Bowling v State, 298 Md 396, 398; 470 A2d 797 (1984).9 The court said that "[t]he civil character of the first proceeding does not make inapplicable the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a subsequent criminal case.”10
In People v Sims, 32 Cal 3d 468; 186 Cal Rptr *17177; 651 P2d 321 (1982), the Supreme Court of California applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a criminal case that was preceded by an administrative hearing.11 The court said:
Collateral estoppel may be applied to decisions made by administrative agencies "[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate . . . .”[12]
The court added that ”[t]he [administrative *172agency] decision exonerating [the accused] of fraud may be given collateral estoppel effect. This is true even where, as in this case, the successive proceedings involved are different in nature and the proceeding to be estopped is a criminal prosecution.”13
Bowling and Sims are, however, distinguishable because in both cases the trial court in the civil proceeding specifically found that the criminal misconduct charged in the criminal prosecution had not occurred while here there was not such a specific finding.
hi
Whenever there is a general verdict — most jury verdicts are general verdicts — there will be difficulty deciding what the jury determined regarding the underlying disputed issues of fact requisite to the ultimate finding. In deciding whether an issue of fact was actually litigated and determined, a court should assess the entire record and decide the question based on the probabilities and not possibilities.
That was the approach of the United States Supreme Court in Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436; 90 S Ct 1189; 25 L Ed 2d 469 (1970). The Court said that "[w]here a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict” in deciding whether relitigation is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a court should
"examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon *173an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.”[14]
The majority cites Ashe with apparent approval, but does not in its analysis employ the standard there stated.15
The trial centered on Gates’ culpability. In his closing remarks to the jury, the judge said: "When you deliberate, you are only allowed to consider the evidence which has been properly admitted in this case.” The only "evidence” that had been admitted was testimony concerning whether the child had been molested and, if so, whether Gates was the person who had molested her. No evidence otherwise bearing on the fitness of her home had been introduced.
Where the trier of fact/court renders alternative determinations of fact or law either of which would have supported the earlier judgment, neither determination is "essential to the judgment.”16 Where, however, only one issue is litigated,17 only one issue could have been determined, and ordinarily there is no reason to suppose that another issue, not litigated, was determined or was determinative.
The parties frame the debate on a given issue through their presentations. They define the parameters in which the jury will consider the competing evidence and arguments. When the parties to a controversy plead, litigate, and submit an issue to the jury, a general verdict should ordinarily be regarded as deciding that issue. There *174should be a strong presumption that the decision of the jury is based on the issue pled, litigated, and submitted, rebuttable only by compelling evidence that the verdict did not decide that issue.
Here the only issue that was litigated was whether Gates had sexually abused his daughter. The overwhelming probability is that the factual issue determined by the jury, when it rendered its verdict, was whether Gates had sexually abused his daughter, as the people so vigorously, but so far unsuccessfully, contended.
There is considerable uncertainty in most lawsuits. The law does not require absolute proof or certainty. The standard applied by the majority in the instant case, in deciding whether the factual issue of Gates’ culpability was determined by the jury, is higher than the standard the jury, on the retrial ordered by the majority, will apply in again deciding that factual issue.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel evolved in response to "the concern of the public in the settlement of litigation in the interest of a stable society and in minimizing expense and effort of the courts, as well as of litigants.”18 Application of the doctrine in a case where a person’s liberty interests are at stake provides assurance that
matters once determined in an adversary action shall be deemed conclusive, thus furnishing a basis upon which to predicate future conduct without fear of repeated vexation arising from relitigation of determined issues.[19]
The people failed to convince the jury of Gates’ guilt. He should not be subjected to relitigation of *175the same basic issue — whether he sexually molested his daughter — in a criminal prosecution.
IV
The majority states that the purposes of a child protective proceeding and a criminal prosecution are so different that application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be contrary to sound public policy.20 Although the general purposes of the two proceedings differ, there is an overlap, and the purposes are not mutually exclusive.
