(dissenting).
I would reverse the order granting summary judgement and for that reason, I respectfully dissent. I adopt the majority’s facts and standard of review, but I disagree with the analysis and would find as follows.
Section 38-77-170 of the South Carolina Code dictates the “conditions to sue or recover under uninsured motorist provision when owner or operator of motor vehicle causing injury or damage is unknown” and states:
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, there is no right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist provision, unless:
(1) the insured or someone in his behalf has reported the accident to some appropriate police authority within a reasonable time, under all the circumstances, after its occurrence;
(2) the injury or damage was caused by physical contact with the unknown vehicle, or the accident must have been witnessed by someone other than the owner or operator of the insured vehicle; provided however, the witness must *636sign an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts of the accident contained in the affidavit;
(3) the insured was not negligent in failing to determine the identity of the other vehicle and the driver of the other vehicle at the time of the accident.
The record fails to include any allegation that Bradley failed to comply with the first or third elements of the above statutory requirement. However, Doe claims Bradley failed to meet either of the two possible prongs set forth 'in the statute’s second requirement. I will address these requirements individually.
The first possible manner in which the second requirement could be met would be to offer proof that the unknown vehicle contacted the insured’s vehicle during the accident. Bradley does not allege any contact was made with another vehicle, but he noted in his affidavit that he believed he had made contact with the garbage bag prior to veering off the road. The trial court correctly applied South Carolina case law in finding that even if this contact had occurred, it would not constitute physical contact with the unknown vehicle as required by the statute. See Wynn v. Doe, 255 S.C. 509, 180 S.E.2d 95 (1971) (holding a motorcyclist’s contact with a very slick and dangerous chemical substance on the highway, such having been dumped or spilled there by an unknown vehicle, did not constitute physical contact with the unknown vehicle); See also Davis v. Doe, 285 S.C. 538, 331 S.E.2d 352 (1985) (holding a wheel bearing which had dislodged from an unknown vehicle and broken through the insured’s windshield did not constitute physical contact with the unknown vehicle).
The above noted Davis opinion, while noting the physical contact requirement was instituted to prevent fraudulent claims, invited the legislature to change this strict physical contact requirement should they find such a change to be “advisable.” 285 S.C. at 541, 331 S.E.2d at 354. Perhaps in response to this invitation, the legislature, in a 1987 amendment, added a second means by which an insured could satisfy the statutory requirements for recovery.4 See Wausau Un*637derwriters Insurance Company v. Howser, 309 S.C. 269, 275, 422 S.E.2d 106, 109 (1992). This second prong (Witness Prong) requires that a witness to the accident other than the owner/operator of the insured vehicle must attest in a signed affidavit to the facts of the accident.
While it is clear an item which has fallen from an unknown vehicle and struck an insured’s vehicle can not satisfy the physical contact element of the statutory requirement, I see no reason why it could not satisfy the Witness Prong. The wisdom behind not allowing the physical contact requirement to be satisfied by contact with something which has fallen off a vehicle is evident. A vehicle owner or operator who sought to defraud could easily refer to any item as having dislodged from an unknown vehicle and struck his vehicle while leaving the insurance company without a means to determine otherwise. However, I fail to see how an independent witness observing an item falling from a vehicle would not be permitted to satisfy the Witness Prong of the statutory requirement. I can discern no difference between a vehicle owner or operator who crashes in evasion of an item which has fallen off a vehicle and a vehicle owner or operator who crashes in evasion of the vehicle itself. Both situations result in an unknown vehicle causing bodily injury and/or property damage to the insured. In either instance, the same protection against fraud would apply in that a witness other than the vehicle owner or operator would have to submit an affidavit attesting to the events which caused the accident. Having established the applicability of the statute, I now seek to determine its satisfaction.
Doe urges this court to construe the statute strictly. He argues the statute’s language “the accident must have been witnessed” dictates that the affidavits of only those who have seen the accident itself are permitted. I find such a strict construction of the statute would undermine the statute’s purpose. In fact, our state Supreme Court has recognized ambiguities in § 38-77-170(2) and has urged a liberal con*638struction. Howser, 309 S.C. at 275, 422 S.E.2d at 110; Gilliland v. Doe, 357 S.C. 197, 201, 592 S.E.2d 626, 628 (2004).
I believe the intent of the language “the accident must have been witnessed” is to direct that the witness must have observed the factors leading to the accident. Someone other than the owner or operator of the insured vehicle simply-witnessing the accident without witnessing an unknown vehicle’s contribution can not logically be interpreted as entitling the owner or operator to an uninsured motorist claim. Both this court and the South Carolina Supreme Court have addressed the witnessing requirement accordingly.
In Shealy v. Doe, this court found that two men who had been thrown from the back of a swerving pick-up truck were not entitled to recover under the driver’s uninsured motorist policy. 370 S.C. 194, 634 S.E.2d 45 (2006). The affidavits submitted by these two men stated that the driver of the pickup truck told them> that he had swerved to avoid colliding with an unknown vehicle. Id. at 197, 634 S.E.2d at 46. This court held these affidavits “do not attest to facts they perceived, but merely restate the perceptions of the vehicle’s operator.” Id. at 200, 634 S.E.2d at 48. Additionally, this court stated that the affidavits were from two people who apparently did not witness the accident. Id. Clearly, these two men thrown from the truck witnessed the accident itself. In fact, there was no accident until they were thrown from the truck and landed on the roadway. Thus, this court was clearly construing “witnessing the accident” to mean “witnessing the events leading to the accident.”
