(concurring specially).
While I concur in the result reached, I believe the majority opinion neatly sidesteps and fails to answer a more important issue that will still be present on remand and needs to be addressed. The majority indicates that plaintiff does not challenge the validity of 761 Iowa Administrative Code 400.11. In its decree the trial court clearly adopted intervenor’s contention that this rule could be utilized to note a judgment lien on a car title. On appeal plaintiff urges that there is no authority for noting a judgment lien as a security interest in a motor vehicle. I believe that the majority’s failure to discuss this issue by inference approves this practice and suggests that sheriffs can continue to incorrectly note judgment liens on certificates of title as long as they comply with the procedures for a valid levy under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 260(a) or (b). I would hold that this rule cannot be utilized on a judgment lien unless it involves a security transaction.
*455Section 821.50 provides authority for the notation of a security interest and specifically refers to the Uniform Commercial Code, Iowa Code chapter 554, article 9. § 321.50(5). Article 9 applies to transactions intended to create a security interest, sales of account or chattel papers, and security interests created by contract. Iowa Code § 554.9102 (1987). Transactions specifically excluded from this article include “a right represented by a judgment (other than a judgment taken on a right to payment which was collateral).” Iowa Code § 554.9104(h) (1987). Thus, when the sheriff garnishes the treasurer, section 321.50 does not provide the treasurer with authority to note a security interest on a title eo-owned by a judgment debtor.
The trial court also relied upon the application of administrative rule 400.11 in its ruling. It is true that this rule permits a sheriffs levy to be noted as a security interest on a certificate of title. The concluding sentence in this rule states: “This rule is intended to implement Iowa Code section 321.50.” While an administrative rule is presumed valid, a rule must be consistent with legislative enactments. Fernandez v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs. 375 N.W.2d 701, 707 (Iowa 1985). Consequently, to be consistent with section 321.-50, rule 400.11 must only apply when the sheriff’s levy involves a judgment growing out of the enforcement of a security interest. This interpretation follows the rule-maker’s express language. Any other interpretation would invade the legislative fiat to first address these issues. The rule has no application to a judgment lien obtained in a tort action.
I therefore only concur in the result arrived at by the majority.