The instant case demonstrates that a function of the probate court proceeding may in fact be to determine whether a parent engaged in criminal misconduct with respect to the parent’s child. Where the probate court petition is based solely on an allegation of parental criminal misconduct with respect to the child, the fate of both the child and the parent are inextricably tied to the determination of the parent’s guilt or innocence. The probate court cannot act to "protect” the child by acquiring jurisdiction of the child, unless the jury finds that the parent is guilty of the criminal misconduct respecting the child charged in the petition. Where sexual abuse is charged, the purpose sought to be achieved by initiating the abuse/neglect proceeding can only be realized upon a finding by the jury that the parent did in fact commit the charged act of criminal misconduct respecting the child.
In an abuse/neglect proceeding, various considerations may inform the jury’s verdict. The application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a particular case does not, however, depend on what may occur in another case. It depends on what occurred in the particular case. In the instant case *176—typical or atypical — the only issue pled, litigated, and submitted to the trier of fact was Gates’ guilt or innocence. No evidence bearing on any other issue was provided for the jury’s consideration. Collateral estoppel effect should not be denied where there is issue identity, where only one issue was pled, litigated, and submitted to the jury, because in another case more than one issue might be litigated or because there is in theory a difference in the primary purposes of the two proceedings.21
The majority contends that applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the instant case would, in future cases, oblige a prosecutor to choose between commencing a criminal prosecution to vindicate the public interest in ascertaining guilt and filing a petition in probate court to protect the interests of the child.22 Reference is *177made to the so-called "42 day” rule set forth in MCR 5.972, which provides that if a child has been taken from the home, i.e., the child is "in placement,” "the trial must commence as soon as possible but not later than 42 days after the child is placed by the court . . . .” The majority argues that because of the forty-two-day rule, it would be "extremely difficult, and often impossible, for the criminal charges to be brought to trial in circuit court in advance of the jurisdiction determination in probate court.”23
The scheduling problem — which case to try first —can be resolved by agreement of the parties or by an amendment of the court rules that this Court has the power to decree. The Court is currently considering a proposal to extend the time frame from forty-two to sixty-three days.24
Prosecutors are generally called upon to participate in an abuse/neglect proceeding.25 When the prosecutor is intimately involved in the litigation, such that the prosecutor has a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the abuse/neglect proceeding, and those issues are actually litigated in the probate proceeding and are the same issues sought to be litigated in the criminal prosecution, the doctrine of collateral estoppel should apply.26
*178The probate court is a court of record,27 in contrast with an administrative agency.28 The prosecutor generally represents the petitioner in a child protective proceeding. The lawyers on both sides are likely to be the same in both the child protective proceeding and the criminal proceeding. This is not a case where the litigants did not have as strong an incentive to litigate in the earlier proceeding as they have in the later proceeding.
If the prosecutor does not participate in the probate court proceeding, application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be inappropriate because the prosecutor has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.29
The record does not substantiate the majority’s assertion that the competence of the probate court to determine in a child protective proceeding the criminal guilt or innocence of the parent "is necessarily compromised by the appropriate focus of the probate court on the protection of children.”30 The prosecutor in the instant child protective proceeding focused entirely on the asserted criminal guilt of Gates. The prosecutor was not compromised. *179Nor was the probate court. The prosecutor simply failed to convince the jury. The prosecutor had his day in court. Gates should not be required to "run the gantlet” again.31
We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.The majority uses the phrase "necessarily determine.” The Restatement uses the term "determine”:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. [1 Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 27, p 250.]
See n 3.
See text accompanying n 5.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the juvenile division of the probate court shall have:
(b) Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child under 17 years of age found within the county:
(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, or other custodian, is an unfit place for such child to live in. [MCL 712A.2; MSA 27.3178(598.2).]