In Gilliland v. Doe, Gilliland, after crashing into a tree and sustaining significant injuries, alleged she was run off the road by an unknown vehicle. 357 S.C. at 198, 592 S.E.2d at 627. No one other than Gilliland witnessed the unknown vehicle. Another driver, Gayle Norris, was waiting to enter the roadway when she observed Gilliland round a curve in the road and crash. Id. at 198-99, 592 S.E.2d at 627. Norris never saw a second vehicle, but did observe two sets of headlights, and observed the second set of headlights “arcing through a field” as if the second vehicle was making a u-turn and leaving the accident scene. Id.
*639The Gilliland court entertained an analysis of whether circumstantial evidence could be used to satisfy the independent witness requirement. If Norris’s witnessing the accident alone were enough, then the Court would not have performed an analysis to determine if circumstantial evidence was appropriate evidence to be used in documenting the events leading to the accident. Further, the Supreme Court agreed with this court’s earlier characterization of the § 38-77-170(2) requirement. Both courts found that the independent witness must “be able to attest to the circumstances surrounding the accident, i.e. what actions of the unknown driver contributed to the accident.” Id. at 201, 592 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting Gilliland v. Doe, 351 S.C. 497, 501-02, 570 S.E.2d 545, 548 (Ct.App.2002)). The Supreme Court found this analysis “constitutes a fair interpretation of the ambiguous fact requirement of § 38-77-170(2).” Gilliland, 357 S.C. at 201, 592 S.E.2d at 628.
I find the critical query in these matters is not whether an independent witness has observed the actual accident itself, but rather it is whether an independent witness has observed evidence of an unknown vehicle causing bodily injury or property damage to the insured. To find otherwise could create absurd results. One could reasonably foresee an independent witness who clearly observes an unknown vehicle create a hazard but be prevented from attesting to these facts because just prior to the accident he lost sight of the vehicles as they rounded a bend in the road. In situations where an independent witness observes evidence of an unknown vehicle’s contribution to the accident, I fail to see the necessity of observing the accident itself. This is especially true in light of the purpose of § 38-77-170(2). This statute was enacted to protect insured drivers from damages caused by unknown drivers while maintaining safeguards against fraudulent claims. Gilliland, 357 S.C. at 199, 592 S.E.2d at 627. Our Supreme Court has instructed that legislative intent must be construed only after reading each of the statutes contained in the same act together. Burns v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 520, 522, 377 S.E.2d 569, 570 (1989). This court has noted “the uninsured motorist legislation is remedial in nature, enacted for the benefit of injured persons, and is to be liberally construed so that the purpose intended may be accomplished.” Franklin v. Devore, 327 S.C. 418, 421, 489 *640S.E.2d 651, 658 (Ct.App.1997). Having established this interpretation of the witness requirement, I next endeavor to ascertain the propriety of using circumstantial evidence to establish the events leading to the accident.
While none of the affiants utilized by Bradley observed the actual accident itself, Bradley attempts to rely upon the circumstantial evidence created by their observations. As noted above, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in the Gilliland opinion, undertook an analysis of whether circumstantial evidence could be used to satisfy the independent witness requirement of § 38-77-170(2). The Court found “[t]he attending circumstances along with direct testimony may be taken into account by the jury in arriving at its decision as any fact in issue may be established by circumstantial evidence, if the circumstances, which must themselves be proven lead to the conclusion with reasonable certainty.” Gilliland, 357 S.C. at 202, 592 S.E.2d at 629 (emphasis added) (quoting Marks v. Indus. Life & Health Ins. Co., 212 S.C. 502, 505, 48 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1948)). The Court held that Norris’s statements regarding seeing two sets of headlights and what appeared to be an unknown vehicle making a u-turn were supportive of Gilliland’s testimony and contained circumstantial evidence which created “a question of fact as to causation for the jury.” Gilliland, 357 S.C. at 202, 592 S.E.2d at 629. The jury’s verdict in favor of Gilliland was reinstated. Id.
Lastly, I recognize temporal and spatial restrictions exist when seeking to utilize circumstantial evidence. One can reasonably foresee attempts to utilize circumstantial evidence which was gathered a significant amount of time or distance from the accident itself, and I note these instances must be addressed under the peculiar facts of each individual accident. In this matter, both Bosley and Bradley stated they left Waffle House shortly after 3 a.m. Bosley stated he drove approximately one-quarter of a mile, swerved to avoid a large trash bag in the road, and then observed a street sweeper truck drop a similar garbage bag onto the road about one-quarter of a mile from the first trash bag. Bradley stated he swerved to avoid the same first trash bag Bosley had seen and crashed his vehicle only minutes after Bosley had left the Waffle House. Shortly after the accident, at approximately 3:15 a.m., Lieutenant Colonel Douglas also observed the large *641trash bag in the road when he stopped to assist Bradley. All of these events took place over a maximum time period of less than fifteen minutes and the second trash bag was dropped approximately one-quarter of a mile from the accident. I find this evidence falls within temporal and spatial requirements.
The closeness in time between Bosley’s and Douglas’s observations of the trash bag on the road and the time of Bradley’s accident, and the closeness in time and proximity between the accident and Bosley’s observation of the street sweeper truck dropping a similar trash bag onto the roadway are relevant. These circumstances elevate the notion of an unknown driver contributing to Bradley’s accident from mere speculation to plausible circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, I find this circumstantial evidence is sufficient to create a question of fact for the jury as to the issue of causation. Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such evidence in the light most favorable to Bradley, I find sufficient circumstantial evidence exists to-warrant a trial in this matter.
. A subsequent 1989 amendment to § 38-77-170, instituted the requirement to prominently display on the face of the affidavit the specific language "A FALSE STATEMENT CONCERNING THE FACTS CON*637TAINED IN THIS AFFIDAVIT MAY SUBJECT THE PERSON MAKING THE FALSE STATEMENT TO CRIMINAL PENALTIES AS PROVIDED BY LAW.”