concurring specially.
Forfeiture proceedings are necessarily harsh. Although I suspect the legislature had good intentions in enacting criminal forfeiture proceedings, this case presents yet another example of how good intentions translate into government overreaching.
Basic rights continue to be eroded in the government’s fight to combat illegal drug use. While such a fight is laudable, the weapons used are sometimes intolerable and alien to a free society. GMAC, long a reputable presence in the business community, is now — like other financial institutions — saddled with the nontraditional burden of ascertaining whether a consumer is lawfully using vehicles, which GMAC simply finances. It is an unnecessarily harsh result, and I believe the legislature should revisit this statutory scheme.
Nevertheless, given the current law, I agree with the result reached by the majority. The dissent’s analysis hinges upon distinguishing a lien holder from a family member “owner” of a vehicle. But OCGA § 16-13-49 (e) (1) expressly applies to the owner of a property interest and to mere “interest holder[s].” In other words, the legislature has determined that a lien holder such as GMAC is subject to the same standard as an actual owner. “ ‘When a statute is plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, the court has no authority to place a different construction upon it but must construe it according to its terms.’”11 Given the plain language of the statute at issue, I am constrained to find that GMAC should be treated no differently than any other property owner, and thus I concur with the majority.
State v. Villella, 266 Ga. App. 499, 501 (597 SE2d 563) (2004).