The majority emphasizes the following instruction:
I do instruct you that this is a child protection case. It is not a criminal case. Therefore, the issue before you is not that of, guilt or innocence but the issue is whether [the child] comes within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Division of the Jackson County Probate Court. You should not consider this proceeding to be in anyway [sic] involved with the criminal law so far as your deliberations are concerned.
That instruction seems to have echoed the penultimate paragraph of the prosecutor’s closing argument:
You know, at the very minimum, this is certainly a case that the People believe by at least a preponderance of the evidence, shows to you that this child comes within the jurisdiction of the court and that’s what we’re asking. It’s not a criminal case. This case is not a criminal case. The father cannot go to jail as a result of the proceedings today here, and we would ask you to find that the minor . . . comes within the jurisdiction of the court so the court can keep an eye on her and the court can keep any [sic] eye on the father ....
The defendant then objected, and the court said that it would give an instruction concerning what the court does "as a result of your making a finding” and asked the prosecutor whether that would be sufficient, and the prosecutor said that it was.
The original petition filed by the dss was amended by the prosecutor when he entered the case. The amendment added the words, "for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification.” The additional language mirrors the penal code definition of sexual contact:
the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or the actor’s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. [MCL 750.520a(k); MSA 28.788(l)(k).]
In response to a question from one of the justices during oral argument in this Court, the prosecutor acknowledged that he had not alleged any other conditions that would have rendered the home unfit when he filed the proceeding.
During the trial, the prosecution did not go beyond the scope of the petition’s limited allegations either during the presentation of the case in chief or during the cross-examination of defense witnesses. Nor did Gates introduce or explore any other issues during his case in chief or on cross-examination of the people’s witnesses.
The majority asserts that because the jury learned that the mother had exclusive custody of the child,
[t]he jury might have concluded on that basis alone that the child did not require the protection of the probate court. Thus the jury’s verdict could rationally have been based on grounds other than a determination of the defendant’s innocence of the allegations in the petition. [Ante, p 160.]
Gates’ lawyer did not ask the jury to consider that the mother had exclusive custody of the child or Gates’ limited access to her in deciding whether the probate court had jurisdiction of her.
In Bowling, a father was charged with sexually assaulting his adopted daughter. A child-in-need-of-assistance petition was filed in circuit court. The petition was based on allegations of sexual abuse. A hearing was held to determine whether the daughter was a child in need of assistance. "The testimony at the hearing dealt almost exclusively with whether or not the alleged incidents of sexual misconduct actually occurred.” Id., p 399. The trial judge found that sexual abuse had not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The court dismissed the petition. Subsequently a criminal indictment was filed against the father. "The indictment was grounded on the identical factual allegations which formed the basis for the earlier . . . petition.” Id., p 400.
Id., p 404.
Sims, a welfare recipient, was notified by the Social Services Department of Sonoma County that she had received afdc and food stamp benefits to which she was not entitled. The county claimed that she "had faded to report that the children’s stepfather . . . was fully employed and living at home while respondent received public assistance . . . .” Id., p 473.
The county then prepared a "Notice of Action” against Sims. "The notice proposed to reduce future cash grants to respondent to compensate for the alleged overpayments.” Id. Sims filed a request for a "fair hearing” pursuant to a California statute "to challenge the propriety of the County’s action.” Id. Prior to Sims’ request for a fair hearing, "a criminal complaint had been filed against her in municipal court. The complaint was based on the same allegations of fraud that were the subject of the County’s 'Notice of Action.’ ” Id.
While the criminal prosecution was pending, Sims’ fair hearing was held. The hearing officer found that "the County had failed to meet its burden of proving that respondent had fraudulently obtained welfare benefits.” Sims later moved to dismiss the criminal charges pending against her. The trial court granted her motion. Id., p 474.
The county had declined to present evidence against Sims at the hearing. It contended that the dss lacked jurisdiction to hear the case since criminal charges were pending in the municipal court.
Id., p 479.
Similarly, see People v Watt, 115 Mich App 172, 182; 320 NW2d 333 (1982), where the Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar a criminal prosecution, and said:
Since the very essence of the criminal proceeding was based upon the allegation that defendant fraudulently misrepresented to the dss regarding whether or not her ex-husband resided with her in her home, and since, in an appropriate proceeding, the administrative law judge held that the dss had not established that fact ... we believe that the criminal conviction must here be reversed and the criminal proceedings dismissed.
Id., p 482.
Id., p 444.
Ante, p 158.
1 Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 27, comment h, p 258. See n 1 for § 27 of the Restatement Judgments, 2d.
The majority concedes that the question of Gates’ guilt or innocence was the factual focus of the probate proceeding such that it was "actually litigated.” Ante, p 156.-
Polasky, Collateral estoppel — Effects of prior litigation, 39 Iowa L R 217, 219 (1954).
Id., pp 219-220.
Ante, p 161.
The cases relied on by the majority are distinguishable:
In State v Fagan, 66 NY2d 815; 498 NYS2d 335; 489 NE2d 222 (1985), and State v Alvey, 67 Hawaii 49; 678 P2d 5 (1984), the courts refused to apply collateral estoppel in a subsequent criminal case to an issue that was previously decided in a civil proceeding. The courts found that the prosecution in the criminal cases did not have a fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier civil proceeding: "[T]he People’s incentive to litigate in a felony prosecution would presumably be stronger than in a parole revocation proceeding . . . .” Fagan, supra, p 816. "[T]he disciplinary committee’s investigative ability is limited.” Alvey, supra, p 56.
In this case, the majority acknowledges that the issues were fully litigated during the probate court proceeding. See ante, p 157.
In Thangavelu v Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 149 Mich App 546, 555; 386 NW2d 584 (1986), lv den 425 Mich 864 (1986), the Court of Appeals affirmed a decision denying collateral estoppel effect in a civil case of an issue that had previously been decided in a criminal case. The Court said that "acquittal of criminal charges does not necessarily bar an administrative revocation proceeding based on the same issues, since a lesser degree of proof is utilized in the latter when making findings of fact.” Thangavelu recognized that a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, where the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, does not foreclose the relitigation of the same issue in a civil proceeding where the lower preponderance of the evidence standard is applicable. In this case the sequence of cases is civil to criminal.
Ante, pp 163-164.
Ante, p 163.
See post, p 1204.
(A) General. On request of the court, the prosecuting attorney shall review the petition for legal sufficiency and shall appear at any child protective proceeding .... [MCR 5.914(A).]
[U]pon request of the department of social services . . ., the prosecuting attorney shall serve as a legal consultant to the department ... at all stages of the proceeding. [1988 PA 224, MCL 712A.17(5); MSA 27.3178(598.17)(5).]
If the prosecutor were to be called into a case by the court under MCR 5.914(A), but oppose the petition, then an argument might be *178made because the prosecutor’s interest would conflict with that of the petitioner. See 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments, § 532, p 686.
MCL 600.801; MSA 27A.801.
But see People v Sims, supra.
The Court of Appeals in People v Watt, n 12 supra, p 179, People v Grainger, 117 Mich App 740, 753-754; 324 NW2d 762 (1982), and in this case, People v Gates, 168 Mich App 384, 387-388; 423 NW2d 668 (1988), said that because an administrative agency and a county prosecutor’s office are "creatures of the same sovereign,” there is sufficient privity between the parties to establish the "same parties” requirement for collateral estoppel.
These cases rely on United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 320-321; 98 S Ct 1079; 55 L Ed 2d 303 (1978). Wheeler may not, however, be applicable because the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply unless there are two criminal prosecutions. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co v Adkins, 310 US 381, 403; 60 S Ct 907; 84 L Ed 1263 (1940), and State v Fritz, 204 Conn 156, 171-176; 527 A2d 1157 (1987).
Ante, p 164.
Green v United States, 355 US 184, 190; 78 S Ct 221; 2 L Ed 2d 199 (1957); Ashe v Swenson, supra, p 446.